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PHAËTHON

ALEXANDER H. KRAPPE

THERE IS NO NEED to outline, for the readers of this review, the story of Phaëthon, the son of Helios, whose rashness threatens to destroy the world by one tremendous conflagration, when he is hurled by Zeus from the solar chariot which he had had the presumption, though not the necessary experience, to drive across the vault of heaven. This story is known to all lovers of classical poetry, thanks chiefly to the magnificent art of Ovid.[1] What is less generally known is the important fact that this form of the story is neither the only nor even the oldest one.

In his *Theogony*,[2] Hesiod (if indeed he is the author of that work) briefly reports how Phaëthon, the son of Eos and Kephalos,[3] is kidnapped as a boy of tender age by Aphrodite, who appoints him keeper of her shrine. Pausanias (1. 3. 1) was familiar with this tradition: on the tiled roof of the hall where the Athenian archon held court, the traveller saw Hemera (who here has taken the place of Eos) carrying Kephalos, and he adds for the information of his readers that the son of Kephalos and Hemera was Phaëthon whom, according to Hesiod, Aphrodite kidnapped[4] and made the keeper of her shrine.[5]

Commenting on the myths attached to Eos, E. Rohde[6] conjectured that, in the original form of the story, Aphrodite seems to have kidnapped the boy to offer him more than a sexton's job, that she took him with her into some far-off paradise, very much like the fairy in the lay of *Lanval* of Marie de France.[7] This conjecture is borne out by the fact

1. *Met.* II. 1-400; Lucret. v. 396 ff.; cf. G. Knaack in Roscher's *Lexikon* III (2), col. 2187 ff.; A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, II (1925), 476. On the study of O. Gruppe, "Aithiopenmythen," *Philologus*, XLVII (1889), 92-107; 328-43, cf. A. Socin, *ibid.*, 575, and the writer's article, "Bene Elohim," *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, IX (1933), 157 ff.

2. Vv. 986-991; cf. C. Robert, *Hermes*, XVIII (1883), 434-41.

3. On Kephalos cf. U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Hermes*, XVIII, 423 ff.

4. This part of the sentence is missing in the text, but the context is perfectly clear; cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 416, n. 1.

5. As is well known, Euripides drew on this text to make Aphrodite the bride of Phaëthon, who objects to this match, perhaps for the same reason which makes the young Ferdinand v. Walther, in Schiller's *Kabale und Liebe*, recoil from the proposed match with Lady Milford. Cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 409 ff.

6. *Psyche* (Tübingen, 1925), pp. 74 f.; 135, n. 1.

7. Ed. Karl Warnke (Halle, 1925), pp. CXXX ff.; 186 ff.

that the δαίμων δῖος of Hesiod's text has generally been thought to be the planet Venus.[8]

The question arises: Is this Phaëthon identical with Ovid's hero, who is the son of Helios and a nymph? If it is recalled that Eos is the Dawn, Hemera the Day, and Helios the Sun, the question must obviously be answered in the affirmative: our hero is evidently the son of some personified celestial phenomenon, and the different readings specifying the latter are simply so many variants of one and the same myth. By the same token, this strengthens the conjecture of the ancients that he is himself the personification of some celestial phenomenon, e.g., the planet Venus. His name, Φαέθων, is a *nom parlant* connected with φάω[9] and probably refers to the bright splendor of the morning star, which has often attracted the attention of men and given rise, among others, to the beautiful Lutheran hymn of Philip Nicolai, *Wie schön leuchtet der Morgenstern,* derived from a verse of the Apocalypse of St. John (22:16).[10]

Such being the case, it is of course not admissible to separate, as Wilamowitz does,[11] from this Phaëthon, son of Eos or Hemera, the myth told of the son of Helios, the less so because the true meaning of that story is as yet unknown, though there is certainly no lack of more or less fanciful interpretations.[12] The fact that Hesiod knew both stories without recognising the identity of the hero[13] cannot alter this conclusion. Whatever may be thought of the vicissitudes leading up to the rash young man's ruin, one thing is certain: there existed not only a tradition of Phaëthon's apotheosis by the favor of Aphrodite, but also one of his fall. It is to this that we must now turn.

Many readers will recall a famous verse of the Book of Isaiah (14:12-

8. Wilamowitz, p. 421; Robert, p. 441; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (München, 1906), p. 811.

9. In the *Iliad* (XI. 735) φαέθων is an epithet of the sun: Εὖτε γὰρ ἠέλιος φαέθων ὑπερέσχεθε γαίης. Φαέθων is the Sun in the *Dionysiaca* of Nonnus of Panopolis; cf. H. J. Rose, *Revue de l'histoire des religions,* CV (1932), 98-101. It is also the name of one of the Sun's horses (Schol. Soph. *El.* 825).

10. In Syriac, the planet Venus is the "brilliant," the "sparkling" star *(kokab nuga).* The Hebrew *Helal* cannot be separated from the adjective *hillel* "bright, luminous." Cf. also M. Grünbaum, *Zeitschrift d. deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* XLII (1888), 45.

11. *Hermes,* XVIII, 426.

12. *Ibid.,* pp. 428 f.; Robert, *ibid.,* pp. 434 ff.; cf. also Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions,* IV (Paris, 1912), pp. 45 ff.

13. Wilamowitz, p. 427.

13): "How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer *(Helal)*[14], son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground, which didst weaken the nations! For thou hadst said in thine heart, I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God."

It is, of course, well known that the Lucifer referred to in the text is the Babylonian king Naboned, captured and dethroned by Cyrus (B.C. 538).[15] It is equally true, however, that the prophet did not invent the metaphor but drew on an ancient myth well known to the Semites and of which a number of variants has come down.[16]

Philo of Byblos,[17] drawing on the compilation of Sanchoniathon on the antiquities of Phoenicia, reports how the bull-headed Astarte, i.e., a lunar goddess, found a stone which had fallen from the sky (ἀεροπετῆ ἀστέρα). She picked it up and dedicated it at Tyre on the "holy island." This mysterious ἀεροπετὴς ἀστήρ is evidently an aerolith, for we know that antiquity regarded meteors as fallen stars.[18] Whatever may be thought of the historical value of the fragments of Sanchoniathon—it is admittedly slight—it is clear that our text presupposes the existence at Tyre of some such stone, the object of a cult, connected with the worship of the moon goddess Astarte, a stone very much like that of the Ka'aba of Mecca. In the great temple of Byblos, Astarte, as late as Roman times, had no image or idol but a conical stone, which appears on the coins of the emperor Marcrinus (A.D. 217-218) with the legend ΙΕΡΟΣ ΒΙΒΛΟΥ.[19]

Philo's text, it is true, does not identify the stone with the goddess; it

14. In some manner as yet undetermined the Semitic word, in the form *Hainal*, seems to have reached the Slovaks; witness the song:

Hainal switá, giž den bielý
Stawagte welky i maly
Dosti sme giž dlúho spali.

"Hainal begins to shine; already the day is dawning; arise, adults and children; we have slept long enough." "Hainal" songs, in the Slovak language, are morning songs. Cf. I. J. Hanusch, *Die Wissenschaft des slavischen Mythus* (Lemberg, 1842), p. 371.

15. D. B. Duhm, *Das Buch Jesaia* (Göttingen, 1892), p. 94.

16. Cf. R. de Vaux, *Revue biblique*, XLVI (1937), pp. 546 f.

17. Ed. Orelli, p. 36; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* I. 10. 21; cf. F. Lenormant, *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, III (1881), 44.

18. On the cult of aeroliths cf. Gruppe, *op. cit.*, p. 773, n. 1-2; G. F. Moore, *American Journal of Archaeology*, II (7) [1903], 82; Lenormant, *op. cit.*, pp. 40 ff.; cf. also F. W. Hasluck, *Annual of the British School at Athens*, XXI (1914-16), 62-83.

19. P. M-J. Lagrange, *Etudes sur les religions sémitiques* (Paris, 1903), p. 188; Lenormant, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

merely states that the goddess found the stone and established its cult. There is, however, a myth preserved by Callimachus,[20] according to which Asteria, a sister of Leto and a daughter of Koios and Phoibe, flees from the embraces of Zeus by a bold leap through the atmosphere, like a shooting star, into the sea, where she is transformed into the rocky island of Delos. According to Hyginus (*fab.* 53) she was transformed by Zeus into a quail and precipitated into the sea, where she became an island known as Ortygia (i.e., Quail Island), which subsequently received the name of Delos.[21] In a third tradition, Asteria herself requested the transformation, but when she was about to swim across the sea in the shape of a quail, Zeus transformed her into a rock, which subsequently became the island of Delos.[22] Since, as daughter of Koios and Phoibe and grand-daughter of Ouranos, Asteria is clearly some celestial phenomenon, most mythologists have not been slow to see in her the personification of a meteorite falling from the sky and disappearing into the sea.[23] Such a view is in perfect accord with the text of Sanchioniathon, except that, in the Hellenic tradition, the goddess not merely finds the aerolith but is identical with it.

Nor are such traditions lacking on the Anatolian table land. There the great mother goddess (Kybele) was worshiped in the form of a cubical stone, which was ultimately taken to Rome. That it was known to have been a meteorite may be inferred from the queer etymology of *Pessinus*, the name of the cult place, which was derived from the verb πεσεῖν, "fall."[24] We thus consistently meet with two identifications of the goddess, viz., (1) with an aerolith and (2) with the morning star, one of the two aspects of the planet Venus. Let us now look for further data on these two facts, in the hope of being able to reconcile them.

Many scholars are probably inclined to question the value of late sources such as the texts of Callimachus, Hyginus, and the Vergil commentator Servius, although the story of Asteria was already known to

20. *Hymn. in Del.* 36 ff.; cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenistische Dichtung in der Zeit des Kallimachos* (Berlin, 1924), II, 65.

21. Apollod. I. 4. 1; schol. Ap. Rhod. I. 308, 419; Tzetzes ad Lyc. 401; Lact. Plac. in Stat. *Theb.* IV. 795; *Script. rer. myth. Lat.* (ed. G. H. Bode), I, pp. 13, 79 f.

22. Serv. ad Verg. *Aen.* III. 73.

23. Cf. Schirmer in Roscher's *Lexikon*, I (1), col. 656.

24. Herodianus, I. 11. 1; Amm. Marc., XXII. 9; cf. Lenormant, p. 41. Cf. also W. F. Albright, *Archiv f. Orientforschung*, V (1928-29), pp. 231-33.

Pindar.[25] Their testimony is however confirmed from an unexpected quarter.

At Aphaca, in Lebanon, at the annual feast of the goddess, Astarte appeared in the form of a fiery meteorite, which descended from the top of the mountain to plunge into the river.[26] Furthermore, the Nabataeans worshiped a female deity, a form of the great Semitic mother goddess, Al-Lât, called Χααβοῦ by St. Epiphanius,[27] and generally identified with Aphrodite Ourania, the Syrian Atargatis, who was regarded sometimes as the planet Venus,[28] sometimes as the moon.[29] Now the emblem of this goddess (or of her son) was no figure or idol but a black stone, on which the pre-Islamic Arabs offered sacrifice. This stone is generally thought to have been an aerolith.[30] At all events, Al-Lât (and her sister Al-'Ozza) were generally supposed to dwell in stones,[31] which were worshiped accordingly. Here only a few examples can be given.

In the classical account of the battle of Ohod, Abu Sofiân is described carrying Al-Lât and Al-'Ozza.[32] The pre-Islamic annals of Ṭâif show the presence of Al-Lât at one of the battles of the war of Al-Fidjâr. The holy stone impersonating the goddess was set up under a tent (*qobba*), which served as asylum for the fugitives from the battle.[33] The stone of Al-Lât at Ṭâif, the seat of the great goddess, is still in situ: a natural block forming a dense mass.[34] As is well known, the black aerolith of the Ka'aba of Mecca is pre-Islamic and was sacred to Al-Lât, the predecessor

25. Paean VII b; cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), p. 328.

26. Sozomen, *Hist. eccles.* II. 4. 5.

27. J. H. Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift d. deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXIX (1875), 99-106; cf. also R. Dussaud, *Notes de mythologie syrienne* (Paris, 1903), pp. 174 ff.; Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 188, n. 3.

28. Dussaud, *Les Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam* (Paris, 1907), p. 131; D. Nielson, *Zeitschrift d. deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, LXVI (1912), 469-472; S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar* (Oxford, 1914), p. 171.

29. F. W. A. Baethgen, *Beiträge zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin, 1888), p. 101.

30. Max. Tyr., 38; Suidas, s. v. Θευσάρης; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums* (Berlin, 1897), p. 49; Lagrange, p. 189.

31. On stones as the seat or "house" of the deity, cf. Sir J. G. Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament* (London, 1918), II, 59, 76; Lenormant, p. 40.

32. Tabari, *Annals*, I, 1395. 3; *Agh.* XIV. 15. 5; 21. This feature is taken from the recension of Ibn Ishaq, a very ancient source.

33. *Agh.* XIX. 79 f.; cf. Lenormant, pp. 36 f.; H. Lammens, *Bull. Inst. Franç. d'Archéologie Orientale du Caire*, XVII (1920), 42.

34. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* (London, 1903), p. 299.

of Allah.[35] At Paphos, in Cyprus, Aphrodite-Astarte was worshiped in the form of a conical stone.[36] We thus find among Semitic peoples a fair equivalent of the Hellenic tradition of Asteria: the heavenly goddess manifests herself in the form of a meteorite or shooting star and is worshiped in the form of an aerolith or other stone presumed, rightly or wrongly, to be of cosmic origin.

We are led to enquire into the reason for a cosmic deity, whether she be the moon or the planet Venus, being thought to dwell in a stone. Ethnology may help to answer this question. In Melanesia the lunar power is closely associated with sacred stones.[37] Thus in Torres Straits, in the island of Erub, the moon is represented by two sacred stones, the one circular, the other crescent-shaped.[38] In Celebes the Alfurs relate that a holy stone of theirs represents the moon god, who is the creator of the universe, that this stone is the symbol of immortality because, like the moon, it endures for ever and is not subject to decay and corruption.[39] Among the Ekoi the moon cannot be evoked by her priestesses without the setting up of sacred stones.[40] Similarly, in Mexico the sanctity of the monolith of Tlalnepautna was accounted for by the belief that the moon god Quetzalcoatl had left on it the imprint of his hand.[41] Returning to the Near East, we find the stone of Hubal, the Arabic moon god,[42] mentioned by Antoninus Martyr.[43] To the same class belongs also the stone located in the town of Qodaïd, between Mecca and Medina, which was sacred to the moon goddess Monât, the Arabic Fortuna.[44]

The reason behind this association of stones with the heavenly bodies

35. The very word *ka'aba* is apparently connected with χααβοῦ and refers to the virgin goddess Al-Lât; cf. Wellhausen, *op. cit.*, p. 50; Lagrange, pp. 188 f.; E. Blochet, *Revue de Linguistique*, XXXV (1902), 5 ff.; R. Eisler, *Philologus*, LXVIII (1909), 121 ff.

36. Tac. *Hist.* II. 3; Max. Tyr. *diss.* VIII. 8; cf. F. Cumont, *Les religions orientales* (Paris, 1909), p. 173.

37. R. Briffault, *The Mothers* (London, 1927), II, 692 f.

38. A. C. Haddon, *Folk-Lore*, I (1890) 185 f.

39. A. C. Kruijt, *Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap*, XXXVIII (1894), 340.

40. P. A. Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush* (London, 1912), p. 101.

41. A. Lefèvre, *Revue des Traditions populaires*, IV (1889), 559; F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion* (London, 1908), p. 142.

42. Eisler, *Philologus*, LXVIII, 131 f.; F. Hommel, *Ethnologie und Geographie des Alten Orients*, II (München, 1926), p. 718.

43. *Itiner.* 38; cf. Lenormant, p. 38.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

must, presumably, be sought in the idea that aeroliths originate on the surface of the moon,[45] or of some star such as the planet Venus, that they are therefore representatives on earth of these heavenly bodies and the divinities they represent.

We have noted above that the Arabic Aphrodite is sometimes regarded as the planet Venus, sometimes as the moon. The same curious fluctuation recurs in the case of the Phoenician Astarte, described as bull-headed by Sanchoniathon (the horns of the animal being likened to the horns of the moon).[46] A like fluctuation has been noted for the Egyptian Isis, who appears to have started her divine career as the goddess of the morning star and one of the spouses of the moon god Osiris,[47] to develop subsequently into a lunar divinity, taking the place of the older Hathor. Much the same evolution was pointed out for the Babylonian Ishtar.[48] On these analogies it would seem probable that Al-Lât and her Syrian equivalents, too, were originally the planet Venus. What is certain is that, among the eastern tribes of Arabia, that heavenly body did receive such worship under the name of Al-'Ozza.[49] This is all the more likely to have been the case because the ancient Semitic moon god, Sin, was definitely a male divinity. But the question arises: When the great goddess assumed a lunar aspect, what happened to the planet Venus?

As is well known, the planet Venus appears sometimes as morning star immediately before sunrise, and sometimes as evening star at sunset. It is equally known that prior to the rise of scientific astronomy these two manifestations of the star were thought to represent two separate stars known by two different names (*Heosphoros* and *Hesperos* in Greek). Similarly the Babylonians distinguished between *Anunit* or *Dilbat*,[50] the morning star, and *Belit Ilani* or *Zib*, the evening star.[51]

45. Cf. G. Flaubert, *Salammbô*, c. 7: ". . . une pierre ronde, obscure, et qui paraissait être lourde. Les gens d'un esprit supérieur, seuls, honoraient ces abaddirs, *tombés de la lune*. Par leur chute, ils signifiaient les astres, le ciel, le feu; par leur couleur la nuit ténébreuse, et par leur densité, la cohésion des choses terrestres."

46. E. Hahn, *Demeter und Baubo* (Lübeck [1896]), p. 26; *Die Entstehung der Pflugkultur* (Heidelberg, 1909), pp. 68 f.

47. Briffault, *op. cit.*, III, 82, 171.

48. Langdon, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

49. Robertson Smith, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (London, 1923), p. 57, n.

50. Hesychius, s. v. Δελεφατ, declares that this is the Chaldean name of the star Aphrodite, the planet Venus.

51. W. Jensen, *Die Kosmologie der Babylonier* (Strassburg, 1890), pp. 117 f.; E. Schrader, *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament* (Berlin, 1903), pp. 423-26.

Subsequently, when the identity of the two was realised (ca. B.C. 2000) these names quite naturally became mere epithets of the great goddess.

Before this happened, the two aspects of Venus had been credited with quite different characteristics. The evening star was imagined to be the goddess of love, she who awakened the mutual attraction of the sexes, for sufficiently obvious reasons.[52] Thus the Ishtar of Erech is the exact equivalent of Aphrodite Ourania, the goddess of sensual love, the very one whom Lucretius and, after him, Voltaire praised in immortal verses; she is the goddess of the evening star. The morning star, on the other hand, was thought to be cold and cruel, disdainful of the tender passion and preferring war and battles.[53] Its representative was the Ishtar of Akkad, the masculine Ishtar (*zikarat*). The reason for this is no less obvious: the morning star presided over the rising of soldiers in camp.

In this way arose the notion of an Ishtar, goddess of love, and an Ishtar, goddess of war. Dilbet, the planet Venus, is male in the morning, female in the evening.[54] This probably accounts also for the curious fluctuation in the sex of the planetary deity, female among the northern Semites, male among the Semites of the South.[55]

At all events, whenever the great goddess assumes a lunar aspect, the morning star (and sometimes both morning and evening star) is male: he is her son. St. Epiphanius implies that the great goddess was worshiped also at Elusa, and St. Jerome, in his life of St. Hilarion, knows a temple of a goddess whom he calls Venus, and whom he declares to have been worshiped *ob Luciferum*, i.e., because of her connection with the morning star. In the Arabic poets, too, the morning star is masculine, and it is this male divinity whom the pagan Arabs, according to the *Life of St. Nilus*, honored with sacrifices in the short interval between the rise of the morning star and that of the sun.[56]

52. On the role of the evening star in erotic poetry, especially in epithalamia, cf. Pauly-Wissowa, R.-E. XV, col. 1254; Bächtold-Stäubli, *Handwörterbuch d. deutschen Aberglaubens*, I, col. 59 ff.

53. A. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur* (Berlin-Leipzig, 1929), pp. 170, 336, n. 4; cf. also V. Bérard, *Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée* (Paris, 1927), II, 361.

54. *Ibid.*

55. Nielson, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

56. Robertson Smith, *Lectures*, p. 57, n.; *Nili opera quaedam* (Paris, 1639), pp. 28, 117.

In Syria, but also in Southern Arabia,[57] the name of the divinity is Aziz, a name which is a good equivalent of the Latin *ferox*, and it is natural that the Greeks and Romans identified him with their Ares and Mars respectively.[58] The root *ʿ.z.z* is common to all Semitic languages: it denotes moral and material strength, virility of heart and body. Even now *Aziz* is one of the common epithets applied to Allah. We have already referred to the Lutheran hymn of Philip Nicolai in which the Founder of Christianity is likened to the morning star.[59]

We have shown above that there is a perfect analogy between the Hellenic Asteria, precipitated into the sea in the form of a meteorite, and the Semitic Aphrodite, worshiped in the form of aeroliths. The Isaiah verse proves that a similar myth was attached to at least one male form of the planet Venus, the morning star Helal. We now enquire whether a similar tradition was current also about Aziz, which would at once permit us to consider Helal and Aziz as one and the same mythical figure. Our suspicion is indeed fully confirmed; we know far more about Aziz than we do about Helal and shall now endeavor to set forth the important role he plays in Semitic mythology.

It is the commentators on the sixth chapter of Genesis who furnish an unexpected clue. In that chapter, it will be recalled, the "Sons of God" (*Bʾne Elohim*) are described courting and marrying the daughters of men. The commentators are virtually agreed on the point that these "Sons of God" are two in number.[60] According to Rashi, they are seduced by Naʾamah, the sister of the smith Tubalqaïn.[61] R. Joseph reports their names as Schemchasai and Azaël; the girl they fall in love with is Ishar.[62] In the *Bereshith Rabba* of R. Moses Ha-darshan the two angels fall victims to the wiles of the fair Aschiro.[63] The number two recurs in Islamic

57. Hommel, *op. cit.*, I (1904), pp. 123, 143; II (1926), p. 719.

58. H. Steuding, Roscher's *Lexikon*, I (1), col. 743; J. Rendel Harris, *The Dioscuri in the Christian Legends* (London, 1903), p. 64; *The Cult of the Heavenly Twins* (Cambridge, 1906), p. 106; H. Brunnhofer, *Arische Urzeit* (Bern, 1910), pp. 79, 411.

59. Philipp Wackernagel, *Das deutsche Kirchenlied* (Leipzig, 1864-77), V, 258.

60. Cf. the writer's study, "Bene Elohim," in *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, IX, 157-72, especially pp. 159 f.

61. Joma 67 b; cf. Max Grünbaum, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Sprach- und Sagenkunde* (Berlin, 1901), p. 59.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 61. The goddess called *Ishar* and *Ashiro* is, of course, *Aširat*, the Biblical *Ašerah*, on which cf. Albright, *American Journal of Semitic Lang. and Lit.*, XLI (1924-25), p. 99; H. Baur, *Z.A.T.W.*, LI (1933), pp. 89 f.

tradition, where the two angels are named Harût and Marût, while the girl bears the name of Anahid, who is none other than the Iranian moon goddess Anâhita or Anaitis.[64] In one Arabic text she is called by the name of Bêdûḫt, "daughter of God," from **bagaduḫta*.[65] The ultimate source of these commentaries and their Islamic derivatives seems to be the Book of Enoch (6-15), where the angels Semjaza and Azaël, or Azâzel, are the chief rebel angels.[66] In the work of the Persian Mirhoud three angels are mentioned, one of whom, however, promptly returns to heaven after becoming aware of the danger he is running; the other two fall into sin and are now known as Harût and Marût.[67]

In this myth the great goddess who seduces the two angels is, to all appearances, the moon. At the same time, her former character as the planet Venus had not completely fallen into oblivion. This fact explains the reading of several Arabic texts according to which Az-Zuhra (the Arabic name for the planet Venus) is sent to earth by Allah to seduce the two "Sons of God" guilty of a rash boast (ὕβρις).[68] Mohammed is said to have exclaimed, whenever he beheld the Venus in the evening sky: "May God curse Zohara who seduced the two angels!"[69] There can be little doubt about the reason for this animosity: the pre-Islamic Venus cult of the Arabs.

The *B'ne Elohim,* the "Sons of God," are not peculiarly Hebrew or even Semitic; they recur in the Mythology of at least one people of I.-E. speech, the Balts, among whom Wilhelm Mannhardt, in the last century, found certain mythical songs relating the wedding of the "Sons of God" with the "Daughter of the Sun" *(Saules Mita),* or the "Daughter of God" *(Devo Duktele).*[70] These "Sons of God" are the Baltic Dioscuri, the equivalents of the Vedic Açvins, the Achaean Tyndaridae, and a vast number of other divine twin couples worshiped among the

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 61 f.; E. Littmann, *Festschrift Carl Andreas dargebracht* (Leipzig, 1916), pp. 70-87.

65. F. C. Andreas in J. Scheftelowitz, *Zeitschrift d. deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* LVII (1903), p. 170.

66. Grünbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

67. Littmann, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

69. Grünbaum, *Zeitschrift d. deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft,* XLII, 48.

70. W. Mannhardt, *Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie,* VII (1875), 73-104; 209-44; 281-330.

most diverse peoples. The conclusion has therefore been drawn that the *B'ne Elohim* are the Semitic Dioscuri.[71]

One of the cult centers (perhaps the most important one) of these Semitic Dioscuri was the city of Edessa, where two gigantic columns had been erected in their honor.[72] Since the chief divinity of Edessa is known to have been the Sun (Shemesh), and since the coins of the city generally show a star or even two, Rendel Harris inferred that the Heavenly Twins of Edessa represented the planet Venus in its two manifestations as morning and evening star, very much as they did among the Greeks, the Germans, and the Balts.[73]

The Dioscuri of Edessa were known as *'Alim*, "youths," a name which has cognates in Hebrew and Assyrian.[74] It is difficult to separate them from the Gods Gracious and Fair of the Ras-Shamra texts recounting their birth,[75] where they are addressed as "princes," i.e., the Semitic equivalent of the Greek ἄναχες, while on the other hand there seems to be some connection between the titles of "gracious" and "fair" given to these ancient North Semitic gods and the σωτῆρες ἐσθλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ πρόσταται, "goodly saviors and champions fair"[76] and τὸ Ζηνὸς καὶ Λήδας κάλλιστα σωτῆρες "offspring of Zeus and Leda, saviors most fair."[77] The gods of Edessa, however, also had individual names, transmitted to us in several ancient texts, the best known of which is, probably, a passage in one of the Emperor Julian's *Orations*.[78] These names are *Monim* and *Aziz*.

The name *Monim* is still awaiting an explanation that will find general approval among Semitic scholars.[79] The most likely of the etymologies proposed is that of F. Hommel, who connected the word with

71. James Darmesteter, "Cabires, Bene Elohim et Dioscures," *Mémoires de la Société de Linguistique de Paris*, IV (1881), 89-95, and my article "Bene Elohim," cited above.

72. Harris, *The Dioscuri*, pp. 29 f.; *Cult*, pp. 106 ff.

73. Cf. the writer's book, *Mythologie Universelle* (Paris, 1930), pp. 91 f.

74. Harris, *The Dioscuri*, pp. 111 f.; Schrader, *op. cit.*, p. 363, n. 7.

75. Ch. Virolleaud, *Syria*, XIV (1933), pp. 128-51.

76. Aelian, *var. hist.* I. 30.

77. Dion. Hal., *de compos. verb.*, c. 17. For these *rapprochements* I am indebted to my friend, Dr. Theodor H. Gaster. On the Ras-Shamra texts cf. also Montgomery and Harris, *The Ras-Shamra Mythological Texts* (Philadelphia, 1935) pp. 75-77 and an excellent bibliography; further: Th. H. Gaster, *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni*, X (1934), pp. 156-64.

78. *Orat.* IV, p. 195 (ed. Spanheim).

79. Drexler, in Roscher's *Lexikon*, II (2), col. 3202.

Arabic *mun'im,* "beneficent," which would form a striking contrast to *aziz* and be an appropriate name for the evening star, particularly in the desert climate of the Near East.

Here again, the gods of the Ras-Shamra texts corroborate our deductions. They, too, have individual names, *Shaḥru* and *Shalmu,* "Dawn and Sunset," and are identified with the morning and evening star.[80] While they are not twins in the strict sense of the word—they have the same father but different mothers, the goddesses Asherat and Anat; yet their virtually simultaneous conception and birth, their common name, their celestial function, and, most important of all, the invitation extended to them to partake of food and drink and which recalls the theoxenia of the Hellenic Dioscuri[81] make it virtually certain that they, too, were a pair of "heavenly twins."

As for *Aziz,* a name known also at Palmyra, at Carthage, and in South Arabia, he is, of course , identical with one of the *B'ne Elohim* of the commentaries reviewed above, where he appears as *Azâzel* or *Azaël.*

As is well known, Aziz and his twin brother were duly punished for their injudicious love affair, being thrust out of heaven and, in the Islamic tradition, suspended, head downward, in a pit or well.[82] According to the Book of Enoch, Azâzel, the chief of the rebellious angels, is banished to the rocks of Beyt Khadudah near Jerusalem.[83] Aziz, like Helal, is therefore a fallen angel, the morning star (as his name alone would indicate), precipated from on high, the only difference being that Helal fell as a result of overweening pride, while the downfall of Aziz was the consequence of a more gentle sin, luxury.[84] At all events, Semitic mythology was quite familiar with the story of the fall of the morning star, whether god or goddess.

Reverting now to the starting point of this inquiry, we find that (1) in Greece, Phaëthon, the morning star, is precipitated from his chariot and comes to a grievous end, and (2) among the Semites Helal or Aziz, again the morning star, is thrust out of heaven and excluded forever from that world of bliss. Again, both in Greece and in the Semitic

80. Virolleaud, *loc. cit.*

81. Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions,* II (1906), pp. 42-57.

82. Littmann, pp. 79, 81.

83. C. Autran, *Mithra, Zoroastre et la préhistoire aryenne du christianisme* (Paris, 1935), p. 211: cf. Littmann, p. 83.

84. The element of presumptuous pride (ὕβρις) is, however, not altogether absent from certain Arabic versions of the *B'ne Elohim* story; cf. Littmann, pp. 78, 80.

countries, the goddess personifying the planet Venus was fabled to have fallen into the sea in the form of a meteorite, which has generally become the object of a cult. Few will maintain after this that we are dealing with an independent and spontaneous development of myths.

Nor is this all. In the Hesiodic tradition Aphrodite is said to have kidnapped Phaëthon. But, in the Hebrew commentaries and in the Islamic texts reviewed above, the "Sons of God" are seduced by the fair Na'ameh, by Ishar-Ashiro, by Anahid, Bêdûḫt, or Az-Zuhra. Of these figures Ishar-Ashiro has long since been recognized as a form of the Babylonian Ishtar.[85] Anahid, we have seen above, is the Persian moon goddess, Anâhita or Anaïtis. Bêdûḫt < *Bagaduḫta is the Iranian equivalent of the Lettish *Devo Duktele,* courted by the Heavenly Twins of the Balts. *Az-Zuhra* is the Arabic name of the planet Venus considered as a female deity. As for Na'ameh, her close relations with Tubalqaïn, the smith, who is her brother, show sufficiently that she is the Hebrew equivalent of Aphrodite, the wife of Hephaestus.[86] We are thus led to conclude that the kidnapping of Phaëthon by Aphrodite has its Semitic analogue in the seduction of Aziz by the Semitic Aphrodite or her Persian successor.

We now approach the question of the priority of the Hellenic or the Semitic myth. The absolute chronology will help us little; the Hebrew commentaries of Genesis and their Islamic derivatives are much later than Hesiod. It is clear, however, that the myth they report far antedates the establishment of Jewish monotheism. Apart from this, the Semitic tradition presents a logical narrative, well thought out from beginning to end, whereas the Hellenic tradition as reproduced by Hesiod, at best furnishes *disiecta membra* whose real meaning and import can be discerned only with the help of the Semitic story. That the later Greeks had completely forgotten the original myth (if they had ever known it in a complete form) may be inferred from the fact that they tried to explain Phaëthon's fall by a completely different story, that is, the tale of how he tried to drive the solar chariot and failed.[87] At all events, the

85. Grünbaum, *Gesammelte Aufsätze,* p. 64.

86. The striking resemblance between Tubalqaïn and Hephaestus did not escape the attention of Philip Buttmann, more than a century ago: cf. his *Mythologus* (Berlin, 1828-29), I, 164 f.

87. This story is fairly wide-spread, being known (with certain modifications) to the Indians of British Columbia and to the natives of Fiji and Samoa; cf. Frazer, *Apollodorus, The Library* (London, 1921), I, 388 ff.; Stith Thompson, *Tales of the*

original Phaëthon myth must be considered as one of the numerous instances of Hesiod's use of eastern material.

How is this myth of the "fall" of the morning star to be explained? I am inclined to believe that it has two roots. In the first place, the morning star was known periodically to disappear from the sky (for it was, of course, not known that it reappeared as evening star). Thus the story of his "fall" furnished an explanation for this disappearance. In the second place, meteorites were believed to represent the star here on earth, after it had fallen from the sky, for which reason such stones were sacred to the stellar deity and received offerings and sacrifices from his or her worshipers.

This brings us back to the female form of the planet Venus, Astarte-Asteria. Let us note at once that the ancients were perfectly aware of the identity of the two goddesses. Thus Cicero,[88] drawing on some Alexandrian source, states: "Quartus Hercules est Jovis et Asteriae, Latonae sororis, filius, qui Tyri maxime colitur." The god here referred to as Jupiter is probably the Phoenician Hadad, while Asteria is Astarte, the great Semitic mother goddess. The same reading is found in a passage of Athenaeus taken from the geographer Eudoxus of Cnidus, who refers to the Phoenician Heracles as the son of Asteria and Zeus.[89]

Furthermore, as we have seen above, Asteria was precipitated into the sea in the form of a quail, whence the name *Ortygia* given the island which was later known as Delos.[90] Asteria shares this peculiar relation to the quail with her sister Leto and the latter's daughter, Artemis.[91] On the other hand, the bird plays an important role in the earthly career of the son of Asteria-Astarte, the Tyrian Heracles. To quote once more the geographer Eudoxus as excerpted by Athenaeus:[92]

the Phoenicians sacrifice quails to Heracles, because Heracles, the son of Asteria and Zeus, when on his way towards Libya, was slain by Typhon and

North American Indians (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), p. 291, n. 66; L. Fison, *Tales from Old Fiji* (London, 1904), pp. 33 ff; O. Sierich, *Archives internationales d'Ethnographie*, 1902, p. 170.

88. *De nat. deor.* III. 16.

89. Athen. IX, 47.

90. On the frequent occurrence of this name in Hellenic toponymy, cf. Stark, *Berichte über die Verhandlungen d. kgl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft d. Wissensch. zu Leipzig, phil.-hist. Cl.*, VIII (1856) 61 ff.

91. *Ibid.*, pp. 69 ff.

92. *Loc. cit.*; cf. Stark, *op. cit.*, pp. 33 ff.

restored to life by Jolaus, who brought a quail to him and put it on his nose, and the smell revived him. For when he was alive he was, says Eudoxus, very partial to that bird.

Thus we find the quail closely connected with (1) the Greek Asteria and her family and (2) the Phoenician Heracles, who is expressly stated to have been a son of this very Asteria-Astarte. Since these coincidences are not likely to be independent developments, it would seem logical to infer the existence of definite Semitic cultural currents affecting Greece in the period immediately preceding the rise of the Hesiodic type of poetry.

THE ORIGIN OF TESTIMONIA BIBLICA IN EARLY CHRISTIAN LITERATURE

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HARDLY ANY OTHER of the pseudepigrapha has been so contradictorily estimated as has been the Epistle of Barnabas. Although nearly three quarters of a century ago the Jewish origin of the author and the material of the writing was proved,[1] the author himself was recently characterized as a pagan,[2] and his alleged insufficent knowledge of the Jewish cult stressed.[3] But research has unmistakably shown the Jewish origin of Barnabas,[4] who betrays a pro found knowledge of the Jewish rites and of the Hellenistic-Jewish method of allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament, which could be expected only from a Jewish Christian. It must be especially noted that the author does not draw his proofs from Jesus' teachings or from the New Testament, but from the Old Testament. In this he represents a special type of Jewish-Christian[5] who thinks too highly of his native religion to allow any aggression against it, because it would have been unbearable to him to have once adhered to something not perfect. Therefore, he opposes neither the sacred books of the Jews nor Judaism, but the only Jews themselves. This approach, judged from the religio-psychological point of view, characterizes a convert's attitude towards his native religion based upon self-hate.[6]

1. M. Guedemann, *Religionsgeschichtliche Studien,* (1876), whose results were accepted by *Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon,* I (1882), 2028; *The Jewish Encyclopedia,* II (1902), 538; and by Muilenburg (see note 4).

2. *Dictionnaire de la Bible,* I (1926), 1465; H. Windisch, *Der Barnabasbrief,* (1920), 413.

3. *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart,* I (1927), 767; *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia,* II (1940), 86.

4. James Muilenburg, *The Literary Relations of the Epistle of Barnabas and the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles,* (Yale University Disseration, 1929), 109 f.; Hans Lietzmann, *The Beginnings of the Christian Church,* (1937), 289 ff.; Floyd V. Filson, *Pioneers of the Primitive Church,* (1940), 83 ff.

5. Cf. A. Harnack, *Judentum und Judenchristentum in Justins Dialog mit Trypho,* (*Texte und Untersuchungen,* XXXIX, 81 f.) concerning the classification of Jewish-Christians.

6. Cf. Kurt Lewin, "Self-Hatred among Jews," *Contemporary Jewish Record,* IV (1941), 219 ff.

Hans Windisch,[7] in analysing the composition of Barnabas, described the epistle's *Testimonienstoff* as "a collection of passages from the OT . . . which were arranged objectively and perhaps already furnished with short introductions and titles indicating the topic, but scarcely already provided with interpretations." James Muilenburg rejected Windisch's assumption in an illuminating literary analysis of the Epistle,[8] but Rendel Harris[9] definitely proved the existence of testimonies used in the early Church. Certain biblical testimonies of Barnabas enable us to solve the problem of the utilization of already existing combinations of OT passages.

Barnabas finds (in ch. 12) the cross prefigured in certain passages of the OT. He sees (12:2-4) a prefiguration of the cross in the outstretched hands of Moses in prayer, according to Exod. 17:8-11, and in the brazen serpent (12:5-7) lifted by Moses in the wilderness, according to Num 21:6-9. He finds the confirmation for his assumption in the allegorical interpretation of these OT passages.

Combinations of the same OT quotations and parallels to their interpretations are to be found in early Jewish and early Christian literatures. Justin Martyr and Tertullian,[10] as well as the tannaitic midrash to Exodus, the *Mekilta,* and the orthodox material of the Jewish tradition, written down during the end of the second century C.E., the *Mishna,* contain the same combinations of OT passages. A comparison shows the following analogies:

Mekilta,[11]	*Mishna,*[12]	Barnabas, ch. 12	Justin Martyr, *Dial. c. Tryph.* ch. 11 f.	Tertullian, *Adv. Jud.* 10; *Adv. Marc.* 3, 18.
Exod. 17: 11	Exod. 17: 11	Exod. 17: 8-11	Exod. 17: 9-13 Exod. 12: 23	Exod. 17: 8-16; 10-11.
Num. 21: 8 Exod. 12: 13, 23	Num. 21: 8	Num. 21: 6-9	Num. 21: 8-9	Num. 21:4-9; 8-9

A survey of these analogies leads to the following conclusions concerning the interdependence of these passages: Barnabas cannot be Justin's source,[13] because Justin's transmission is more comprehensive. It contains three accounts connected with OT passages, whereas Barna-

7. Hans Windisch, *op. cit.,* 410 f.

8. Muilenburg, *op. cit.,* p. 109 f.

9. Rendel Harris, *Testimonies,* I (1916), II (1920).

10. The same interpretation of the Exodus passage is offered by Cyprian, *Testimonies,* II, 21; *On the Exhortation to Martyrdom,* VIII.

11. *Mekilta,* Tractate *Amalek,* I, 119-137, ed. J. Z. Lauterbach, II (1933), 143 f.

12. *Mishna,* Tractate *Rosh ha-shana,* III, 8, ed. H. Danby, (1933), 192.

13. Cf. Gebhardt and Harnack, *Barnabae Epistula,* (1878), p. XLI.

bas possesses only two. Justin's transmission coincides singularly with that of the tripartite *Mekilta* transmission:

(I) *And it came to pass, when Moses held up his hand, . . .* (Exod. 17: 11). Now, could Moses' hands make Israel victorious, or could his hands break Amalek? It merely means this: When Moses raised his hands towards heaven, the Israelites would look at him and believe in Him who commanded Moses to do so; then God would perform for them miracles and mighty deeds.

(II) Similar to this: *And the Lord said unto Moses: "Make thee a fiery serpent, . . ."* (Num. 21: 8). Now could that serpent kill or make alive? It merely means this: When Moses did so, the Israelites would look at him and believe in Him who commanded Moses to do so; then God would send them healing.

(III) Similar to this: *And the blood* (viz., of the Paschal lamb) *shall be to you for a token, . . .* (Exod. 12: 13). Now, of what use could the blood be to the angel, or how could it help the Israelites? It merely means this: When the Israelites did so, that is, put some of the blood upon their doors (cf. Exod. 12: 7), the Holy One, blessed be He, had pity upon them, as it is said: *The Lord will pass over, . . .* (Exod. 12: 23).

Mekilta and Justin offer the evidently original tripartite version of the underlying string of OT passages; Barnabas, Tertullian, and *Mishna* contain only two of the originally three testimonies. The same parallel literary structure as in the *Mekilta* can partly be recognized in the text of Barnabas. No one of these passages appears to be the direct source for the other; even the coincidence between the transmission of the *Mekilta* and Justin Martyr seems to have been the result of both authors' having used the same original tradition.[14] The combination of the OT passages as offered by the *Mekilta* is evidently the most original one. However, the "exegesis is not originally Jewish but a foreign product that was planted by the Jewish Hellenists," as Jacob Freudenthal has already proved.[15]

When Christianity was in the making, during the first and second centuries, and its leaders were at work reinterpreting the OT, the passages under consideration became OT proofs for the symbolism of the cross, which at that time evidently was a current popular belief of the

14. Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 64 thought that Justin's interpretation of Num. 21:8 may have been influenced by the Wisdom of Solomon, 16:5 f., but this assumption is refuted by the proof that Justin's transmission is an analogy to that of the *Mekilta*. Cf. also E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr*, (1923), 40, 90.

15. Jakob Freudenthal, *Hellenistische Studien*, 1 (1874), 75.

Church's adherents,[16] as Barnabas, Justin Martyr, and Tertullian testify. Furthermore, a pair of outstretched hands (Exod. 17) was a symbol of invocation of divine help to heathens, Christians, and Jews alike.[17] Thus, the combination appears in Barnabas' theological tractate, which was the work of a Jewish-Christian who was anxious not to speak "like a Jewish teacher" but rather like a full member of the Church. The occurrence of the combination in a legal code like the *Mishna* is undoubtedly related to the silent apologetic challenge of the current early Christian interpretation, which, by a symbolizing exegesis, saw the cross prefigured in Moses' actions.[18] From the literary point of view, the *Mishna* transmission is a subsequent haggadic interpolation into the original surrounding halakic material of the tractate.[19] The *Mekilta* transmission is to be found among controversies that form a running double commentary to Exod. 17 about Israel's fight against Amalek.[20] These controversies are haggadic group sentences which deal with certain combinations of OT passages. There can be no doubt that the combination is of Hellenistic Jewish origin. The very fact that the Church had to mention it so often in its early writings suggests that she had to reckon with the Jewish origin of the combination. A survey of the Christian and Jewish interpretations of the respective OT passages is quite illustrative of this fact.

Exod. 17:11 is interpreted by Philo (*Leg. Al.*, III, 186), Moses being identified with mind, Amalek with passion. This interpretation corresponds to that given by the first *Mekilta* account: Moses' hands do not bring victory to the Israelites but bid them look upward to God and submit their minds to God's rule.

16. Hans Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

17. A. Deissmann, *Light from the ancient East*, (1927), p. 415.

18. A. Marmorstein, in "Eine apologetische Mischna," *Monatsschrift fuer Geschichte und Wissenchaft des Judentums*, LXX (1926), 396, guessed the apologetical status without proving it.

19. E. Baneth, *Seder Moed*, (1927), p. 404, note 34, stated that the connection of the haggadic portion with the halakic material is to be found in the *Mishna's* stressing of the value of *Kawwana*. But in reality the interpolation of the allegorical, Jewish-Hellenistic interpretations among *shofar* laws is based on the rabbinic popular belief that the beginning of the eschatological times will be announced by the blowing of the *shofar*. See I. Scheftelowitz, *Archiv fuer Religionswissenschaft*, XIV (1911), 23, 385. The wish to rise from the dead in messianic times is expressed on tombstones in catacombs by a *shofar*. The resurrection will be announced by the sound of the trumpet according to Mat. 24:31; I Cor. 15:52; I Thess. 4:16.

20. W. Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, (2nd. ed., 1903), 230.

Philo's interpretation of Num. 21:6 (*Leg. Al.* II, 76) is the same as in Barnabas 12:5: the serpent of Eve, representing pleasure, brings death not of the body, but of the soul. At God's command (Num. 21:8) Moses makes a serpent of the opposite kind, the serpent of self-mastery (*Leg. Al.*, II, 79). This account corresponds entirely with Barnabas 12:7[21] and with the second *Mekilta* account: Moses' brazen serpent does not give life or death, but to look at it inspires faith in the God who heals. Philo stresses in his exegesis the fact that Moses is told to make this serpent for no one but himself. Barnabas (12:6) and the *Mekilta* employ exactly the same interpretation. Salvation from pleasure is, according to Philo, to look upon "the serpent of Moses, and in seeing this one beholds God himself."

Classifying the different methods of exegesis, we have at first Philo's *allegorical* interpretation. Barnabas's method is the same, but the allegorization is not applied to the heroes of the OT passages but to their *actions*. Thus Moses' outstretched hands in prayer (Exod. 17), and his lifting up of the brazen serpent (Num. 21), are interpreted by Barnabas as symbolizations of the prefiguration of the cross. The Hellenistic Jewish interpretations to be found in the *Mekilta* are allegorical too, but their dialectical representation is an eschatological one. The *Mishna* transmission is a derived "metaphorization"[22] of an excerpt from the same literary source to which the *Mekilta* transmission likewise belongs.

The strong traditional influence of the allegorical method is evident. This remained the method of OT interpretation for early Jewish and Christian exegesis alike. Only in the interpretation of the different parts of speech did a differentiation take place: the Hellenistic Jewish interpretation became eschatological, whereas the early Christian became symbolical, establishing elements of Christian typologies.

Both methods of interpretation express again a definite historical appropriateness. One was the result of the grim experiences of the Jews of the first two centuries, experiences which had somehow to be explained, because they seemed contrary to the promises of God to His people. The external situation urged the Jews to find some spiritual hope in the creation of a timeless eschatological attitude of mind amidst the actual hopelessness of their existence. It found expression in a very well imagined eschatological interpretation of the OT. Early Christian

21. Cf. also Philo, *De Agricultura*, 95, 97, 99, 107.
22. R. Rosenblatt, *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Mishna*, (1935), 23.

OT interpretation had to develop and use that kind of exegesis which enabled it to discover in the OT the prefiguration of the Christian typologies. Such an approach to OT passages produced, by applying the allegorical method, such typological interpretations as those of Barnabas (ch. 12). Hans Lietzmann's statement that typological and allegorical interpretation provided the means by which early Christianity snatched the OT from the Jewish people[23] should be modified by including the undeniable fact that the allegorical method of the early Christians was a Jewish heritage. The victor took over the arms of the conquered and used them in his missionary activities.

Allegorical Hellenistic Jewish OT exegesis seems to have existed side by side with the orthodox rabbinic interpretation of the OT. It is not strange that there should have been some relics of this Hellenistic exegesis in the *Mekilta* and *Mishna,* and surely also in other rabbinic writings. These Hellenistic interpretations are traces of the Hellenistic cultural orientation of the Jews of the Greek Diaspora,[24] perhaps even of Hellenized Jews in Palestine. These Hellenistic Jews used the Greek language in their religious practice,[25] which produced an OT exegesis of its own. From this Hellenistic Jewish haggadah OT interpretations reflecting elements of Greek literature and folklore drifted over into the rabbinic haggadah. This is one of the main sources for the occurrence of Greek ideas and thought, and of elements of Greek culture, in rabbinic literature.[26] It is the Hellenistic background, vestiges of which represent the OT combinations preserved by *Mishna* and *Mekilta,* which are dealt with in this essay. How strong the tradition of this Hellenistic Jewish branch of OT exegesis was may best be shown by the similarity between Philo's conceptions of the respective passages with those Palestinian Hellenistic relics offered by the two rabbinic writings.

Remnants of Hellenistic Jewish exegesis are, in this writer's opinion, in many of the passages quoted from the Palestinian Midrash as alleged parallels to similar passages in Philo.[27] The cultural historic aspect of the problem does not allow one to assume any longer a relation of in-

23. Hans Lietzmann, *op. cit.,* 333, 294 f.

24. Hans Lietzmann, *Geschichte der Alten Kirche,* I. (1932), 64-101.

25. Cf. the fragments of a Jewish-Greek prayerbook preserved by a Christian Church regulation of the fourth century, *Constitutiones Apostolicae,* VII, 33-38.

26. See also Saul Lieberman, *Greek in Jewish Palestine,* (1942).

27. Cf. E. R. Goodenough, *An Introduction to Philo Judaeus,* (1940), on the present status of Philo research.

terdependence in the sense of a definite priority ascribed to the Midrash. The relation seems to be one of mere analogy only. If, for instance, both render the notion of the original androgynous form of man, the assumption of Philo's dependence upon the Midrash is out of the question. How can it be assumed that a central biological notion, as common to ancient thought[28] as Charles Darwin's theory of the origin of species by means of natural selection is to us today, was adopted by such a Hellenist as Philo from a second-hand Jewish source which, in its turn, represents nothing more than a popular element of Hellenistic cultural orientation that filtered down into the Midrash?

Summarizing, we may state that the literary complex, *Testimonia Biblica,* composed of certain combinations of OT passages, is to be traced back to original Hellenistic Jewish interpretations of the respective passages. Some of these are preserved in rabbinic literature as relics of a Hellenistic Jewish exegesis in the form of haggadic group sentences. The same combination of passages as occur in early Jewish writings appears in early Christian writings with the new Christian interpretation, for the new faith was trying to reinterpret the current Jewish conceptions, and to establish OT proofs for the new doctrines. Clearly, research into problems of the early Church has also to take into consideration the contemporary early Jewish writings.

28. Cf. E. L. Dietrich, "Der Urmensch als Androgyn, "*Zeitschrift fuer Kirchenges chichte,* LVIII (1939), 297 ff.

THIS-WORLDLINESS AND OTHERWORLDLINESS, TIME AND ETERNITY

ROBERT LEET PATTERSON

THE TOPIC OF THIS PAPER has been suggested by Professor Lovejoy's observation in his recent work, *The Great Chain of Being,* that between this-worldliness and otherworldliness there subsists "the deepest and farthest-reaching cleavage separating philosophical or religious systems" (p. 24). This is a weighty saying, and one which challenges our scrutiny. The term *this-worldliness* we are wont to associate with an outlook restricted by the limits of this life, the term *otherworldliness* with a purview which extends beyond. Professor Lovejoy, however, makes it clear that he is employing each term in an unusual sense:

> By otherworldliness I do not mean a belief in and a preoccupation of the mind with a future life. To be concerned about what will happen to you after death, or to let your thought dwell much upon the joys which you hope will then await you, may obviously be the most extreme form of this-worldliness; and it is essentially such if that life is conceived, not as profoundly different in kind from this, but as more of much the same sort of thing, a prolongation of the mode of being which we know in the world of change and sense and plurality and social fellowship, with merely the omission of the trivial or painful features of terrestrial existence, the heightening of its finer pleaures, the compensation of some of earth's frustrations (p. 26).

We should, therefore, scarcely be surprised when we learn from the next page that this-worldliness consists in "an identification of the chief value of existence with progress and struggle in time, an antipathy to satisfaction and finality, a sense of the "glory of the imperfect," in Professor Palmer's phrase.

If the desire for immortality just described be "the most extreme form" of this-worldliness, what, then, is otherworldliness? Professor Lovejoy answers, "By 'otherworldliness' I mean the belief that both the genuinely 'real' and the truly good are radically antithetic in their essential characteristics to anything to be found in man's natural life, however normal, however intelligent, and however fortunate" (p. 25). It thus involves a concentration of interest upon "a 'higher' realm of being differing in its essential nature, and not merely in degree and detail, from the lower" (p. 26). Clearly, therefore, the distinction which

Professor Lovejoy has in mind is not that between this-worldliness and otherworldliness in the usual acceptation of these terms, but that between a belief in and preoccupation with the temporal, and a belief in and preoccupation with the eternal.

Each cleavage is "deep and far-reaching." It is to the latter, however, that I invite your attention. I propose, in the first place, to discuss the metaphysical outlook which accompanies the enthusiastic temporalism which Professor Lovejoy has called "this-worldliness," and also that which constitutes the background of its "otherworldly" counterpart; and, in the second place, to call attention to another point of view for which the relation between the temporal and the eternal is emphatically not one of "radical antithesis." In so doing I shall not attempt to estimate the soundness of the philosophical arguments by which these various positions are defended, but shall limit myself to tracing the connection of ideas as we actually find it, and to emphasizing certain fundamental value-judgments.

The anticipation of a life to come and its future joys can be said to constitute "the most extreme form of this-worldliness" only, as Professor Lovejoy has pointed out, if such an existence be conceived, not merely as involving "much the same sort of thing" as we experience in this life, but also as offering at least the possibility of improvement. Such an expansion of the axiological horizon inevitably entails the transference of the center of interest from the here and now to the hereafter. To whatever extent worldly affairs and problems may press upon us, to attribute primary importance to them would obviously be absurd if our terrestrial sojourn be but a fragment of an endless existence. Consequently, wherever the doctrine of immortality has been interpreted in this melioristic sense, it has normally been accompanied by the same attitude of eager expectation.

This attitude Professor Lovejoy's temporalist fully shares; what he rejects is the notion of an ultimate goal or τέλος of the soul, in which intellect, emotion, and volition alike can come to rest. Thinkers of this type are to be found, in general, among the admirers of Browning and Tennyson, and among the disciples of Bergson and William James. They are those to whom activity is the very breath of life, and who abhore quiescience as the equivalent of slumber or of death. And, since activity requires time in which to manifest itself and is productive of change, they are staunch partizans of the everlasting flux. If there is to

be another life, it must be full of incident. There must be deeds to be done, problems to be solved, battles to be fought, victories to be won, genuine possibilities of real gain and real loss—with the ensuing possibility of failure and defeat.

Upon the last point, however, there is some difference of opinion. Certain temporalists trust in the power of a finite God, which they hope will be adequate in all situations to support those prepared to co-operate with him; while others rely upon the resistless upward rush of the *élan vital* to carry them from conquest to conquest and achievement to achievement, overwhelming all obstacles and retrieving all reverses in the surge and tumult of its perpetual advance. Yet others there are who profess themselves ready to encounter the fearful hazard of a metaphysical overthrow and irretrievable ruin. There can be no victory, they say, without a fight; and there can be no fight without a risk. If you want to win, you must be prepared to lose. All would agree, however, that a world of change and struggle is the best that we can hope for; hence their attitude is expressive of what Professor Lovejoy would call this-worldliness. A final attainment which would put an end to striving, a complete satisfaction which would leave nothing more to desire, would seem to them unspeakably terrible. What, they would ask, would there be left to live for? Better all the perils of the flux than that! Immortality they do, indeed, yearn for; but a busy, bustling, immortality in which the range of possibilities is greater than in this life, in which the problems are more subtle and fascinating, the issues more vital, the battles more worth fighting, the victories more worth winning.

The metaphysical presuppositions of such a view are, of course, those which underlie contemporary philosophies of creative or emergent evolution. The total rejection of any notion of eternity other than that of a beginningless and endless succession is obviously congenial to an outlook such as this. It does not appear, however, that it is essential. The recognition of a changeless realm of being, in which universals, propositions, numbers, and values subsist,[1] would seem to be compatible with the temporalist's position so long as from this realm particulars remain forever excluded. The value-judgment which inspires such a theory has been well stated by Professor Lovejoy. It involves "an identification of the chief value of existence with progress and struggle in time." For the temporalist zest, excitement, and adventure possess an incomparable

1. Cf. Professor G. Dawes Hicks. *The Philosophical Bases of Theism*, pp. 220-27.

charm. Despite the emphasis upon "social fellowship," it can scarcely be said that temporalism sets a high value upon human affections. In a world where the supremacy of change is unquestioned, what guarantee have we that the relationships to which earthly existence gives birth will persist in another, that they will not be destroyed in the ceaseless flux of the hereafter?

Lastly, since the view which we are considering is incompatible with the recognition of an ultimate goal, it seems clear that the temporalist must renounce the idea—so dear to the religious heart—of deliverance or salvation. Professor A. E. Taylor's[2] attempt to distinguish between progress *toward* fruition and progress *in* fruition must surely be pronounced paradoxical, and his heaven with its "social service," surprises, and adventures would, I have little doubt, be esteemed by Professor Lovejoy thoroughly this-worldly. Possibly a substitute for the old ideal of a changeless satisfaction might be found in the notion of an endless succession of states each characterized by a maximum of happiness, although, so far as I know, no philosopher or theologian has attempted to work out such a theory; yet it would clearly involve a surrender on the part of the temporalist of his basic value-judgment with regard to "progress and struggle in time," hence this hypothetical alternative must, however regretfully, be renounced.

Let us now turn to the otherworldly point of view. Wherein lies its fascination? What is the impetus that impells the mind toward a transcendent beyond? Is it a thirst for knowledge? If so, what sort of knowledge? Is the value of knowledge utterly independent of the nature of its object? Who would labor to discover, for instance, the number of times that the definite article occurs in the pages of *Alice in Wonderland*, and to subtract that figure from the number of times that the same word is to be found in Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*? It is safe to say that no one has ever contemplated such an enterprise, and it is equally safe to assume that no one will ever do so. Yet an awareness of the result of this arithmetical operation would be as truly a state of knowledge as any state of awareness can be. It would, however, be a knowledge of what is utterly trivial and unimportant; hence no sane man would desire to possess it. Nor would any sane man desire to know an indefinite number of equally unimportant truths.

It is to the universal that those who sing the praises of knowledge are

2: *The Faith of a Moralist*, vol. I., ch. IX.

forever turning. It is that which holds true always, everywhere, without exception, that they yearn to grasp. Such knowledge is wholly disinterested, and neither requires nor admits of any external justification. It seeks, not to transform its object, but to contemplate it as it is. In this lies its grandeur. The mind that is devoted to it becomes liberated from all that is accidental and provincial, from pettiness and partiality. Thus the spirit finds itself at home in its universe, and realizes to the full the latent nobility of its nature. This, say many scientists and philosophers, is the life most worth living, the richest, the most exalted. Not in feverish activity is man's true destiny fulfilled, but in knowledge, which, losing itself in the universe which it beholds, acquires something of the vastness and significance of its object.

What will be the character of such knowledge? It is evident whither this way of thinking tends. It tends beyond analysis, beyond synthesis even, to a synoptic vision of the whole, to an apprehension of that "principle of unity" which, as Professor Sorley has said, "is not one element among others."[3] Ideally, of course, this awareness of unity in plurality can be nothing else than direct, non-discursive, non-inferential intuition, which is to say that it will be mystical in character.[4] And what will issue from it? History provides the answer. Whether we ascend the stream of occidental philosophy toward its Hellenic fountain, or interrogate the metaphysicians of Islam and the Far East, everywhere we discover the same tendency of speculative thought to culminate in mystical insight, and everywhere we find it accompanied by an elevated serenity, an overmastering joy, a delight in the goodness and beauty of the object contemplated. Intellectual illumination and passionate devotion thus unite to form the *amor intellectualis Dei* of which Spinoza tells.

Here, I maintain, in an experience, not of pure cognition, but of insight fused with emotional exaltation, we discern the fundamental value-judgment which inspires this type of otherworldliness. The experience is, indeed, intellectual, but it is also emotional, and in its emotional aspect we discover, I think, its chief significance. It is one of love, albeit an otherworldly love. The aloofness with respect to human relationships thereby engendered has been rightly stressed by Professor

3. See *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, pp. 252-53.

4. Such awareness is attributed by St. Thomas to those who behold the divine Essence, and, in seeing it, see all things. Cf. *Con. Gen.* lib. III, cap. III.

Lovejoy. Of this attitude we find in the words of St. Thomas a typical expression. "If we speak of the perfect beatitude which will obtain *in patria*,"[5] he writes, "the companionship of friends is not requisite to beatitude, for man has the whole fulness of his perfection in God." Thus the evaluation which this form of otherworldliness sets upon human affection reveals a curious similarity to the position of temporalism. And it must be confessed that the behavior of many contemplatives strongly suggests that, if such indifference to human relationships be a characteristic of perfection, it is one which they find it easiest to realize.

The metaphysical position associated with such an outlook may be that of a transcendent theism, or of an all embracing absolutism. Whether time be treated as wholly illusory, or accorded a subordinate degree of reality, a way of deliverance from it is always provided, and an ultimate goal beyond it is always posited. As to personal immortality, it is sometimes explictly affirmed as in Christian Scholasticism, sometimes emphatically denied as in the philosophies of Bosanquet and Professor Hallett, and in those of many Oriental thinkers.

Does a relation of "radical antithesis" between the temporal and the eternal necessarily follow from the adoption of an otherworldly outlook? As I said before, I do not intend directly to argue in support of a different position, but I do wish to point out that the connection has actually been otherwise envisaged; and the fact that, if the theory propounded be sound, it has this peculiar advantage that it renders the notion of an ultimate goal compatible with the conservation of the highest values to be found in temporal experience, strongly suggests, I feel, that it merits a fuller examination on the part of those interested in the philosophy of religion than it has yet received.

What I have in mind is the approach made by McTaggart in his *Nature of Existence*. In his early work, the *Hegelian Cosmology*, we encounter, indeed, a forecast of his final position in the observation that "it is possible that we might find, on further consideration of the nature of Absolute Reality, and of our own lives, some element in the latter which seemed to belong directly to the former—something which did not lead to heaven, but *was* heaven" (p. 192). This thought is developed

5. "Si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patris, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem: quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo." *Sum. Theol.* Ia-IIae. q. 4. a. 8.

and defended in his later writings. For McTaggart the real is the eternal. There are no degrees of reality, and time is an illusion. Yet it is a real illusion, and the order of its successive states is the reflection or appearance of a non-temporal order. The anterior terms of this non-temporal order are included in the posterior, and the final term of the series includes all the others. Thus, since the series is bounded, at one end by non-entity, and, at the other, by the final and all-inclusive term, the time-series of successive states in which it is reflected is finite; consequently time will gradually fade into eternity. The last and all-inclusive term of the non-temporal series is perceived, *sub specie temporis,* as future. Hence Christian theologians have been profoundly right in regarding heaven as at once future and yet timeless.

All selves, *sub specie temporis,* enjoy an existence without beginning or end. This is an important consideration, for it means that we must think of the content of the pre-final states of the non-temporal series, not merely in terms of this life, but in terms of what went before, and in terms of our potentialities of future development; for these pre-final states are, of course, eternal, and their content is included within the final state. This final state itself, since it is boundless, is of infinite value. Not all the values, however, which we now experience will be found there. "If," writes McTaggart,

> I contemplate the fact that I shall lose at death the memory of my friend, and of our love in this life, I may well be consoled by the reflection that, in all the future, I shall never permanently lose my friend or his love. But I should have no analogous consolation when I think of my approaching forgetfulness of my country and of my school. And, although such loyalties are trivial by the side of love, yet by their side, most other things are trivial. Yet it will be the highest that will not be lost.[6]

This passage becomes the more significant when we think of McTaggart's own devotion to "Clifton, Trinity, and England,"[7] of which Dr. Broad has reminded us.

The values which are to be found in the final state are preeminently knowledge, virtue, pleasure, fulness of life, and love. The last of these values occupies a unique place in McTaggart's system. He observes somewhat scornfully,

6. *The Nature of Existence,* II. 395-96.
7. Introd. to *Some Dogmas of Religion,* p. xlvii.

Philosophy and theology, when they profess to take men's love seriously, generally confine it either to a love for God, or to a passion for mankind as a whole. It is rarely that the writings of a philosopher or a theologian find anything in a young man's love for his sweetheart except a mixture of sexual desire and folly, or anything in a young man's love for his comrade except folly pure and simple.[8]

As we have seen, there is ample evidence to support such a judgment. For McTaggart himself, however, the human relationships and affections of which Professor Lovejoy has spoken possess supreme worth. He writes:

It seems to me that, when love reached or passes a certain point, it would be more good than any possible amount of knowledge, pleasure, virtue, or fulness of life could be. This does not, so far as I am concerned, spring from any belief that I have reached such a point. It is a conclusion which seems to me to follow from contemplating the nature of love, on the one hand, and of the other qualities, on the other hand.[9]

For McTaggart, love is a relation of metaphysical nearness subsisting only between selves, and eternal as they are eternal. *Sub specie temporis,* it is the factor which chiefly determines the *locus* of rebirth, for McTaggart is committed to the theory of a plurality of lives—a doctrine which, strangely enough, both Broad and Wisdom are inclined to retain despite their rejection of the cardinal principles of his teaching. Moreover, in the final state, it is love which constitutes the chief value of eternal life.

Enough has been said, I think, to make it clear—in spite of the inadequacy of this brief sketch—that, in the philosophy of McTaggart, eternity is related to time, not as its antithesis, but as its consumation. As he himself says, "It is sometimes forgotten that the changelessness in question is not the comparative changelessness of monotonous duration, but the absolute changelessness of the eternal—the changelessness which means, not limited experience, but completed experience."[10] Completion is undoubtedly the word which best expresses his conception of this *rapport.*

It would seem that the three points of view which I have just de-

8. *Ibid.,* p. 121. n. 1.
9. *The Nature of Existence,* II, 437.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 436. n. 1.

scribed exhaust the possibilities of the situation, and that consequently the philosophy of religion must come to terms with one of them. But with which one? The partizans of eternity and those of time have alike advanced metaphysical arguments in support of their respective positions; yet these arguments have, one and all, hitherto failed of general acceptance. This does not, indeed, necessarily redound to their discredit, for when was truth ever established by a mere counting of heads? The soundest arguments need not be the simplest, nor the most easily grasped. Yet, where so much is dark, we should be grateful for any ray of light. Why not, then, try to discover how our threefold problem appears when surveyed from the vantage ground provided by religion itself?

Such an attempt, it may be objected, presupposes the validity of religion, and no justification has been given for such an assumption. True enough; yet, for the purpose of our present inquiry, let us make the assumption in question, and see what follows. As we proceed to survey the field of religion we can scarcely fail to be impressed by the almost incredibly chaotic materials which confront us, seemingly devoid of any common element. On the one hand, we have religions such as those of the Homeric Greeks, the Babylonians, and the ancient Hebrews, in which faith in a future life is vague and nebulous in the extreme, but which entertain nevertheless a vivid belief in many gods—or, possibly, in the case of the greatest of the pre-exilic prophets—of a single God. On the other hand, we have also such religions as Jainism or primitive Buddhism, which are the standing scandal of many investigators, inasmuch as they admit the existence of no God at all, in the usual meaning of the word—even though they posit a multitude of exalted spirits who are, however, as much members of the cosmos as human beings, and like them subject to the process of time and change—but which none the less are vitally concerned with man's fate in the hereafter. In the face of such complete diversity of creedal content what right have we to classify movements so dissimilar under the common head of religions?

To the question thus posed there would appear to be no logical answer. If we turn our attention, however, from the formal beliefs entertained to the various ends envisaged, we find that the welter of heterogeneous facts does fall into some sort of order. Thus the primitive cults referred to, Hellenic and Semitic, are concerned with goods obviously transient in character, and largely, although not exclusively,

of a material kind—with health, long life, abundant harvest, a multitude of children, victory over enemies, and the like. Such aspirations may be termed religious, not at all because of the objects upon which they are directed—for toward these all men may strive—but because of the means employed to realize them, because those who desire them petition and rely upon superhuman Powers, or a superhuman Power, to grant these hoped-for favors, or at least to aid in their attainment. In recognition, therefore, of the fleeting character of the goods thus sought we may legitimately describe such religions as religions of *relative salvation.*

Let the life to come, however, no longer be conceived of as a mere phantasmal reflection of this present existence, but as at least as vivid and intense and meaningful as that enjoyed here and now, and a profound change takes place. The fear and horror which previously assailed men at the thought of death gives way to hope and gladness and desire. Preoccupation with the present and immediate future is no more all-absorbing. The limitless vista before him awakens man's curiosity and stimulates his emotions. At this stage of development were born the Viking's belief in Valhalla and the American Indian's anticipation of a Happy Hunting Ground. For sheer vividness of poetic imagery, as yet untransfigured by an ethical idealism, but vibrant with triumphant assurance and bathed in an almost unearthly beauty, the descriptions of the after-life in the mythology of ancient Ireland are unequalled. The very names accorded there to the abode of the dead—the "Land of Youth," the "Land of Promise," the "Land of the Living"—ring with a glad confidence that seems to have banished the fear of death forever. Indeed, one may say that the absence of moral reflection only intensifies the impression of pure exhilaration, of a consciousness of abounding and invincible vitality, which breathes in these matchless legends. It is good to enter this atmosphere, to mingle for a moment with the throngs that people the "Happy Plain," before we pass on to the austere altitudes of Egyptian and Iranian religion, with their doctrines of a future judgment in which moral ideas are clearly predominant. We are now obviously approaching the notion of an ultimate goal, and but a single step will carry us to the *unio mystica* of the Christian, the *mokṣa* of the Hindu, the *fana al-fana* of the Sufi, or the *nirvāṇa* of the Buddhist. Let this step once be taken, and we have arrived at the conception of a perfectly satisfying experience wherein faith passes into sight, anticipation into realization,

and desire into fruition, an experience which, once attained, can nevermore be lost. Such is the goal which all the great "world-faiths," all the fully developed religions—as we are wont to call them—have posited, in virtue of which we may appropriately term them religions of *absolute salvation.*

The evolution of religious thought which we have so rapidly sketched is one which, whether metaphysically justified or not, has actually taken place on the stage of history. What has the temporalist to say of it? What *can* he say? Religion has always been the quest for a goal, but the goal has evolved from an instrumental into an intrinsic one, from a fleeting into an abiding one, from a this-worldly into a transcendent one. From the standpoint of the temporalist this is all wrong. The evolution in question has been the following of a will-of-the-wisp. Humanity has been on the wrong track for at least twenty-five hundred years. What, then, shall we do? Retrace our steps? The thing is not feasible. We cannot revive the intellectual climate of ancient Babylon or of Mycenaean Greece. Shall we renounce all goals and immerse ourselves in the excitement of living? There has been enough of that, and to spare, in the world for the last four years; yet we should do the temporalist gross injustice if we assumed that he has been thereby rendered especially happy. It is not *mere* excitement that he craves; it is the feeling of achievement. If we ask, then, what he would put in the place of an absolute goal, the only possible answer is, "The progress of mankind onward and upward forever," the vision of the soul of man perpetually going forth anew "conquering and to conquer."

But what reasons have we, in a universe in which the dominance of change is the primal fact, to believe in the possibility of such progress? How do we know that the *élan vital* will not exhaust itself, encounter insuperable obstacles, or even "go into reverse." Shall we trust in a finite God? How do we know that, if he be himself involved in the flux, his power will be equal to our need? But if he be beyond the flux? Ah, that is another story. But the temporalist is prohibited from making such an hypothesis.

Again, is not the notion of endless progress self-contradictory? Is a goal at an infinite remove from us, from which after aeons of progress we shall still be infinitely distant, a genuine goal at all? Is progress which never arrives really progress? The moral of all this is surely obvious. He

that is this-worldly, let him be this-worldly still; but let him not profess to satisfy the aspirations of religion, for the thing cannot be done.

It would seem, therefore, that the tide of religious thought bears us directly toward the conception of eternity; but toward eternity envisaged as the "radical antithesis" of time, or as its completion, fulfillment, efflorescence? Our answer to this question will depend upon whether we accept or reject McTaggart's judgment as to the supreme value of love—of love as such, and not merely love for God. This is a judgment which claims to be ultimate and self-evident, and which, consequently, can be neither supported nor refuted by argument. It must be either taken or left. Hence it is easy to make fun of it, or to disparage it as a piece of sentimentality, as Dr. Broad has done.[11] If the judgment be false this disparagement is justified, inasmuch as an illegitimate appeal to emotion is the very essence of sentimentality. Accordingly, to those whose opinion coincides with that of Dr. Broad, McTaggart will no doubt appear somewhat ridiculous. But, on the other hand, to those who find the judgment in question as self-evident as it seemed to McTaggart himself, Dr. Broad will appear equally ridiculous. Nothing, therefore, is to be gained by sarcasm. On the contrary, the situation is fraught with a significance which may well prove in the highest degree sobering, for the position of any philosopher whose value-judgments are integrated with his metaphysics is bound to be profoundly affected by his acceptance or rejection of this particular value-judgment, intimately connected as it is with the problems of man's status in the universe and of his ultimate destiny. It is, indeed, one of those watersheds in philosophy from which a descent on either hand takes us very far.

Does not an affirmative answer, however, it may be asked, constitute a break with tradition as complete as that involved in the acceptance of temporalism? Is not McTaggart's position novel and unprecedented? Does not he himself admit as much?[12] And is not the correctness of Professor Lovejoy's description of the otherworldly attitude amply vindicated by the history of every great religion?

In reply it may legitimately be urged, in the first place, that the break with tradition is not so pronounced as it appears at first sight. The theologies of the various religions have been largely elaborated by men wholly devoted to the religious life, many—if not most—of whom were profes-

11. *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, II. Part I, 129-30.
12. See above, p. 144.

sional ascetics. Consequently it is the point of view of these specialists, rather than that of the average devout layman, which we find represented there. And there can be little doubt, I think, that the layman would have been far more inclined to sympathize with McTaggart than would the ascetic. Now can it plausibly be maintained that the opinion of the advanced contemplative—who is incidentally a "world-renouncer"—is alone worthy of consideration? May he not, in common with so many other specialists, suffer from a lack of balance? And, in the second place, is there not at least one prominent witness on McTaggart's side? If the author of the first epistle of St. John had not been of the same way of thinking could he ever have penned that sentence which, upon any other interpretation, seems to constitute so glaring a *non sequitur*, "We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love the brethren"?[13]

So much, I believe, may fairly be said without special pleading. Nevertheless, we must honestly concede, as McTaggart conceded, that the general opinion of philosophers and theologians is adverse. McTaggart does not ask us to accept his judgment on the ground that it is sanctified by tradition, but on the ground that it is true. And, if true, it constitues a genuinely new insight—new, at least, in its clarity and breadth of vision—the importance of which cannot be too greatly stressed. For those who share, as does the writer, his conviction of its self-evidence, the other-worldliness which posits between time and eternity a relation of "radical antithesis" will appear no less unsatisfactory than the position of the temporalist. Even if we find, then, that the arguments whereby McTaggart arrives at his conception of the relation between time and eternity are not wholly convincing, even if the conception itself be not in all details completely satisfactory, must we not ask ourselves whether "something like it" may not be true? Has he not pointed the way which the philosophy of religion must follow if it is to develop a metaphysic which will vindicate the legitimate aspirations of religion itself? The answer would seem clearly to be, Yes..

13. I John, 3:14; cf. *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 121. n. 1.

WHITEHEAD'S MYSTICISM: A REVIEW ARTICLE

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IT HAS BEEN MY DUTY recently to review for a non-philosophical journal the third volume of the admirable *Library of Living Philosophers*,[1] by all odds the most perplexing and baffling job of reviewing that has ever fallen to my lot. The difficulty did not arise, it need hardly be said, from the contents of the volume itself, which is on the same high level of excellence as the previous two volumes. The trouble is with Professor Whitehead's own doctrines, to which, of course, the reader must always keep going back. I am still haunted by mental discomfort and division of judgment, ranging from the warmest admiration for the profound insights and brilliant utterances of this venerable mind, to deep and troubled dissent. Mingled with this state of mind are several definite considerations which seem to me proper for the attention of philosophers themselves.

First of all is the unescapable conviction that Whitehead is never safe from an incongruous commingling of what Bertrand Russell has called mysticism and logic, in his essay under that title. This reaches its high point, quite naturally, in Whitehead's doctrine of God. Indeed, this brief article might well have been called, as I first intended, "Whitehead and God." But the mysticism infects passages where the word God is not used.

My first perplexity arises from the occurrence or distribution of specific propositions concerning God in Whitehead's works. Taking the three books which he himself implies make up a summary of his philosophy, we find the following: in *Science and the Modern World* (1925) there is a short chapter on God, in which we are told mainly that "In the place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover, we require God as Principle of Concretion" (p. 243). Of this doctrine we may say at once that it is not necessarily mystical, even if highly hypothetical; but we must add that if God is the principle of concretion in Whitehead's system, then he must pervade the whole scheme, and must be reckoned with at every turn. But this is not all, for at the very end of the chapter, Whitehead ranges far beyond Aristotle's doctrine, and, as I am com-

1. P. A. Schlipp, Ed., *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (Evanston, Ill., 1941).

pelled to think, far beyond any logic of the chapter or of the book as a whole when he declares: "If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme' " (p. 251).

But it is when we come to *Process and Reality* (1929), that the concept of God occupies,—what it must occupy, one can well suppose, if used at all,—a supreme place. The final chapter, "God and the World," gives us by far the most extended, and by far the most extreme exposition of the doctrine. Far be it from me to deny that there may be much logic and rationality running through the chapter and hingeing upon previous chapters, although I must admit that my mind does not succeed in getting clarity even on this. But to me it seems manifestly impossible to arrive by any rational path at the sweeping declarations which more and more make up the substance of the chapter as it marches to its climax. God, we are told, has two sides to his nature, primordial and consequent: the one side "is free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious." The other side "is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious. His necessary goodness expresses the determination of his consequent nature" (p. 524).

The next section is nothing short of apocalyptic. "The perfection of God's subjective aim . . . is a tender care that nothing be lost. . . . He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved" (p. 532). Certainly the whole chapter must be read; yet I cannot think that these categorical statements can be ignored.

The third book is, of course, *Adventures of Ideas,* and it is in the preface to this book that we are told that the three books make up one coherent whole. This third book, we are also told, "is in fact a study of the concept of civilization," and the actual contents abundantly verify the statement. Surely then, if the first major proposition concerning God, that he is the principle of concretion, is truly significant, it is hard to see how this study can dispense with God, since civilization is the sum of those concrescences which most essentially concern the life and destiny of man. And if it is God's nature "to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominion supreme,' " surely God should play some major role in nearly all of the twenty chapter-

themes of the book, and certainly in the consummatory items of Truth, Beauty, Adventure, and Peace (Part IV).

Yet a reader unfamiliar with Whitehead's other books might go through *Adventures of Ideas* without suspecting the author of any special interest in God. The index carries only one reference under the word God, as compared with some sixty references in *Process and Reality,* and that one reference oddly enough covers a mere allusion to Plato's views. The word does occur actually several times, with better claim to the attention of the indexer, but nowhere, so far as I can discover, in any context in which it is both clearly comprehensible and significant. There is one cloudy passage at the bottom of page 319, with the phrase "the Essence of God," which should be significant, and one, on page 326, which definitely echoes the phraseology of *Process and Reality,*—"the valuations involved in the Primordial Nature of God." But the other occurrences are trivial, even unfavorable.

We must now revert to the last cited passage, and quote it at more length for its bearing upon our main question: "the valuations involved in the Primordial Nature of God, here also termed the Eros of the Universe." Oddly enough this occurrence of *Eros,* by far the most significant, to me at least, of the many in the book, escaped the attention of the indexer. This passage seems to present itself as definition of "the Eros of the Universe," and so to raise, at least, the possibility of remedying the absence of the concept of God. But *Eros* appears scattered liberally through the book in advance of the definition. In most of these earlier occurrences it is frankly "the Platonic Eros," which, it is said, is "the soul stirring itself to life and motion" (p. 84; also pp. 188, 189. 302, 354, 355, 366), and so apparently an individual rather than a divine character or entity. But, even before the definition is provided, this larger sense of Eros appears,—on page 323 we read: "But we have to ask whether nature does not contain within itself a tendency to be in tune, an Eros urging toward perfection."

Again, on page 357, we find a whole paragraph in which God and the Divine Eros are brought together, and are told that "We must conceive the Divine Eros as the active entertainment of all ideals, with the urge to their finite realization, each in its due season." In the light of these and other passages in the last chapters it seems clear that to some extent the Eros, or at least the Divine Eros, takes the role in this book of the God of the two earlier books. The "lower criticism" on this is

that it is bad terminology, falling far indeed below the standard properly expected of a great mathematical logician. But far more grave than the looseness of terminology is the cloudy mysticism which infects the doctrine of the Eros in this book, as it does the doctrine of God in the others.

Nothing is further from my intent than to exhibit lack of respect for these utterances of Professor Whitehead concerning God, in and of themselves. For it seems to me that one of the most momentous tasks of the intelligence and moral energy of our epoch is to preserve and enhance the vast values which, in the past, have been widely and deeply involved in the concept of God, at a time when the older logic of that concept has been largely swept away by the advance of human knowledge. For that reason I find satisfaction in the concern of a great mind such as Whitehead's in the problem. I would gladly know such profound and vital truths about the universe in which I must live my life, if indeed they be truths. But to the utmost limit of my capacity to understand, such things as Professor Whitehead so eloquently declares about God and the World lie decisively beyond the realm of knowledge in that other realm called faith. Being a voluntarist and a pragmatist of sorts, I must count faith no mean thing in my scheme of life and thought. Still my response to these declarations is expressed in Russell's "Of the reality or unreality of the mystic's world I know nothing."[2]

As I read over and over Whitehead's eloquent and expansive utterances about God and the Nature of God, and still more, perhaps, when I read similar discourse in Professor Hartshorne's chapter on Whitehead's doctrine of God, I cannot but be impressed by the age-old momentous silence and reserve of God himself, even when men cry out most passionately that he should speak or act. I cannot better conclude than with Russell's concluding words in the essay already referred to: "A truly scientific philosophy will be more humble, more piecemeal, more arduous, offering less glitter of outward mirage to flatter fallacious hopes, but . . . more capable of accepting the world without the tyrannous imposition of our human and temporary demands."

2. *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 12.

BOOK REVIEWS

Horus, Royal God of Egypt. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER. Grafton, Massachusetts: Society of Oriental Research, 1942. xx + 231 pp., 1 plate, and 106 figures. $3.80.

In this book Professor Mercer has "attempted to present an account of the important Egyptian god Horus, as full as our present sources and knowledge will permit." It is evident that the volume is the result of long and painstaking research. As background material it presents a detailed sketch of the prehistoric and early dynastic periods, as well as an up-to-date account of their organization and political evolution. Then, more directly in line with the purpose of the book, follow detailed notes on Horus, the gods associated and identified with him, his possible origin, family connections, places where he was worshipped, and many representations of the god in his numerous aspects. In addition, the author has appended to his book extensive lists of epithets of Horus and personal names in which the god's name occurs.

As students of Egyptian religion are well aware, books devoted to the subject in general and to individual gods in particular do not make easy reading. This volume is no exception, though the section devoted to the conflict between Horus and Set is as interestingly related as any account known to this reviewer.

The book will prove exceedingly useful to specialists of ancient religion, for it has assembled most of the available material, together with an impressive number of important bibliographical references. Unfortunately, however, Professor Mercer's work is neither so thorough nor so accurate as to make it the last word on the subject. The author would, of course, be the last one to make such a claim for his book. In this stage of Egyptological studies, however, it should be possible to write an account of Horus which is much more than "tentative" and "complete for the moment." It is exceedingly doubtful whether more than a few details of fact will ever be added to the existing body of material available for the study of this ancient Egyptian god.

It is evident that Professor Mercer has attempted to design his book so that it would not be prohibitive in price. It is a practice which might well be emulated by the producers of archeological books in these days. Nevertheless, since the illustrations constitute such an important part of the volume, presenting as they do most of the different forms and aspects

of Horus, it is greatly to be regretted that the author chose to publish nothing but "merely rough but useful tracings and drawings of numerous published and unpublished representations." As a result, most of them leave much to be desired, and nearly all of them are inferior in quality to the originals from which they were taken. Some of them (e.g., figs. 45, 94, 101) would scarcely be recognizable except to one unusually familiar with the subject matter. In this era of scientific publication methods, good illustrations could easily have been obtained from the sources utilized by the author, and they would have enhanced the value of the book immeasurably.

Slips of the pen and other errors are too numerous to catalogue in detail. However, it will be useful to point out a few of them. On page 90 the author, in his discussion of the origin of Horus, believes that no one by that name had ever lived, to become the god Horus in later times. "Horus" was just an idea which had its home in Lower Egypt. On page 186, however, Horus is traced to Egypt by way of the Wadi Hammamat from Mesopotamia. This contradiction (and Egyptian religion is full of contradictions) might have been clarified for the general reader by a system of cross references.

"The earliest known representation of Horus in human form with the head of a falcon" is not really Horus at all, nor does the figure have the head of a falcon. The author's own Fig. 10, though not so distinct as the source from which it was traced, is clearly a typical representation of the anthropomorphic animal-headed Set. The ears are somewhat shorter than in many later representations of this god, but they are quite unmistakable. Furthermore, King Peribsen, on whose seal this figure occurs, was closely associated with Set, and Professor Mercer himself states that the alleged Horus of Fig. 10 (which he supplies with an interrogation point) "stands before the Set name of the king." It may likewise confidently be denied that any Second Dynasty mixed form of god with lion head, mule ears, and human form (p. 45) ever existed. Even the horse did not appear in Egypt for more than fifteen hundred years after the Second Dynasty, and there is but one representation of a mule known to this reviewer from the entire realm of Egyptian art.

The author states (p. 99) that "the falcon-god took the name *ḥr* because of his identification with the heaven-god." This argument is evidently based on the association with the word *ḥr.t* for "heaven," lit., "that which is above"; the best authorities, however, including the au-

thors of the *Wörterbuch der ägyptischen Sprache,* are agreed that the word *ḥr.t* is connected rather with the verbal root meaning "to be far away."

In his discussion of the five-fold titulary of the Egyptian king (p. 145), the author perpetuates the old error of interpreting the title *nśw.t bi.t* (incorrectly written *nśw.t bitj* on page 81) as "King of North and South," instead of the correct "King of Upper and Lower Egypt." Indeed, the error is more serious than it appears on the surface because of the reversed order of the two divisions of the Egyptian united kingdom. The precedence of Upper over Lower Egypt in this title has been the subject of a great deal of historical discussion. To Professor Mercer the word for "King of Upper Egypt" is everywhere in the volume derived from the word *nśw.t,* "reed" (e.g., p. 50); but the word which he translates as "reed" is really *św.t,* and that for "King of Upper Egypt, "*nśw.t,*" lit., "the one belonging to the *św.t* plant."

There is probably no good philological ground for interpreting the title *Ḥr-'ḥ.ty* (pp. 122, 139) as anything but "Horus of the Horizon." The second part of the name is plainly a nisbe form, not a dual, though resembling a dual in its orthography.

Translation of *Ḥr-'ḥntj-ḫtj* as "Horus Possessor of the Body (divine)" (p. 126) ignores the ending of *ḫtj;* this word must be distinguished from *ḥ.t* "body." Like many of the primitive names and epithets of gods, including many named in the author's two appendices, the sense of this one is obscure, perhaps too much so for a translation to be attempted at all.

While it appears now that the Canaanite god Horon had been adopted into the Egyptian pantheon by the time of Amenhotep II, there is much more to be said on this subject than is implied by Professor Mercer (pp. 136-7). This reviewer expects to disprove, when he returns to civilian life after the war, on the basis of the hieratic writing, the erroneous view proposed by Montet (*Revue Biblique,* XLIV, 158-59), and accepted by Edwards (*Hieroglyphic Texts from Egyptian Stelae, etc., in the British Museum,* VIII, Pl. 27), Smithers (*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology,* XXVI, 164), and most recently by Albright (*BASOR,* 84, p. 9), that the name of the Pharaoh Haremhab should be read *Ḥawrūn-em-ḥab,* or the like. For the hieratic writing proves, without a doubt, that the complete form of the name was *Ḥr-m-ḥb-mry-n-'Imn,* "Haremhab, Beloved of Amun." The genitive word *n,* normally written in hieroglyphic over the back of

the falcon *Ḥr*, is in the hieratic removed from that convenient space in the cartouche and written, where it belongs, after the passive participle *mry*, "beloved." The Pharaoh Haremhab was proud of his dependence on the god Horus, and there is no justification whatever in transforming that "god of his city" into a foreign god from western Asia.

Professor Mercer's book deserves much more attention than the present reviewer has been able to devote to it, separated as he is from facilities of study and research. Like many of his fellow orientalists, he will be glad to have it close at hand when, after the war, he resumes his place at his desk and resumes the study of ancient history and culture.

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Myth and Society in Attic Drama. By ALAN M. G. LITTLE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. vii + 95 pp. $1.50.

The first sentence of the preface gives the theme of this book: "The present study is an attempt at putting the two halves of a single picture together—the one half Attic drama, the other Attic society." The author feels that the traditional appreciation of Greek drama has too often neglected the sociological setting of the Greek theatre and wishes to discover not what makes the Greek theatre timeless, but what made it originally timely. What could it have meant to contemporary listeners that it may fail, on the surface, to tell a modern reader, and could we profit by recovering the topical as well as the more general thought and feeling in it?

The Greek theatre is the collection of extant Greek plays, and the ruins of the theatre buildings. What is Attic society? Professor Little accepts the common story of its political and social changes as they are outlined in any good book of general Greek history, but he brings to the ordinary story the new touchstones of social psychology and anthropological studies. He is particularly interested in observing how Attic society in the late sixth century and in the fifth is losing "tribal" viewpoints and is growing into democratic attention to the individual, and how the manners of the drama keep pace with this change. "Aeschylus' audience of primitive folk is more keenly alive to symbolic thought than to abstraction" (p. 11) and represents, sociologically, the moving from tribal life and mythological interpretations of its values to a political life

and a conscious and organized thinking. This conscious and organized, rather than subconscious, thought comes to appeal more and more until it over-does itself in Euripides' time and in Euripides' plays, where it loses the old assurances of Aeschylus' day and flounders among the doubts and subtleties of sophisticated logic. Mythology is discredited as rationality advances.

> Each dramatist in bringing his myths into line with the state of public credulity and public conscience in his day, is adding his contribution to a destructive process. . . . One cannot lay too much stress upon this fact, for it is the key to the evolution of Greek tragedy. By its aid the sum of what the group accepted as matter for belief became in the course of one century material for the exercise of the individual's judgment (p. 19).

In the drama of Aeschylus we see a dramatization of the conflict of old codes and new thinking, but "Aeschylus is less an elaborator of new and strikingly original lines of thought than an adapter of an old faith to new conditions" (p. 42). Sophocles shows the pathos of old tribal viewpoints in combat with fresher concepts. Antigone is "a tribal heroine in a democratic age" (p. 44), and Electra is "the true representative of a traditional code which lends her individuality when her sister deserts it" (p. 45). With Euripides, tragedy ceases "to combat residual codes of tribal thought or to bolster in the face of democracy the codes of the aristocrat" (p. 49), and depicts "the conflict of the human soul in the shattered ruins of a society" (p. 58). Aristophanes, learning a great deal from Euripides, shows the conflicts within the democracy between individuals and established majorities. The Hellenistic age perpetuated the Greek theatre as one of the accompaniments of the new bourgeois society formed by the educated Greek classes in the new Hellenistic cities. Here the New Comedy, it, too, leaning heavily on Euripides, gives a form which combines comedy and tragedy, a drama "like the society it represented, civilized, rational, and articulate, not really comic in the broader sense so much as ironic and philosophic, compassionate and detached" (p. 63).

The structure of the theatre buildings reflected the sociological and psychological beliefs of the times. Aeschylus' theatre had, and needed, little scenery, for "psychologically the growth of visual imagination reverses that of verbal expression" (p. 71). As thought becomes conscious and logical, and the imagination weakens, the scene buildings and appurtenances grow elaborate.

Professor Little, in this book, gives interesting and plausible interpretations of a number of plays in terms of social changes and pressures. It is only when he attempts the whole picture of the theatre as a "solvent for social conflict" (p. vi) and too rigidly places the three great tragedians in this struggle that the reader draws back. The whole picture remains somewhat hazy, partly because the author does not always make his terms clear, and partly because the subject of Greek society is itself a hazy one and seems bound to remain so. The style of the book is often smooth and condensed, and the reader is therefore surprised when many phrases seem to need sharpening; the very opening sentence, for example, seems a little confusing, "The present study is an attempt at putting the two halves of a single picture together—the one half Attic drama, the other Attic society"; *are* these really two halves of a single picture, or is society the whole picture and the theatre a part of it, a symptom of it, too, if you like?

A similar lack of clarity accompanies the use of the word "primitive," a confusion which is not dispelled by glances at modern primitives; in any such comparison it is easy to ask, "Were the Greeks like the Polynesians" and easy to forget to ask, "Are the Polynesians like the Greeks?" This anthropological approach is evidently very important to Professor Little, but he does not carry the reader through his use of it, and, to one who sees his results but not his methods, some of his conclusions seem opportune rather than inevitable. If the reader were certain, for example, that the word primitive were applied only to sociological attitudes—tribal codes of conduct—he would be less inclined to think of ways in which even the earliest Greeks were sophisticated.

In this study, mythology is regarded as symbolic language employed by primitive thought, and its use after the victory of logical thought is considered vestigial. But this is too summary a view; whatever mythology may be among other peoples, Greek mythology is a complex subject, not to be airily dismissed. And it is a way of thought which seems to have been with the Greeks, from Homer until now, living perfectly comfortably in the mind by the side of a capacity, evident from Homer down, for seeing life in other and more "realistic" terms. It alternates with the rationalistic and relieves or extends it; it may even grow in power with the spur of logical thought to challenge it. We may not agree with the idea that the Greeks created this mythology because they saw life with painful clarity and alleviated the pain with the poetry of the myth, but

one can easily agree with Santayana's feeling that "a good mythology cannot be produced without much culture and intelligence. . . . Nor is mythology essentially a half-way house between animal vagueness in the soul and scientific knowledge."

Troubling this study throughout is the lack of detail in the historical picture of Attic society, a lack not due to Professor Little; it still seems that the data for a clear picture are too meagre. We keep adding all the new evidences of art, epigraphy, archeology, comparative studies in religion, sociology, and economics, but as yet the data from all other sources are less than those given in Greek literature, and literature is just where one does not wish to go if one is to pose the literature against the society; for if one gathers the picture from the literature it is obviously a mistake to marvel how well the literature reflects the society. Perhaps a continued use of new touchstones, such as anthropological and psychological studies, may produce new insights, but these should be tried upon the whole of a society, and Greek literature very often is not interested in the whole picture. Being aristocratic, it is likely to neglect portions of the social structure, and it frequently does what Professor Little objects to in many critics of the drama—it concentrates its attention upon individuals and does not speak to the satisfaction of any modern sociologist in terms of classes, social patterns, or abstract social principles. In some way, the picture must be more thoroughly assembled without the help of literature; then we shall know how much each single writer is using society and how much his own personality in his work.

It is certainly true that Greek drama grows in interest with attention to its social milieu, and even literary critics of the drama have discussed the social backgrounds as necessary to any full appreciation; Professor Little's book reminds us again that all the ingredients of the drama must be considered, though no one of them alone explains the final effect, and all together are but material for the artist's use. Perhaps every generation with its own special viewpoint should rewrite all past history; Professor Little feels it appropriate for us now to use our present newer critical methods upon Greek society; since each past writing of history is partially the biography of the historian, there will be few to say the present hour should not attempt its interpretations, in spite of difficulties with the old material. A sociological approach may not in the end arrive at a very detailed picture of Attic society or be able to detect all the reverberations of social movements as they sound throughout

the drama, but some degree of clarity should come, and there will be many incidental discoveries which will be as valuable as the articulation of the main theme. In the study of ritualistic backgrounds of tragedy, no one has yet found the exact ritual patterns back of the theatre, but a great many important facts about Greek religion have come to light. Study of the sociological side should be as worth while.

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The Wisdom of China and India. By Lin Yutang. New York: Random House, 1942. xiii + 1104 pp. $3.95.

If ever there was a time when an understanding between East and West was imperative, that time is now. Too long we of the West have neglected the values which the East has developed. To be sure, there has been some little academic interest in Eastern culture, though, alas, far too little even of that! But the man on the street has had very little of it brought to him in a form which he would understand or which would make an appeal to him. Fortunately in recent years there has developed some popular interest in the literature of the East, particularly the sacred literature, and these have been, through well edited anthologies, made available to western readers. Some of these have attained to a modest sale, but, edited by little known people whose names have created no extensive market for their books, they have had to depend on the usual book selling methods for their circulation.

The significance of the book here under review lies not so much in the quality of the content of the book nor the skill and wisdom that have gone into its editing, as in the fact that it bears on its title page the name of a man who has won great popularity by his previous writings, and who will, therefore, have a wide market for his book simply among the Lin Yutang "fans." This is not, however, its only claim to attention. It is a good workmanlike job which will commend itself to scholars as well as to popular readers.

In the first place, it contains not a little material which has not hitherto appeared in English translation, and this is a real service. Take the "Six Chapters of a Floating Life," a simple, unadorned account

of a Chinese who lived in the latter part of the eighteenth century. What better or more appealing picture of Chinese life has yet been published? Or take the private history of Queen Feyien, who lived in the first century B.C., or some of the Chinese tales which Lin Yutang has translated. They combine to offer a picture of Chinese life that is quite remarkable.

In the second place, it offers new translations of material already frequently translated and published in English. Here the most notable example is the little Taoist classic. Only those who know Chinese may venture to criticize or evaluate Lin Yutang's own translation, but comparison of his work with that of a number of better known, older translations leads one to the conclusion that, if he is not more accurate he is, at least, more intelligible in his rendering and frequently expresses himself with greater grace and charm. Sometimes the difference between the translations is considerable. For example, contrast two translations of Chapter 35:

> To him who holds to the Great Form all the world will go.
> It will go and see no danger, but tranquillity, equality and community.
> Music and dainties will make the passing stranger stop.
> But Tao when uttered in words is so pure and void of flavour.
> When one looks at it, one cannot see it;
> When one listens to it, one cannot hear it.
> However, when one uses it, it is inexhaustible.
>
> (Translation of Chin Ta-Kao)

> Hold the Great Symbol
> And all the world follows,
> Follows without meeting harm,
> (And lives in) health, peace, commonwealth.
> Offer good things to eat
> And the wayfarer stays.
> But Tao is mild to the taste.
> Looked at, it cannot be seen;
> Listened to, it cannot be heard;
> Applied, its supply never fails.
>
> (Translation of Lin Yutang)

Occasional differences would seem to indicate the use of different texts from which the translations are made. Lin Yutang is careful to

state the text upon which he bases his translation, while others have not usually done so. He also furnishes his own translation of Chuangtse. Needless to say, the whimsicality of the original writer has lost nothing in passing through the mind of his most recent translator.

In the third place, Lin Yutang has supplied liberal introductory discussions concerning each of the major sections of his book. These alone add greatly to its value as as essay in human understanding. Take his general introduction to the Wisdom of China, where he discusses Chinese civilization. He repudiates the often made generalization that the Chinese is devoid of deep spirituality. He says:

> I agree entirely, on its being humanistic; I disagree on its being non-mystical, for any culture which has a broad and deep spiritual basis must be in a sense mystical. If by "non-mystical" is meant the modern servile and shallow worship of mechanistic and materialistic facts, accurately observed and well-tabulated, seemingly sufficient unto themselves, which is the prevalent type of thinking today, them I must repudiate that Chinese civilization ever fell so low. The fact is, any branch of knowledge, whether it be the study of rocks and minerals, or the study of cosmic rays, strikes mysticism as soon as it reaches any depth.

He is proud that China has no systematic philosophy.

> They have too much sense for that. The sea of human life forever laps upon the shores of Chinese thought, and the arrogance and absurdities of the logician, the assumption that "I am exclusively right and you are exclusively wrong," are not Chinese faults, whatever other faults they may have.

Incidentally, he passes judgment upon Western philosophers, declaring that

> There are professors of philosophy but there are no philosophers. . . . We need a philosophy of living and we clearly have not got it. The Western man has tons of philosophy written by French, German, English and American philosophers, but still he has not got a philosophy when he wants it. In fact he seldom wants it (p. 569).

It will be good for the souls of Americans and Westerners generally to read Lin Yutang's introduction to the *Wisdom of China.*

Through the introductions to various sections, technical scholars will be likely to note that the author has taken little account of more recent works of scholarship on Chinese chronology. He still uses without apparent question the older chronologies which rest upon the

scholarly work of Legge and other early Sinologists. When he uses the translations of others from the Chinese he usually gives his reasons. "The Book of History" he takes from Legge's translations, likewise Mencius. Of Confucius' own sayings he makes his own translation. In his poetic selections he chooses from the work of various translators, though he confesses those of Helen Waddell seem to him best. Here one finds poems from the Odes and many other ancient lyrics, but he also includes poems from later writers.

As might be expected, his principal contribution is in his section on the Wisdom of China, for in the Indian section he must depend on the judgment and literary skill of others. On the whole, however, his selections there are well made. Others would undoubtedly omit some things which he includes, and include other writings. Thus the present reviewer thinks he has done less with the Rig-Veda than he might have done. He leans heavily on the tenth book. Also his selections from the Upanishads seem rather too brief and not sufficiently representative of the breadth of interest which they display, though it must be said that the selections he includes are good. Perhaps because he expects his readers to be mainly those without special interest in philosophy, he has put into less than twenty pages all that he has taken from the basic philosophic texts of India. Of course every one would include the *Bhagavad-Gītā,* or the Lord's Song, though many would have chosen a different translation. For popular consumption the present reviewer would have chosen Edwin Arnold's rendering. Lacking something, perhaps, in detailed scholarship, it nevertheless has a literary quality which makes it readable to a degree not found in most other versions. He has chosen to include the epic of Rāmā, using the Romesh-Dutt translation. He omits anything from the *Mahābhārata* save the *Gītā,* though here again it would seem to the reviewer that room might have been found by omitting some of the *Rāmāyana* to include either "Nala and Damyanti" or "Savitri and Satyavan" or "Love Conquers Death," one of the loveliest of Indian stories.

For humor, he takes certain fables from the *Panchatantra,* using Arthur W. Ryder's translation. From Buddhism, he includes the *Dhammapada,* some scattered Buddhist parables and legends, and Sir Edward Arnold's long poetic story of the life of Buddha, *The Light of Asia.* For the rest, Buddhism is represented by the *Surangama-Sutra,* a

not so well-known writing preserved in Chinese translation. This Sutra he believes is "the best approach to the philosophical basis of Buddhist belief . . . , a kind of *Essay on Human Understanding* and the *Gospel of St. John* combined, with the intellectual force of the one and the religious spirit of the other." A useful glossary of Hindu terms is provided, in which it is gratifying to note that all diacritical markings are omitted which have no meaning to the non-technical scholar and are therefore of little or no use in a popular treatise.

Altogether, the publishing of this book is something of a literary event. It should be in every public and college library and on the shelves of a vast number of American citizens and others of the English speaking world. Here is entertainment, instruction, spiritual insight, beauty, and charm. Here is the best that the two great cultures of the East have thus far produced. It would be difficult for one who reads long in these writings to continue to think of the people of China and India as an inferior people, unworthy to be admitted to our country and to become citizens thereof.

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Early Christian Art: An Outline of the Evolution of Style and Iconography in Sculpture and Painting from Antiquity to the Eighth Century. By CHARLES RUFUS MOREY. Princeton University Press, 1942. ix + 282 pp. 211 illustrations on 70 plates. $7.50.

Professor Morey's main purpose, as he says, is "to link early Christian art with its late antique sources." The guiding thesis may be stated briefly as follows, at the risk of simplifying his thought.

In late antiquity, since the third century B.C., art shows two divergent lines, a neo-Attic and an Alexandrian: the first, a deliberate traditionalism, which reproduces the forms and types of Greek art of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.; the second, a more vivacious, modern, picturesque art, with landscape, moving figures and a certain episodic liveliness. In the period between the first and fifth centuries A.D., the two styles are widely diffused in the Greco-Roman world, but are modified by the influence of the Orient, which experiences a renaissance, reacting against Hellenistic domination and imposing on Greco-Roman art its

own native taste for more schematized, primitive, frontal, decorative, coloristic, and rhythmical forms. There is also a negative factor, the decay and barbarization resulting from the decline of ancient society; it appears in Rome as well as in the provinces, and is manifested in rigidity, loss of classic proportions, and in technical crudeness. The neo-Attic tradition is preserved most faithfully in Asia Minor, where Morey has localized some of its productive centers, and the opposed impressionistic style survives in Alexandria until the seventh century, when the Arab conquest of Egypt drives the artists of that country to Italy, Constantinople, and Salonica and thereby refreshes the waning Hellenism of those regions, transmitting to them the models for the classicistic revivals of the ninth and tenth centuries in both the Greek and Latin worlds. The interplay of these ingredients, the neo-Attic, the Alexandrian, the Oriental and the provincial-barbarian, of varying strength in different localities, constitutes the story of early Christian art. The synthesis of the Oriental and the neo-Attic produces Byzantine art, while in the Latin West the Alexandrian tradition is stronger and, with its greater realism and mobility of forms, already established in pagan Roman art, determines the large direction of Western mediaeval art (although in the fifth and sixth centuries, Northern Italy and Gaul are also subject to the orientalized neo-Attic forms of Asia Minor).

Besides this broad conception of development should be mentioned Morey's theory of the origin of the great cycles of biblical illustration. It enters often into his judgment of particular works and will interest students of the text tradition. He believes that the long cycles of the Old Testament in mosaic, fresco, miniature-painting, ivory, etc., which supplanted the sporadic and variable subjects of the first phase of Christian art (as in the catacombs), are all derived ultimately from an illustrated Alexandrian Septuagint manuscript, possibly a Jewish work of the second century A.D., and that this origin agrees with the numerous elements of Alexandrian style in such cycles and accounts for the persistance of the illusionistic forms in late images of the Old Testament. On the other hand, the corresponding cycles of the gospel story come from an Asia Minor or Syro-Palestinian illustrated manuscript and are therefore essentially Asiatic, that is, neo-Attic, in style, since the art of Syria and Palestine, according to Morey, depended largely on Asia Minor.

This large view of early Christian art has the merit of uniting in a

single scheme the numerous scattered works and of isolating a few major factors to clarify the historical trends over a period of almost a thousand years. From this viewpoint, Morey describes a great number of images, each one being broken up into typical details that may be conveniently referred to some older stage or source. According to their Alexandrian or Asiatic elements, objects in various parts of the Mediterranean are assigned to Alexandrian or neo-Attic artists or are derived from their works. With the help of the Princeton Index of Christian Iconography, a powerful tool of research in this field, built up mainly through Morey's stimulation, he is able to present a valuable account of the frequency and location of types in the early period and to uncover hidden genealogical relationships that have escaped the attention of other writers. It should be said that the investigation of early Christian art in this country has been largely inspired by Morey, who alone provided a theory comprehensive enough to guide research. The results of the studies of iconographic and formal motifs carried out by Morey and his pupils have been incorporated into his conception of the historical development. This conception was already familiar from his other books and articles, but is more richly documented in the present work.

It is impossible to review this book without making clear that Morey's system and certain of his conclusions are not supported by the findings of other scholars, especially in Europe. His larger views have never been submitted to a searching criticism and have assumed a rather schematic character. The plausibility that his synthesis possesses, when stated broadly with reference to the main outlines of the development and a few typical works, begins to break down when the theory is applied as tenaciously as in this book to the whole variety of early Christian works. I do not propose to examine his views fully, but I shall try to state some of the reasons why they are unacceptable. The main difficulties lie in the rigid dualism of the neo-Attic and the Alexandrian, but they are also rooted in his general approach to art, in his standards of judgment and choice of problems, which narrow the range of interpretation to conform to his stylistic and historical schema.

Naturally, a work of this kind disregards or subordinates important aspects of Christian art. It is written mainly for those who are occupied like the author with problems of origins and classification. It will not satisfy an artist or a reader who wishes to understand the aesthetic

of this art, or to penetrate its content in a deeper way, or to see its living relations to Christian thought and institutions. Morey's conception of classic and Christian art as expressing two opposed world-views is no subject for investigation or more precise nuancing; once stated in the first chapter, it plays little part in the rest of the story. The fact that he relies so much on iconographic comparison is not inconsistent with this attitude, for the subject-matter is less significant to him as a vehicle of changing Christian ideas and feelings than as a clue to the geographical or typological place of the object. There is a tendency throughout the book to convert artistic problems into questions of ancestry and influence and to reduce the massive changes in content to phenomena of diffusion of models. History becomes a report of successive copyings and miscopyings, and the individual objects, summations of genealogical elements. If he observes in the art of the fourth century an increase of Old Testament subjects and Passion scenes, Morey explains this fact by the "dissemination in the Latin West of illustrated manuscripts from the East" (p. 68); not a word about the new content of Christian sentiment and doctrine at this time, and no effort to interpret the choice of the narrative scenes and to bring it into relation to what we know of that period of Christian history. And we feel the defect of such an approach to art all the more seriously when we consider that his explanation is only a conjecture: there are no manuscripts of the kind he invokes, nor is any evidence offered to show that the new biblical scenes on the sarcophagi of the fourth century originated in miniatures.

Considering Morey's avowed purpose, "to link early Christian art with its late antique sources," it is perhaps wrong to reproach him for not dealing with the other problems. Yet the narrowness remains disturbing, for it often affects the genealogical researches and leads to doubtful interpretations. He seems to be retracing the footprints of artists, rather than their imagination and sensibility, and where the path is broken or unclear, we become aware of the arbitrariness and sometimes the futility of his mapping of artistic movements. Morey is still guided by limiting academic standards in judging this art; his frequent abuse of certain works as crude and comical and degenerate, because of their naïveté or distortions of human forms, would be shocking to cultivated contemporary artists. His attitude toward Coptic, barbarian, and Merovingian art, to the Italian frieze sarcophagi and

the Roman mosaics of the ninth century, are cases in point.[1] Since Morey is our most respected American scholar in this field and his ideas are taught in many colleges as authoritative and as the most advanced insight into this great art, it is necessary to point out these critical limitations of his book.

If we turn to its real substance, which has been outlined in the first paragraphs of this review, and which is the result of a long and devoted labor of research, we are faced by theories and attributions of a decidedly controversial character. Here the difficulties inherent in the scattered materials and the complexity of the relationships to be studied are responsible for some of the divergencies of opinion. In many respects Morey's book springs directly from the great researches of forty years ago on the origins of Christian art, which were fruitful in extending our knowledge and ideas. The main hypothesis about the Hellenistic sources of Christian art and the preponderance of the near Eastern centers, Alexandria, Antioch, and the coastal cities of Asia Minor, had been worked out by Strzygowski and Ainaloff around 1900; the conception of the Orientalizing of classical and early Christian art was intensively elaborated by Strzygowski at the same time; and the writings of Wickhoff and Riegl in the 1890's and early 1900's established the importance of the new illusionistic and coloristic styles in late antiquity and the early Christian period and for the whole subsequent development of European art. The contrast of two styles, one, picturesque, and the other, more severe and conservative, was well-known to the older scholars, and has been formulated with great learning by Gabriel Millet.[2] If we consider the general ideas of Morey rather than his particular attributions, the novelty of his work lies, first of all, in the way in which he ties up these results to the genesis of med-

1. Morey's theory recalls the common academic judgment of the art of the last hundred years. Two opposed traditions are observed: the formal, conservative, classicist, originating in the South, and the more realistic, impressionist and colorist, developed in the northern countries. They rule until the end of the nineteenth century, when these strains are modified by the influence of exotic Oriental and primitive arts, which beget the Expressionist and Cubist styles, and by the presumed decadence of Europe which leads to complete abstraction and surrealism.

2. The possibility of a Jewish illustrated Old Testament manuscript was already proposed by Strzygowski before the discovery of the Dura synagogue, in his studies of the Ashburnham Pentateuch and the Alexandrian World Chronicle. But he did not conceive of this work as the archetype of all the extensive Christian cycles of the Old Testament.

ieval art, especially in the West (and this is most apparent in his explanation of the classicizing currents in the early Middle Ages and in his chapter on the Italo-Gallic school), and secondly, in the overwhelming importance that he gives to Alexandria as a creative center up to the seventh century A.D.

Forty or fifty years ago the emphasis on Alexandria was in part a polemical correction of the view that Rome was the chief source of Christian art. The scholars who presented the new thesis did pioneer work in exploring the monumental remains in the Near East. Since that time opinions have differed mainly in evaluating the relative weight of the Greek and native Oriental factors, and in interpreting the processes in which the new styles arose. In Morey's book we are brought back to the controversies of 1900, but the old Alexandrian thesis is now part of a highly schematized polar explanation of the whole course of early Christian and even medieval art, and it is defended with a richer material and the resources of the Index of Christian Iconography.

Nevertheless, the conception of Alexandrian art rests on little evidence from the remains in Alexandria, as Morey himself admits (p. 38), and for that reason alone is bound to inspire doubts in the minds of critical readers. It is conceivable that a single center was so preponderant in the development of art (the examples of Florence and Paris come to mind), but the claims for the domination of Alexandrian art during a period of almost a thousand years are based on arguments which would hardly be enough to establish the unique importance of one of the medieval or modern centers for a single generation. At the same time, Morey underestimates Constantinople between the fourth and seventh centuries, when that city was the capital of the Eastern empire and the assured source of works of sculpture, painting, and architecture of the highest quality.[3]

What makes the conception all the more doubtful is that the criteria of Alexandrian style fluctuate throughout the book. In general, the

3. The important Christian sarcophagus discovered in Constaninople in 1933 and reproduced by Morey (fig. 102) gives an idea of the superior level of stone sculpture there. Morey cites the sculptures of the base of Theodosius' obelisk merely as an example of neo-Attic style, a wholly inadequate judgment of this remarkably significant and original work. At the same time, he disregards the reliefs of the destroyed column of Theodosius, which we know from old drawings. They include landscape, architectural elements, moving figures, and personifications—the typical Alexandrian paraphernalia—and support the possibility of a local source of the Joshua Roll, which has a related military content.

distinguishing mark of the Alexandrian, as opposed to the parallel neo-Attic style, is the illusionistic method: representation in a flecked, atmospheric, picturesque manner, which Morey sometimes identifies with modern Impressionism. Since this method is often applied to landscape, the presence of a landscape background or of isolated elements of nature in a painting or relief becomes for Morey a sign of the Alexandrian origin or descent of the work, even though the landscape itself (not to mention the figures) is not especially illusionistic in style. He justifies this by the assumption that "unlimited space," regardless of other characteristics, is a specifically Alexandrian contribution to art. The suggestion of a deep or open background, and even the overlapping of figures where there is no landscape or indication of locality, as in the Ara Pacis in Rome, is a proof of an Alexandrian connection. On the other hand, a setting of buildings and trees which limits the depth of the image, although it overcomes the older neutrality of the background, is a symptom of the neo-Attic style, an attempt to preserve the traditional Greek ideal of the limited and the general, in spite of the rendering of the environment; because of the distinctive "completeness of the Greek comprehension of the world," the Greek mind dislikes the indefinite and incomplete and is indifferent to the particular. I doubt that this correlation of the neutral or limiting background with the "Greek mind" accounts for the spatial quality in question. The neutral background is also usual in Egyptian and old Oriental art, as well as in the arts of most primitive peoples and of the early Middle Ages. What concerns us more at this point is the fact that the background is neutral or limited, in Morey's sense, in some of the chief works that he assigns to Alexandria (and in the early Alexandrian objects that he ignores). In the basic polar types of the portraits of the evangelists, it turns out that the standing type, which he is certain originated in Alexandria, perhaps as early as the second century A.D., has a neutral background, while in the seated type of author, attributed to the neo-Attic art of Asia Minor, there is a deeper background, sometimes including landscape.

To establish the Alexandrinism of numerous works which show neither the essential illusionism nor the landscape nor the unlimited space of the original definitions, other criteria have to be used: realism, the action or vivacity of figures, flying draperies, and certain iconographic details. Morey speaks sometimes as if there were an Alexandrian

type of figure, but this conception is unclear and merges too often with the characteristics assigned to the neo-Attic type. That is especially the case in the Maximianus Chair and in the images of the standing evangelists, both of which are assigned unhesitatingly to Alexandria. At one point we are confused by his terms, for he says, apropos of the future amalgamation of the neo-Attic and Alexandrian styles in the Byzantine art of about 1000, "the nobility of its [*sc.*, Alexandrian] figures will inform, elongate and monumentalize the two-dimensional flatness of the neo-Attic tradition" (p. 195), although earlier in the book it is the neo-Attic tradition that supplies the statuesque figure-types, and it is Alexandrian sketchiness that creates the anti-statuesque, unmonumental, filmy and mobile human forms. Of the iconographic details, isolated as symptoms of Alexandria (among others, the short-haired youthful Logos, the midwife with the withered arm at the Nativity, the personifications, the choice of scenes from the story of Joseph, the Blacherniotissa image, the altar with the zigzag crown, Nilotic landscape elements, the tree and stela, the standing evangelist, and especially the old Testament cycles as such), a considerable number of the examples are works which lack the stylistic marks of Alexandrian art. Morey accounts for this fact by the assumption that in such objects there is also an influence of the space-inhibiting neo-Attic or Asiatic style, or that Oriental and provincial tendencies in Egypt have reduced the fulness of the Alexandrian aspect. With these criteria and assumptions, it would be possible to claim for practically any object of early Christian art a direct or indirect connection with Alexandria. They are carried to such a point that, in considering two miniatures in a manuscript written in Constantinople, the Vienna Dioscurides, Morey distinguishes one as Alexandrian in its source because there is a small bit of landscape, as well as architecture, behind the figures, and the other as neo-Attic, because the background is wholly architectural. Yet the two are otherwise identical in style, and the second miniature is more illusionistic and has more depth than many works that Morey considers undoubtedly Alexandrian.[4] The most recent editor of the

4. A parallel example that shows the error of deducing stylistic origins from iconographic elements (according to the theory of the unity of stylistic and iconographic traditions, p. 77) is the pair of ivory book-covers in Etzschmiadzin and the Paris Bibliothèque Nationale. They are of the same style, but Christ is short-haired and youthful (Alexandrian) in one, bearded (Syrian) in the other. Yet two types of Christ occur in the paintings of Bawit in Egypt, in the miniatures of the Etzsch-

manuscript, Buberl, has observed a blue sky above the buildings of this "neo-Attic" miniature; and it should be said that in both paintings the author, Dioscurides, is shown seated. On the other hand, in treating the paintings in the Syriac Gospels of Rabula, Morey disregards the illusionistic mountains and sky of the Crucifixion and the figures over-lapping in depth in the Pentecost, but refers the style to the neo-Attic, Asiatic tradition ("the shrubbery," he says, "limits the background," p. 120). At the same time he does not hesitate to derive from Alexandrian art and to cite as an evidence of "Egyptian book-making" the paintings with neutral backgrounds in another Syriac manuscript (Paris, B.N. syr. 341).

If we did not have the inscription which makes the origin of the Dioscurides manuscript in Constantinople certain, I wonder if we could ever discover this provenance with the help of Morey's criteria. True enough, he observes that the presence of both Asiatic and Alexandrian forms in this manuscript points to the eclectic Constantinople as a likely place of origin; but we cannot forget that, although he discerns a mixture of his two polar styles in the consular ivory diptychs, he classifies them as Alexandrian, in spite of the obvious fact that they were made for rulers whose seat of office was in Constantinople, a center which produced some of the finest works of early Christian art. It is hard to accept a theory which uncovers works of Alexandrian style everywhere but in Alexandria, and denies the individuality of whole regions, reducing their art to vestiges or traditional derivatives of the arts of other centers remote in time and place. In several instances, where documents assure us of the local production of an art, we run into contradiction of Morey's thesis; the excavations of Antioch confirmed what had been inferred before, that illusionism was practised here as in other great centers and was not simply an importation from Alexandria and Rome. The study of the columnar sarcophagi of the fourth century showed that although the decorative type issues from

miadzin Gospels, in the Rabula Gospels, in the mosaics of the S. Appollinare Nuovo in Ravenna and of Sta. Maria Maggiore in Rome, on the doors of Sta. Sabina, etc., without our being able to conclude from that fact that there were two artists of different origin, or that models from two different centers were employed. The same objection may be raised to the inference of Friend and Morey that the use of two seated and two standing evangelists in Syriac, Armenian, and Georgian Gospel manuscripts implies an eclectic combination of Alexandrian and Asia Minor models. Pagan art already grouped authors in sitting and standing pairs.

a pagan model of Asia Minor, not one of the Christian examples comes from Asia Minor; except for the single example from Constantinople, they were produced in Italy and Gaul. The effort to refer widely diffused characteristics of early Christian art to a single center is bound to fail, since it is based on assumptions contrary to what we know about the nature of early Christian culture.

I think that a careful reader who is not well-informed about the material will be inclined to suspect Morey's theory on logical grounds alone. But serious objections will be brought by scholars against the criteria themselves, either because of neglected material which contradicts Morey's general statements or because of the arbitrariness with which details of the works of art are forced into the pattern of his theory. In the Vienna Genesis, in the scene of Joseph guided by an angel in searching for his brothers, Morey thinks that this angel, who is not mentioned in the text, "probably duplicates a personification in the Alexandrian original." But this figure is familiar to Jewish Midrashic literature as Gabriel, and there is no reason whatever to interpret him as Morey does. In the same way, he describes the *baetylion,* an obvious Semitic type, in another scene in this manuscript (fig. 69), as an "Alexandrian stela"; and the horned altar, which is represented in several scattered works of early Christian art, is declared to be a specific Alexandrian mark, in spite of its frequency in Syria and Palestine and the reference to it in the Old Testament. The representation of Zechariah with a sickle in Paris, Bibl. nat. ms. syr. 341 is for him a sign of an Alexandrian artist or model, because the sickle is due to a mistranslation of the Hebrew text in the Septuagint; but is there any reason to suppose that an attribute of Zechariah, based on a text so widely used throughout the Mediterranean, could only have been copied from an Alexandrian painting? Of the three known examples in early Christian art, two are found in Syriac manuscripts and the third in a Byzantine copy of a sixth century work, the Christian *Topography of Cosmas Indicopleustes.* If Cosmas was an Alexandrian, it does not follow that the illustrations of his book were faithful to Alexandrian iconography; he himself tells the reader of his indebtedness to Syriac sources for certain of his ideas. There is reason to suspect that in this detail of Zechariah's sickle, the miniature depends on Syrian tradition. The text accompanying the image, a short paragraph on the prophet as one of those who foretold

the coming of Christ (V, 237), cites first of all the passage in Zechariah "Behold thy King will come to thee, lowly, and riding upon an ass" (9:9), which was quoted in Matthew 21:5, as an Old Testament prophecy of Christ's entry into Jerusalem on an ass.[5] Now it is precisely a figure of Zechariah who bears a roll with this prophecy beneath the painting of the Entry into Jerusalem in the Rossano Gospels, a manuscript which seems to be of Antiochene origin and in any case, according to Morey, belongs to the Asiatic-Syro-Palestinian pole rather than the Alexandrian. The idea of juxtaposing prophets with New Testament scenes also appears in the Rabula Gospels. Since the image of Zechariah with the sickle occurs in this manuscript, it may be asked whether the example in the Cosmas manuscript, associated with the prophetic concordance of the Old and New Testament, is not derived from Syrian art.

The theory that all Old Testament cycles of the early Christian period, whether on walls or in miniatures, descend from a single Alexandrian Septuagint model is also very doubtful. The illustrations in the Vienna Genesis, the Cotton Genesis, the Octateuchs, the Ashburnham Pentateuch, the Maximianus Chair, the sarcophagi, and on the walls of Sta. Maria Maggiore and S. Paolo, are so different in composition and type that I do not see the point of referring them all to a single source. Morey offers no evidence of the common origin and makes no attempt to account for the obvious discrepancies; nor does he show that the mural cycles depend on the manuscripts. Comparison of the two scenes of Abraham and Melchizedek in the Vienna Genesis and the mosaic of Sta. Maria Maggiore would bring out at once the difficulty of his hypothesis. The theory that the New Testament cycles comes from a Syrian model and therefore tend to be neo-Attic in style, like their archetype, is equally doubtful. It is no advance on the work of Gabriel Millet, who has patiently tried to reconstruct the divergent lines in Gospel illustration.

Morey himself avows the weakness of his position when he writes "Alexandrian" in quotation marks (although he does not do this consistently and therefore leaves it uncertain whether he has two concepts of Alexandrian art, the true Alexandrian and the putative "Alexandrian," or the native Alexandrian and the exported, diffused

5. For the text of Cosmas, see *The Christian Topography of Cosmas, an Egyptian monk*, tr. and ed. by J. W. McCrindle (Hakluyt Society, XCVIII [1897] 205).

Alexandrian), and when he tells us early in the book that the name designates a style practised throughout the Mediterranean regions; it "was really not so much Alexandrian in origin as proper to the newer frontiers of Hellenism in general" (p. 31). He is aware that, by the second century A.D., the landscape theme was widely known in the Greco-Roman world and that the so-called Hellenistic reliefs with figures in landscape settings, which Schreiber and others, including Morey, once considered typically Alexandrian, are not at all Alexandrian; he can go so far as to say now, "The so-called Hellenistic reliefs are obvious products of the neo-Attic school" (p. 22). But I do not think he has taken these admissions seriously enough, or drawn the consequences from them. When we compare his observations on the genesis of landscape types with the study published by Rostovtzeff in the *Römische Mittheilungen* in 1911, we cannot help feeling the regression in this more recent work. Where Rostovtzeff distinguished several styles of landscape of different source among the paintings of Pompeii, Morey can still say that "the originals from which the miniatures of the Paris psalter and the drawings of the Joshua Roll are descended were identical in general style with the landscapes of Pompeii, and constitute with them our best representatives of what we have described as 'Alexandrian' style" (p. 78).

It would take us beyond the scope of a review to consider in detail the arguments for the Alexandrian origin of landscape painting in late antiquity and the early Christian period. They rest largely on literary documents which indicate that landscape and illusionism were known in Alexandria, but are hardly evidences that these kinds of art originated there or were exclusive possessions of that center. If Petronius speaks of the *compendiaria* (interpreted by some scholars as a technique of rapid painting) as an Egyptian invention which was ruining the older method of painting, Libanius, some centuries later, tells us that in Antioch artists become rich by teaching how to paint rapidly *(On Professors)*. It would be easy to show from the literary sources alone that the illusionistic conception of painting was familiar throughout the Roman empire. Even the conservative Plutarch, in the first century A.D., compares the varying colors of sunlight, tempered by shadows and mists, with the painter's palette (*On the Apparent Face in the Moon*). An interval of five hundred years separates the Alexandrian illusionistic painter, Antiphilus, from the illusionis-

tic works of the early Christian period. To refer these to Alexandria, because of its presumed priority in landscape and illusionism in the third century B.C., is like explaining Monet by the art of the fourteenth or fifteenth century.

Morey's concept of the Alexandrian style is too static for the burden of historical explanation which he expects it to carry. He not only sets up an Alexandrian archetype style in the pre-Christian period, the copying of which determines the character of works of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. and even of the eighth, but he assumes that the style was being practised in Alexandria with little change all through this long period, even though, by his own admission, no works of this kind have been found in the Egyptian region. This is a surprising assumption, when we reflect that the period between 100 and 700 A.D. is one of intense mobility in art as well as in religion and social life, with a rich production of new forms. To justify it, Morey has to abstract from what we know about the history of Alexandria during this time, and to suppose that, down to the Arab conquest, Alexandria was a great and unique outpost of Hellenism as in the first centuries B.C. When a classical method appears in paintings in Rome around 700, he supposes that it was brought there by refugee Alexandrian artists, fleeing from the Arabs. And to suit the hypothesis of refugee classicism, he dates around 700 the Joshua Roll and the miniatures of the Paris Psalter (B. N. ms. gr. 139), which other scholars have assigned (with good reasons, I think) to the Byzantine "renaissance" of the tenth century;[6] he also attributes to the

6. He argues, for one thing, that the simple border ornament of the paintings of the psalter point to the early date, since it is so unlike the ornament within the admittedly tenth century text of the manuscript. Yet he himself observes, in his account of the pavements of Antioch (pp. 30, 31), the "persistence of certain border motifs" (the guilloche, the "running hound" scroll) for five hundred years, while the enframed images are changing in style. And in manuscripts of the ninth and tenth centuries in the West, with which Morey is fully acquainted, the artists often repeat the border ornament of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D., although the ornament in the text (initials and frontispieces) is new.

One of his arguments for an intrusive (hence Alexandrian) source of the paintings of the Joshua Roll and the Paris Psalter around 700 (rather than the accepted production in Constantinople in the tenth century) is that their style "is out of tune with the great majority of Christian works of either of these periods." But then why not an intrusive source in the tenth century? I do not know whether in limiting the parallels to Christian works, he is deliberately excepting the mosaics of Damascus (*ca.* 700), which show most strikingly the persistence of landscape paint-

time of the Islamic conquests the recently discovered mosaic of Hosios David at Salonica, a work more plausibly placed around 500,[7] and certain mosaics of St. Demetrios in the same city, which are ordinarily dated before Islam. For if one accepted the common dating of these works in Salonica, which include landscape backgrounds, it would be unnecessary to assume that such elements of landscape and illusionistic style in the following centuries could only have been brought to Europe from Alexandria. Yet when we turn to Egypt itself, we find there little of the sort, at least little that justifies Morey's theory. On the contrary, since the fifth century and even earlier, the arts in Egypt show a progressive abandonment of the illusionistic methods, a tendency toward ornament, rigidity, regular coloristic patterns, and flat surface forms. The illusionistic features have more often a vestigial character, and the style as a whole cannot be adequately described in terms of such elements, although illusionism was one of its parents. Morey recognizes this tendency of Egyptian Christian art, but presents it as a local peculiarity of Upper Egypt, the Egypt of the monks and the Copts, who were antagonistic to the more Hellenized and refined Alexandrian culture. The illustrations of a work so Alexandrian in its text as the "Alexandrian World Chronicle" is said to be an example of the "primitive style of the Upper Nile" (p. 81). In this opinion he overlooks the fact that the same art is also preserved in the Delta, and that the church in Alexandria, far from being Greek, orthodox and opposed to the Coptic-monastic movement, was in the later period fiercely national, hostile to Constantinople, and violently anti-Greek.

ing as an independent genre in the Moslem world and suggest that this art had not died out in Syria (and probably Constantinople) in the seventh century. The wall-paintings of the Ommayad palace of Kuseir Amra in Transjordania (eighth century) are also an evidence of the strength of Hellenism outside of Alexandria at this time. As for the tenth century, there are more parallels then to the Joshua Roll and the Paris Psalter than Morey is willing to consider, as one can see by consulting the illustrations in Weitzmann's book on the Greek manuscripts of this period.

Still another questionable argument is his effort to derive the scene of the Anointing of David in Paris B.N. gr. 510 (later ninth century) from the miniature in the Paris Psalter. He points to the expanding perspective of the plinth in the former as a sign of its later date, although this detail is common in much older art and may be observed in the Rossano Gospels (sixth century) in Pilate's table.

7. On the date of this mosaic, see the review of the different opinions by Weigand in the *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 33 (1933) 211 ff.

Morey explains Coptic art by "the incredibly rapid degeneration of Alexandrian style when it passed to upper Egypt" (p. 79). On the other hand, he cites the finely precise and technically sure forms of old Egyptian art as the ancestors of the Coptic. I think it is necessary to distinguish more carefully than he has done between the provincial or domestic reductions of the Hellenistic styles, which may be observed throughout Egypt, as elsewhere, in varying degrees since the beginning of Greek domination, and the positive growth of new native styles parallel to the early Byzantine. But whatever our judgment of the relative value of Alexandrian and Coptic art, it should be noted that in Alexandria and nearby have been found objects which are no less "Coptic" in Morey's sense than those of Upper Egypt, and that the Maximianus chair in Ravenna, which he considers the masterpiece of sixth century Alexandrian sculpture, shows the same trend toward a coloristic surface style of deep carving, without the old illusionistic landscape forms. The material and cultural decline of Alexandria since the fourth century A.D. is too well-known to be recounted here; the book of J. G. Milne on Egypt under Roman rule gives a clear picture of the situation. It is unlikely that Alexandrian artists around 640 had preserved an illusionistic style that was purer, closer to the archetypes, than the illusionism of the artists of Constantinople and Rome. Everything speaks against it, and even if we suppose that around 700 illusionism was suddenly revived in the Byzantine world, it is improbable that Alexandrian artists were the carriers of the revival. We know what kind of works were being made in Egypt around 500 and, if we add to them the objects of high quality found elsewhere and assigned by some scholars to Egypt—the Maximianus Chair, the Cyprus treasure, the various small ivory carvings—we have to recognize that in the sixth century there was in Alexandria a strong trend away from the classic illusionistic methods and deep space. If these reappear to some extent in Byzantine art two centuries later, after an interval from which relatively few works have survived in the Greek world, we cannot conclude that they were carried by Alexandrian artists, unless we suppose that Alexandria, too, had experienced a revival of antique forms after 600. When Morey writes that "there is evidence of persistance in Alexandria of the Hellenistic forms in figure and drapery down to the Arab conquest" (p. 83), he begs the question. The criteria of the new Hellenism are not simply in the figure and

drapery types, but in landscape and illusionistic technique (as he has said apropos of the Joshua Roll and the Paris Psalter and the mosaics of Salonica), and of these he offers no Alexandrian examples in the hundred years between the mid-sixth century and the Arab victory. If one should argue that the examples have been lost, the same arguments may be given to support a theory of a local Byzantine source of the forms around 700. Moreover, the Alexandrianism of that classic figure and drapery type is doubtful; this type is compatible with Morey's conception of the neo-Attic style, and in one of the oldest Christian works in which it appears—the Abraham Pyxis in Berlin that Morey treats as an assured Alexandrian object—this figure type is relieved against a neutral "neo-Attic" ground.

It is also against a flat ground that are presented the immobilized, frontal, statuesque figures in the paintings of S. Maria Antiqua in Rome that Morey, after Miss Myrtilla Avery, attributes to the hypothetical refugee Alexandrian artists. Their Alexandrinism is no longer defined by the mobility, realism, illusionistic sketchiness and "unlimited" space which constituted the original definition of this style, but by opposite characters from which one could as readily deduce an old neo-Attic model.[8] In the mosaics of St. Demetrius in Salonica, where Morey refers the background landscape to the same band of fleeing artists, he admits that the stable, frontal figures are "Asiatic."

If we compare the compositions on the "Alexandrian" plates from Cyprus (sixth century) with those in the Paris Psalter, (according to Morey, the work of an Alexandrian artist or his pupil in Constantinople around 700), we observe that the later artist has added in certain paintings the features which are symptomatically Alexandrian for Morey, and which are lacking or undeveloped and vestigial in the Cyprus treasure: landscape background, personifications, illusionistic texture. If Morey's attributions are correct, Alexandrian art must have undergone a great change between 500 and 700; its broad tendency around 500 must have been arrested and redirected even more than the contemporary art in Constantinople, Syria and Italy. But if Alexandrian art had really the deep influence that Morey imagines,

8. This holds also for the Vatican Cosmas manuscript (gr. 699) of the ninth century, which we know was based on an original made in Egypt in the sixth century (according to Morey an example of pure Alexandrian work), yet shows no landscape or marked illusionistic detail.

and if its illusionism and classic figure types had flooded the entire Greco-Roman world in the first centuries of our era, what is the point of accounting for later examples of illusionism and classic figure types by a recurrence of this old impulse from the Egyptian center? His theory is like a theological system in which the all-powerful divinity has to intervene again and again to renew the order and laws he has given to nature. The hypothesis of an Alexandrian art as the carrier of the classicism of the seventh and eight century is a construction designed to preserve Morey's fixed dualism of the Alexandrian and the neo-Attic in the entire course of early Christian art.

So little is gained by the effort to localize the early Christian picturesque styles in Alexandria, and so much confusion is produced by forcing works into that schema of origins, that I think it would be wiser to give up the concept of a distinct and original Alexandrian style as the source of the landscapes, the illusionism, and the related traits in late classic and early Christian art. We should be none the poorer without it. We should be no less aware of the existence of the picturesque style, but instead of restricting it to one source and giving it a fixed character, we should follow its variations from century to century over a broad front and investigate more attentively the aesthetic qualities, the relations to other aspects of particular works, and its expressive and social meaning as a style.

The question may be raised whether the polarity of neo-Attic and Alexandrian is in all cases a matter of different styles in the historical and regional sense, or only of "modes" practised by the same artist or school of artists according to the content to be expressed. Just as the ancient musician might compose in the Dorian, Lydian, or Phrygian mode, or the writer and orator might employ a simple, middle, or grand style, with different vocabulary and figures of speech adapted to the subject-matter, the artists of late antiquity and the early Christian period could use the landscape or neutral background at will, according to the context, and the same painter was able to produce on the walls of Rome and Pompeii both the large figures in a traditional manner and the small sketchy compositions in a lighter, more modern vein. This deliberate duality of style may appear within a single image, as in the Dioscurides manuscript, where the formalized, symmetrical group of the Princess Juliana and the flanking personifications of her virtues are surrounded by tiny scenes of putti

engaged in various arts, like those in the wall-paintings of Pompeii. In the great mosaics of Sta. Maria Maggiore, the New Testament scenes of the arch of triumph appear more solemn, deliberated, "Byzantine," nearer to Morey's category of the Asiatic style. The contemporary Old Testament cycle of the nave, with its picturesque groups, natural backgrounds, and impressionistic details, correspond rather to his Alexandrian style and this opposition seems to confirm his correlation of the two styles with the different sources of Old and New Testament cycles in the Alexandrian Septuagint and the Asiatic manuscripts of the Gospels. Yet, if we observe the two sets of mosaics more closely, we not only see that they are parts of a single project, identical in technique and in numberless details, but we discover the sense of the divergence in several of the scenes. In the Old Testament series, the incidents of dogmatic or ceremonial content, like the Abraham and Melchizedek, show the general features of the New Testament scenes of the arch of triumph: relatively "neutral" background, stable monumental grouping, symmetry, larger and clearer compositional forms. In the Wedding of Moses, the upper scene of the ceremony, if detached from the wall, would be judged as an Asiatic work according to Morey's criteria; but the same hand has created below it a pastoral landscape of Moses as a shepherd which belongs to his picturesque mode. The panel of Moses brought to Pharaoh's daughter resembles in its solemn courtly composition the scenes of homage on the arch of triumph in the same basilica; but below it, and no doubt by the same artist, is the astonishingly Hellenistic Moses among the Wise Men, with receding architecture and free grouping like the ancient pavement mosaics of the pagan Wise Men. If the large impression of the two cycles is of a contrast of two styles, it is because the Old Testament was interpreted chiefly as history or action and the New Testament as the source of dogmas and rites; but wherever the latter were implied in the Old Testament scenes, these too were cast in the expressive mode of the New Testament subjects. A similar duality is, indeed, a feature of certain ivory consular diptychs of the sixth century, in which the large figure of the seated consul, surrounded by emblems and personifications in a rather rigid grouping, surmounts the more naturalistic and lively little scenes of the circus.

If, then, the two polar styles were also modes available to a single artist or school of artists, Morey's effort to deduce the place of origin of

works and their ancestry from isolated formal elements must be regarded with some suspicion. There is, of course, beyond these modes a less deliberated, genuinely individual and local quality of the style in the works which employ them; but this has to be discerned and judged with more refined criteria than Morey offers. The treatment of the conventional modes is affected by the taste of the moment, which may be more disposed to one or another of the modes. The grand style and the *petite manière,* practised simultaneously in France throughout the eighteenth century, were favored in different degree at different times, and the predominance of one had some effect on the character of the other; it is possible to isolate qualities of color, touch, and structure common to both, although in varying degree. In principle, we deny that the mere presence or absence of landscape or a type of garment or posture can be a sufficient ground of historical interpretation, when we know that these elements do not determine the essential core of the form and expression of individual works.

In distinguishing between the style of Asia Minor as a spaceless reproduction of old Attic types, with neutral backgrounds, and the Alexandrian style as a picturesque, mobile representation with unlimited space, I think Morey has not observed sharply enough the character of the first style, although we owe to him the most comprehensive work on the Asia Minor sarcophagi. In the sarcophagus of Sidamara, to take one example, the figures overlap their architectural borders; legs and arms, and sometimes the heads, reach across the frames, which are felt as an environment around the figures rather than as a surface boundary. That is why the common description of this background as a theatrical setting within which the figures stand and sit, is so just and could not be applied to the relief of the fifth or fourth century B.C. There is in these sarcophagi a formal kinship with the contemporary picturesque style—we sense it also in the looseness of the composition and in the many contacts of objects with the frame, and I should not be surprised if the sculptors who produced them were also capable of making illusionistic landscape reliefs when commissioned to represent historical actions or genre scenes. The so-called "neutrality" of the background is hardly a sufficient basis for grasping the character of the space in these works, no more than the "neutral" backgrounds in the portraits of Manet would permit us to speak of the absence of space as a peculiarity of the style of Manet.

Nor do I believe that one does justice to the "neo-Attic" paintings in the Vienna Genesis and the Rossano Gospels, with soft purple backgrounds and ground-lines extended beyond the outer figures, in describing them as spatially neutral or "limited." It would be no less incorrect to speak of the black grounds in certain highly impressionistic paintings in Rome and Pompeii as neo-Attic features; who would confound them with the backgrounds of Greek red-figured vase paintings or of the later paintings on untreated surfaces which are more properly called neutral? This is not merely a matter of terms, but of aesthetic characterization, in which errors may be as far-reaching in consequence as errors in describing natural phenomena.

That the style of the Asia Minor sarcophagi has an illusionistic component may be seen in their rich ornament. It is boldly cut and produces a decided coloristic play; the background between the positive forms is so deeply carved as to yield a dark hollow. This opposition of solid and hollow, in which the background disappears and the vague patterns are the consequence of the contrast of light and dark values, is closer in aesthetic principle to the means of illusionistic painting, with its sketchy flecked tones, than to the Attic tradition. Morey explains this new style of ornament by an Oriental influence, on the assumption that "color" is the Eastern means *kat' exochen;* but he is unable to point to examples of such carving in the art of the old Orient, which, on the contrary, gives to sculptured decoration a more tangible background and more definite forms. In the same way, he disregards the close connection between the use of neo-Attic figure types and the gold background. In the past, he spoke of the latter as an Oriental or Persian element, although it was unknown in old Persian art, and he has described it as another example of the opaque ground, overlooking the significance of its luminosity. Both accompaniments of the neo-Attic figures in their later phase, the deep-dark coloristic carving of the ornament and the use of the gold background, which spiritualizes and absolutizes the light of the preceding spatial backgrounds, presuppose highly developed illusionistic and spatial conceptions of the pictorial surface. Riegl had already made a brilliant analysis of these relations around 1900, in his attempt to demonstrate the larger unity of late antique and early Christian art; but although Morey sometimes uses Riegl's language, he does not seem to value these important insights of Riegl sufficiently to come to terms with them.

On the other hand, in spite of his critical attitude toward the radical champions of the theory of the Oriental origin of early Christian art, and his own persistent effort to distinguish the classical strains in this art, he is often inclined to see an Oriental influence where a little observation and comparison would confirm the native Greco-Roman source of the element. One would not suspect from his book that the frontality which he considers a typical Oriental and primitive symptom in the relief and painted figures was uncommon in the old Orient (which standardized the profile head and feet) and presupposes Greek models. I do not know on what evidence he attributes to Persian influence the strewn all-over ornament and the large animals in rinceaux in the mosaics of Antioch (p. 35), or to the Orient as a whole the new colorism and the regular processional grouping of figures in early Christian art. The strewn all-over ornament is a typical Hellenistic decoration not without illusionistic affinities, and is foreign to the repetition and closed forms of old Oriental art; the large animals playing in the rinceaux occur prior to the pavements of Antioch on the Arch of Titus in Rome, and like the rinceaux are of Hellenistic origin; the processional grouping may be traced far back into old Oriental art, but it has a continuous history in Greek and Roman art, and the tendencies toward more regular (or "rhythmical") composition are already apparent in provincial works since the first and second centuries A.D. on Roman monuments (Susa, Adam Kilissi) and acquire a more positive value and highly expressive patterns, in connection with a new secular and religious content, during the last centuries of the empire. As for the color of early Christian manuscripts and mosaics, a complex of elusive and still inadequately described qualities, it is distinct from old Oriental flat polychromy, and is a development equally new in the East and the West, which required the classic development of shading and atmospheric tonalities and the subsequent conversion of illusionistic painting within the spiritual ambience of the Byzantine empire into a more sonorous, weighty and luxurious style. So far as we know, the characteristic gold, purple, blue, and rose of early Christian coloring are foreign as a group to the art of the pre-Hellenistic Orient.

The whole problem of the Oriental factor in early Christian art deserves a more careful study than is given it in this book. No one today doubts the importance of the Eastern provinces of the Roman and Byzantine empires in forming the new art, but the nature of the

Oriental component, its relation to older Near Eastern art, the original processes which transformed the ancient native arts in the East, these are still presented too vaguely or too schematically. One wishes that Morey would say more precisely what he has in mind when he speaks of Oriental colorism and rhythm by distinguishing them from other kinds, and by pointing at least to specific Oriental works prior to the late antique and early Christian objects, so that his claims might be tested. The example he gives of the "direct penetration of Oriental style in the West, of the means and methods wherewith this penetration was accomplished" (pp. 181, 182) is puzzling. It is the Vienna manuscript gr. 847, in which a page of ornament in the Greek part of the book has been copied by a Western artist; but there is, so far as I can judge, nothing peculiarly Oriental in either the Greek or the Latin page. The difference between the provincial simplification or reduction of classic styles and the invention of more expressive, unclassical forms anticipating the art of the Middle Ages, is not clear in Morey's account. The same trait of rigidity is regarded as something positive and spiritual when assigned to Oriental influence, and as decadent when found in popular or provincial works (cf. his opinion of the paintings of the Freer book covers in Washington, works of remarkable religious expression, as specimens of "the unrivalled depths of decadence" in Upper Egypt). It is, perhaps, the degree of classicism which is the final ground of his judgment, although the significance of Christian art lies in its creation of new forms, which are described as spiritually in polar contrast to those of pagan art.

This critical engagement with Morey's ideas has gone well beyond the length of a review. I feel sure that other students who disagree with the conclusions of the book have received from it, like myself, a fresh impulse toward re-examination of the field as a whole. It is one of the few works on early Christian art which undertakes to comprehend the large historical relations of this art and, at the same time, to solve the difficult problems of detail. And for this reason it has a greater importance than one would suppose from the positions discussed. The union of theoretical breadth and minute observation of particulars is extremely rare in English writing on art. And these are the real sources of the vitality of study and the progress of insight, in spite of the defects of theory and errors of fact.

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The Reformation Refugees as an Economic Force. By Frederick A. Norwood. Chicago: The American Society of Church History, 1942. ix + 206 pp. $3.00.

Coming as it does at this particular moment, Mr. Norwood's book is something more than an interesting monograph on sixteenth-century economic and religious history. It is also a tract for *our* times. We are all currently interested in refugees and pondering how they can best be absorbed into our American life. Mr. Norwood's book provides us with what we very badly need in helping to solve this problem (since problem it unfortunately is)—an historical perspective. Mr. Norwood reminds us that the refugee problem is not new, that our European ancestors of the Reformation wrestled with much the same problem with which we are obliged and privileged to deal. He describes for us the economic friction between native and alien which is, perhaps, the inevitable counterpart of any large-scale migration, and the mistakes in judgment, the class antagonisms, the splendid Christian idealism which our ancestors, in varying degrees and in different places, displayed in solution of that friction. And finally, he calls to mind what we ought to know already, namely, that refugees are usually of immeasurable benefit to the country to which they flee for refuge. Knowledge of these facts should be of considerable help to us in seeking for a solution of our contemporary problem.

Mr. Norwood does not attempt to deal with all the refugee movements of the sixteenth century. Since he is primarily concerned with refugees "as an economic force," he limits his study to the Protestant refugees of the Calvinist persuasion. The Roman Catholics are left out, because they were for the most part ecclesiastics and, as such, of comparatively little economic importance. Just why the Anabaptists are excluded from consideration is not so clear. At any rate, the Calvinist refugees constitute a clear-cut case. They were most of them highly skilled artisans and clearly of first-rate importance for the economic development of their adopted countries. They came mainly from the Netherlands, but also from France and northern Italy—and in fantastic numbers for those days (in 1571 there were nearly 4000 refugees in Norwich alone). The main havens of refuge were, in order of importance, England, Germany, and Switzerland, i.e., the three leading Protestant countries of Europe.

The reception accorded the refugees by these countries varied accord-

ing to local economic and political conditions. In England they fared better on the whole than in Germany, owing to the protection afforded them by a strong central government and the industrial capitalists. Mr. Norwood accepts Strype's thesis that in England "the better sort" welcomed the refugees, whereas "divers of the common people and rabble" resented their presence and sometimes resorted to violence against them. The great livery companies of London and the industrialists of Norwich saw in the refugees a source of skilled labor. The small craftsmen saw in them only competition and an added threat to the already crumbling guild system. In Germany, where there was no central government worthy of the name, and where the medieval guilds were more firmly entrenched, the refugees were not so proof against native reaction. A number of German cities, notably Cologne and Frankfort, welcomed them with open arms, only to turn them out when the full force of their competition with native craftsmen began to be felt.

The shortsightedness of these German cities in so doing (Halstead in England and Zürich in Switzerland were similarly shortsighted) is revealed in the new prosperity which the *Glaubensflüchtlinge* helped to bring to those communities which permanently befriended them. On the basis of the evidence which Mr. Norwood adduces, there can be no doubt that the refugees administered a shot in the arm to the ailing industries of England, Germany, and Switzerland. They introduced new industries (e.g., silk-weaving) and new industrial techniques (e.g., improved processes in dyeing cloth) and aided in resuscitating old and languishing industries (especially the textile industries). Most important of all, they contributed enormously to the breakup of the guild system and to the reorganization of industry along "free" capitalistic lines.

The tendency of the refugees to throw their weight on the side of capitalistic enterprise Mr. Norwood attributes to three factors: (1) the comparatively liberal organization of industry in the Netherlands from which the majority of the refugees came (I feel here that Mr. Norwood should have given us a fuller treatment of the economic background in the Netherlands); (2) the conflict of the refugees with established guild systems which almost invariably sought to restrict their economic activities; and (3) the religion of the refugees. Mr. Norwood follows Max Weber in partially deriving the capitalistic spirit from the Calvinist ethic (the Calvinist conception of the "calling," man's duty to

pursue his "calling" energetically in the world *ad majorem gloriam Dei*). He points out that the Calvinist refugees were known everywhere for their religious zeal *and* economic industriousness, and he sees in these two characteristics a relationship of cause and effect. For the creation of the capitalistic spirit among the refugees, he rightly lays more stress upon the general psychological effect of Calvinist teaching than upon the teaching itself, which often tended to be anti-capitalistic.

Altogether, Mr. Norwood has done a sound job on an important subject. His conclusions are not new, but much of his material is, and his book has the added virtue of bringing within a single compass much local monographic material (particularly the publications of the Huguenot Society of London and the Deutscher Hugenotten Verein). The section on the relationship between religion and capitalism is too involved, and the book as a whole is over-organized and somewhat repetitious. Nor does the style always flow easily. But these are not major criticisms. It is to be hoped that Mr. Norwood will go farther with his study of sixteenth-century refugees.

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The Forgotten Hume: Le bon David. By ERNEST CAMPBELL MOSSNER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. xv + 251 pp. $3.00.

There are certain pregnant scenes in which an age is momentarily caught off its guard and dramatically revealed to the historian of ideas. Such was the cool discussion of immortality, reported in the *Phaedo,* which transpired on the morning of Socrates' willingly-accepted execution. And such was the curiously comparable discussion of immortality which James Boswell contrived one summer Sunday in 1776, when he visited his friend David Hume as the latter lay cheerfully dying. In this interview, as in all his relations with Hume, Boswell epitomized the religious faith of the British Enlightenment: eager to be pious despite persistent doubts, desperately attempting alternately to be convinced and to dull a pricking conscience. To Boswell, as to many of his contemporaries, Hume set a "moral enigma" (in Mossner's phrase) that outraged the most sacred religious and moral axioms of the age. He was the incredible agnostic who did not require belief in God in order to be virtuous, the ethical utilitarian who was known for generosity and

charity, the inquiring skeptic who was always amiable and even capable of true humility, the critic of the Christian clergy who counted several of the foremost Scottish churchmen among his companions and defenders; and, most shockingly, he was the unbeliever who died without fear in the conviction that death would mean annihilation rather than eternal life.

An even more striking facet of this paradox is the fact that, when Adam Smith commemorated Hume's death with a benediction for his friend (in the famous open letter to Strahan), whether knowingly or not, he closed his tribute to the outstanding infidel of his time with almost the same words that end the *Phaedo*. Plato wrote: "Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend; concerning whom I may truly say, that of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best." And Smith wrote: "Thus died our most excellent, and never-to-be-forgotten friend. . . . Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime, and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will admit" (quoted by Mossner on pp. 208-9).

Such was the riddle that Boswell and his contemporaries had to face. Was Hume really a skeptic, as he declared, and therefore secretly immoral, despite all appearances? Surely, then, there would be some evidence of blemishes upon his character; but there was none. Or was he really, as reported, a good man, and therefore secretly pious, despite his words? But surely, then, in his dying hour, which was no time for joking, he would pretend no longer. The third alternative, that fear of divine wrath was not necessary to prompt virtue, and that hope of coming blessedness was not necessary to dissolve the fear of death, was unacceptable to Boswell, and inconceivable to Johnson. Boswell wavered between the two alternatives, and agonized; Johnson, though his intellect felt the force of the challenge, would not permit himself to be disturbed, and took refuge in blustering dogmatism whenever the name of Hume came up.

This miniature of the impact of Hume's personality upon his age forms the most vivid, and the most significant, part of Mossner's book. His treatment (in Part IV) of Hume's relation to Boswell and Johnson is penetrating and just, and contains valuable insights into the significance of this relation for the eighteenth century current of ideas. Mossner's theme, in this part, is that Hume and Johnson, in their contrasting

characters, in their opposing championship of Scottish and English letters, in their different sources of morality and truth, represent two divergent, and, in part, complementary, tendencies of the British eighteenth century spirit: the cosmopolitan Enquirer and the insular lay Consoler. He pictures the bewildered Boswell, symbolically enough, flitting back and forth between them, split in loyalty, putting his questions, mulling the answers. But beneath this opposition Mossner discerns also a common skepticism: in the one, mature and systematic; in the other, suppressed and sporadically disturbing. And he concludes that "in Johnson's religious skepticism, subdued but never extinguished, lies the secret of his consuming hatred of Hume" (p. 206).

Almost in spite of the author's intentions it is, after all, Hume the Inquirer who stands out most vividly in the present work. For Mossner opens with the promise to treat Hume "not as philosopher, or historian, or economist, or political scientist, or skeptic—but simply as a human being, *le bon David*" (p. xi). It is this Hume, the charming joker, the congenial friend, the temporate controversialist, the clubable fellow, the "northern Epicurus," who is "the forgotten Hume." Of course, *le bon David* has not really been forgotten, for he moves in many lights through Greig's biography; nor does Mossner in fact round out his picture according to his promise, for he says little about the detail of Hume's personal and domestic habits of life. But even if the endeavor to describe some "essential" Hume without continually referring to his philosophy and his works is doomed as inevitably as the endeavor to find a "Gyntish self" at the core of an onion, Mossner does tell, in an interesting and well-documented manner, some neglected and some slighted chapters of Hume's life. In this respect he adds a useful supplement to Greig.

Here is Hume in the role of patron of Scottish letters—his self-effacing promotion of the blind poet Blacklock, his reckless championship of John Home, his attempts to persuade his friends to read Wilkie's enormous epic, his judicious rejection of Macpherson's famous fraud. Mossner tells a fuller story than we have yet had of Hume's character-revealing controversy over population with Wallace (who does not appear in Greig's biography), a controversy which lived up to the highest standards of reasonable urbanity in argument set by the Enlightenment. He adds a few details to the eternally-perplexing Rousseau affair (though it seems to me that his account is strained to play up the benev-

olence and forebearance of Hume). (And, by the way, he reprints, as Part I, Hume's brief autobiography, *My Own Life*.) In all these sketches Mossner does succeed in making real the Hume who wrote and meant the words (which might have formed a motto for this book): "Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man."

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A Prophet and a Pilgrim: Being the Incredible History of Thomas Lake Harris and Laurence Oliphant; their Sexual Mysticisms and Utopian Communities amply Documented to Confound the Skeptic. By HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER and GEORGE LAWTON. (No. 11 of Columbia Studies in American Culture). New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 589 pp. $5.00.

The "prophet," Thomas Lake Harris, born in 1823, was an almost exact contemporary of Mary Baker Eddy, and younger by a generation than Joseph Smith and Ralph Waldo Emerson. His symptomatic career may be charted: In the transcendental and millenial 1840's, Harris turned from his evangelical Protestant rearing to become a liberal (Universalist) minister; in 1847, becoming acquainted with A. J. Davis, he became a spiritualist and, a little later, a believer in the imminence of the Second Advent; a decade afterward, in 1857, Harris became an independent Swedenborgian minister and, in the same year, boldly identified himself as the revelator of the "celestial sense" of the Sacred Word, thus superseding Swedenborg, the expositor of the (humbler) "spiritual sense"; in 1859 and 1860, visiting English idealists, he was drawn into their liberal political thought, their Christian socialism; in 1861, he founded in New York State his first community (or "Use"), thus becoming what he was to remain, for forty years,—a religious dictator, the "Father" or "Primate" of a close society; in 1875, he transported himself and his favorite disciples to California; and in 1900, relinquishing communal leadership, he took up his last stand in Florida, where (though self-reported incapable of death) he died in 1906.

Harris is often spoken of as a Swedenborgian and, until nearly the end of his life, he continued to have the sympathy of such independent readers and teachers of Swedenborg as Weller and Dr. W. H. Holcombe. But his debt is terminological, motifal: technical words like *influx*,

ultimation, vastation, proprium, and *conjugial* gave basis and norm for his own vocabulary. Of Swedenborg's doctrine of the Word, Harris makes little employment: After his initial exegeses of the "celestial sense," he seems to have found it easier to produce, for his disciples, direct revelations, put out (as our authors say) "rapidly, spontaneously, and almost endlessly, with little regard to their internal coherence or their consistency with previous revelations." As for his theology, it remains inchoate. It is clear that ultimate deity is bisexual (Father-Mother, as with the Shakers and the Christian Scientists) and that subordinate deities are also bisexual (Jesus has his counterpart in Yessa); but beyond that all is uncertain. What was Harris' own cosmic status? Was he, like Swedenborg, a revelator, in whose Writings the Second Advent of the Lord was to be found, or was he that Lord in His return? Was he a prophet or God Himself veiled in flesh? The latter was apparently the view of his simpler followers; Harris himself, it is my impression, now swelled, now contracted, his claims. . .

From Swedenborg, Harris drew hints as well as words. The elder Seer had professed "internal respiration," a holding of the physical breath while, breathing spiritually, he conversed with angels; and Harris made it a spiritual test of his followers (at least in the middle period) that they should arrive at "open breathing." Swedenborg had taught that there is marriage in heaven, and that one's mate in heaven is not necessarily the same as one's earthly partner. In Harris' doctrine of "counterpartal love," however, these ideas are given vast and monstrous development, according to which one's counterpart, his true mate, is normally (like Harris' heavenly spouse, Queen Lily) in heaven; though earthly marriages are permitted, sexual relations are, except in rare instances, prohibited. The outcome is a community in which the sexual experience is practically denied but mystically hypostasized.

Concerning Harris, the most diverse testimony can be assembled from people who knew him equally well—both neighbors in New York State and California and members of his community. Even the charges (familiar in such cases) that his sexual mysticism was but cover for his own licentious practices are difficult either to accept or to refute. That he was shrewd in practical affairs is abundantly attested, and that he possessed impressive penetration into the souls of his intimates; it is further obvious that he was an eloquent speaker and a talented writer in prose and verse: his verse, which has no resemblance to the "prophetic writ-

ings" of William Blake or Christopher Smart, nor to the hypnoidal dithyrambs of Dr. Chivers, is everywhere smooth and sometimes just escapes distinction. But was he insane or not? A self-deceiver or a charlatan? A saint or a diabolist?

For answer, one is finally reduced to ethical and intuitive criteria. Unlike the founder of Christianity and Boehme and Fox and Swedenborg, Harris not only founded an ecclesiastical community but profited (in wealth and power) therefrom. His biography shows much evidence of the *libido dominandi* and none of undeniable unselfishness. His own sons (by his first and fleshly marriage) broke away from him; children generally disliked him. A commendable "economy" (in Newman's sense) and a reprehensible compromise are not always easy to distinguish; but against Harris I should bring a verdict of opportunism. He adapted himself to Spiritualists, to Swedenborgians, later (in 1883) to Masons and to Theosophists (turning off for their benefit *The Wisdom of the Adepts: Esoteric Science . . .*); in 1890, Bellamy and Gronlund led him to think the times ready for the promotion of religious socialism; writing in the following year for English consumption, he was careful to avoid exposition of counterpartal love and to make his teaching appear as Christian, specifically as Swedenborgian, as possible. The total impression made upon me by Harris' life is not that of a saint but of an ambitious man of native spiritual as well as literary talents who, partly wittingly and partly unwittingly, prostituted his vocation. Nor do I find real intellectual originality, real "revelational" quality, in Harris. He seems to me a glib eclectic all of whose ideas find abler—as well as more succinct—expression elsewhere.

The "Pilgrim" whose tale is told in alternation with Harris', is another and simpler matter. When he met Harris, Laurence Oliphant (man of the world, traveller, journalist, amateur philosopher) was a "divided soul" in search of unification. His dramatic entrance into Harris' community, his years of subordination to Harris' primatial directorship, show him (like many of Harris' followers) gaining in self-control and goodness under the imposed discipline: a parent's selfishness can make the children unselfish. When, after fourteen years, he broke away from Harris, he devoted himself, in collaboration with his most loved wife, to the causes of Palestine and of Marriage, viewed as an exalted, spiritual relation possible here and now. Oliphant was, in our authors' estimate, which I find acceptable, "a gifted man of erratic and undis-

ciplined intellect who tried to lead a Christlike life and achieve a variety of saintliness all his own."

A Prophet and a Pilgrim offers matter of much interest to a student of the "varieties of religious experience." I cannot but regret, however, that Messrs. Schneider and Lawton issued the book in its present form. Whether they found their indebtedness to surviving witnesses (adherents of Harris and of Oliphant) prohibitive of plain speaking, or whether they grew too fascinated or too oppressed by the detail of their chronicle to be able to impose an interpretative pattern upon it I do not know. They declare that their efforts have been to "remain objective and impartial," and that they have left to the reader "the neat explanations, moral judgments, and weighing of evidence." Yet they have not really adhered to this code. The treatment is inconsistent: sometimes neutral, sometimes critical. Oliphant is throughout subjected to far more interpretation and evaluation than Harris, but Harris' career by no means escapes comment: the comment is merely unsystematic. The materials of the book might, of course, have been offered as documents, as "case histories." In view of the psychological and philosophical attainments of the authors, however, I can scarcely acquit them from having failed in their responsibility to offer what they ought, better than their reader, to be able to provide: moral judgments and not "neat" or facile, but subtle and profound evaluations.

AUSTIN WARREN

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Liberal Theology: An Appraisal. Essays in Honor of Eugene William Lyman. Edited by DAVID E. ROBERTS and HENRY PITNEY VAN DUSEN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. ix + 285 pp. $2.50.

These essays in honor of a great Christian liberal make it abundantly clear that liberalism is far from being a candidate for the theological graveyard. The three chief contributions of this volume are: (1) a masterful summary by Walter Horton of the main outlines of the thought of Professor Lyman; (2) varying definitions of the liberal spirit and the tracing of that spirit in action; and (3) the thought of some outstanding liberals today—and not ten or twenty years ago!

The summary by Dr. Horton needs little comment. He traces some of the developments in Dr. Lyman's thought. He shows how he moved

from pragmatism to realism in epistemology, how he accepted a more dualistic type of evolutionary theism in metaphysics, how he became more appreciative of Church tradition and yet still finds in the historical Jesus the unsurpassable revelation of God, and has become more realistic in his view of "building" the kingdom of God on earth.

Most of the writers define liberalism in terms of the liberal spirit. Horton, however, defines liberalism in terms of the doctrine of immanentism, which may explain his attacks on it in some of his other writings. Hocking's definition is in terms of freedom to think and magnanimity, with the immediate political problem of toleration. Bewer combines freedom from narrowness with the welcoming of new ideas, and then brings in the idea of democracy. Mrs. Lyman stresses the newness of ideas and the demand for rebirth in the New Testament, but also introduces other aspects, such as the testing of truth by the appeal to history and to the facts of experience, faith in men as children of God and in God as working in the hearts of men, and hope for the future. Hardy makes the distinction between liberalism which accepts authority (Catholicism) and that which does not. Rufus Jones points out that liberalism is anti-dogmatic, free from bigotry, open to new ideas, and sets minds free, using the *Oxford Dictionary* as an authority. Cady lists six characteristics: alertness and sensitivity to contemporary modes of thought, high valuation of the human, respect for reason, exaltation of ethical values, stress on the primacy of religious experience, and finding the supreme norm in the historic personality and mind of Jesus. Montague simply makes liberalism the appeal to reason. Roberts points out liberalism's faith in philosophy, its interest in relating Christianity to culture, its open-mindedness, and its assumption of an affinity between God and man.

The carping critics could find many inconsistencies in this list, and probably even more in the application of these descriptions in the essays of this volume; but the appreciative critic would say that this list does express the heart of the liberal spirit, especially its freedom to seek truth and discard error at whatever cost, its hesitation in accepting authority without question, its complete open-mindedness and toleration, and its faith that there is a knowable relation between God and man.

When we come to the results of liberalism as exemplified in these articles, we discover again that liberalism has grown up since the days of immanentism, optimism, faith in progress, and some of the other

errors which have become catchwords among the epitaph writers. The semi-historical sketches in Part II give some background, but the permanence of the liberal spirit as part of the Christian tradition is not made as clear as it should be. Bewer is able to discover liberalism in the rugged individualism of the prophets and in their social message, and I think he is right. Mrs. Lyman discovers the essential liberalism of Jesus and stretches a point to find some in Paul and Hebrews, and then shows its appearance in the Johannine literature. Hardy succeeds in showing why Newman and Gore (and Hardy?) did not like liberalism, theologically if not psychologically. McGiffert traces some developments of New England liberalism, with especial kudos to Bushnell, and shows why some liberals became "modernists." Rufus Jones makes clear the intimate relationship between liberalism and mysticism. Van Law Cady indicates the contribution of liberalism to several of the world missionary conferences, especially "the basic liberal belief that the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is also and inevitably the Father of all men and *the source of every form of good wherever it appears*" (p. 150, italics mine). The first part of this is essential to any Christianity worthy of the name, but the second is surely part of the liberal emphasis.

Part III gives some sketches of what modern liberals believe about major theological subjects, but does not (as is claimed) provide foundations for any kind of theology. Montague's suggestion that we should sing the traditional creeds and then make up one we can say and believe literally is not a facetious one, and he believes that the "Broad Church wing of Episcopalianism" already does this. But he misses the chief point, which is that all creeds should be sung anyhow, for no creed can be taken literally by a large number of thinking people unless it is so vacuous as to have no binding power. There are conservatives and liberals within most of the major communions, and his suggestion would be more to the point if all public creeds, ancient or modern, were accepted with complete freedom of interpretation.

John M. Moore shows that liberalism has not been able to add to the possible relationships between faith and reason, and frequently has only confused or oversimplified them. The important contribution was that faith involves value-judgments, especially in relation to the incarnation. This opens the door to an empirical verification of the theistic hypothesis. David Roberts seems to deny this, believing that a

convincing theistic metaphysic cannot be independently established. The only answer, for Roberts, is to begin with the incarnation (and not as a myth or metaphysical principle), which seems to eliminate philosophy of religion from the stage.

The problem of Christology, which is considered central in the essays by Moore and Roberts, is the topic of the article by Henry P. Van Dusen. He reminds us that while Christ has satisfied the Christian soul, no interpretation has for long satisfied the Christian mind. What he has to say cannot be overlooked, but his view is strictly a moral interpretation, with little room for a real atonement. Christ is universal and unique, but there is nothing about the change in the relationship between God and history, or between man and God, that came from this uniqueness, although he points out that the fact of Jesus Christ "embraces various and successive phases of a single organic personal reality—*Jesus-Christ-in-the-life-of-the-world*" (p. 210).

The article by John Bennett on man is nicely balanced. He contrasts the emphases of liberalism with those of Augustinianism, and, with some help from Niebuhr, suggests what the Christian conception of man would be from the point of view of a critical liberalism which might be called the "central tradition" of American theology. The contrast is necessarily overdrawn, because only the extremists in both camps would deny the fundamental insights of the other position, but this sharp contrast does provide the polarity for proper focus, and this is important, because Christian anthropology frequently is the determining factor in theology.

The authority of the Scriptures, according to Henry Sloane Coffin, rests primarily in Christ. It is not the Scriptures as such, but "the Christ-like in it lays hold of them" (p. 236). The biblical revelation brings us to God, and that is its chief purpose. Furthermore, liberal Christians believe that revelation is still open, and that God "is both known and *to be known*" (p. 236). Liberals believe they have discovered something of the riches of God and that, if they remain truly liberal, more will be revealed.

As Christian liberals have become older, they have become more interested in immortality. Douglas Clyde Macintosh builds his faith in immortality upon a series of propositions which are the fruits of the life-long empirical method of at least one outstanding liberal:

> that there are eternal values; that these values are potential in and imperative for personality in general; that the eternal values are actualized in God's char-

acter and will, thus constituting the eternal life of God, but that this eternal will of God is not fully recognized in the objective world as yet; that the primary meaning of eternal life in man consists in the actualization of eternal values in human individuals; that eternal life was realized and revealed in normative fashion in Jesus Christ; that the actualization of eternal values is participation in the Divine nature, a progressive immanence of the Holy Spirit of God and at its height a Divine Incarnation; that there is a valid meaning which "eternal life" has in vital Christianity; that there is an element of essential truth in the Greek Catholic doctrine of eternal life through union with the divine humanity of Christ; and that the doctrine of eternal life thus involves, as its future aspect, the credibility, the universal potentiality and yet conditioned character of a "heavenly" existence after the death of the physical body, albeit with a progression and differences of degree of the realization of all that may be thereby made possible (pp. 241-42).

This argument can be destroyed by denying the fundamental premise that there are eternal values, but this would also destroy most forms of Christian theism, for if we start with God we are led to belief in eternal values, and if we begin with eternal values logic compels belief in God.

The final essay, by William Adams Brown, is on the recovery of the idea of the Church. He gives credit to the Anglo-Catholics for the recovery of the historic tradition and sacramentalism (although this is somewhat doubtful), but points out that liberals differ from Anglo-Catholics in their view of the exclusiveness of one channel of the Church and of the ministry. The Ecumenical Movement has made it clear "that God has more than one way of making his presence and will known to men" (p. 270). In the Church today, liberals have a real responsibility to act as ministers of reconciliation in facing the complicated issues of the future, as those who accept the task of keeping freedom, and therefore hope, alive.

This volume has the value of making a constructive appraisal of liberalism. The particular essays have the significance attaching to the men who wrote them, which is great enough. The conclusion to which the reader is drawn is that liberalism, while chastened and more realistic, is making a real contribution to the Christianity of today and tomorrow, and that even those who are not liberals should do everything in their power to encourage liberals to reassert their wisdom and strength in the days to come.

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A Digest of Christian Thinking. By CHARLES S. MACFARLAND. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1942. 192 pp. $1.50.

The title of Dr. Macfarland's latest work (the fifth in a series) is not an inappropriate one in the light of the author's avowed purpose. His aim throughout the series is "to give his readers a comprehensive view" of current theological trends "by reviewing volumes that were typical of them." The word "digest" in the title fits in well with a more or less verbatim report, which is planned to be neither critical nor constructive in the technical sense. What we have here is a succession of literary snapshots—hurried photographs of the significant thinking of some forty-odd Christian writers, some of whom are among the most influential theologians of our day. Forty-two volumes are surveyed, volumes from the pens of Roman Catholics on the one side, and liberal and neo-orthodox Protestants on the other. In the list are outstanding American theologians such as John C. Bennett, the Niebuhr brothers, Edwin Lewis, Henry Nelson Wieman, and W. Adams Brown; British theologians such as John Oman and J. S. Whale; the Catholic thinkers, Gilson and Maritain; and well-known church historians, E. F. Scott, James Moffatt, S. J. Case, and K. S. Latourette.

Dr. Macfarland confesses that his study "does not imply systematization or a discursive passing of judgment," but rather a reporting of "what the writer of the book thinks," with little and "occasional reference to his own predispositions." The reader must not be led by these remarks, however, into supposing that the author merely transcribes without evaluation. One of the most interesting aspects of this remarkable compendium (the book is less than 200 pages) is the ever-recurring personal reactions of the recorder. Yet when Dr. Macfarland evaluates, it is for the most part not an evaluation of details, not a critical judgment on specific data or specific arguments. Rather his reactions concern the worth of the study as a whole. Even these comments (usually positive and appreciative) are not strictly critical, so to speak, but intensely practical or ethical. Often they are mere bouquets thrown at the writer, now and then with a little sentimental aroma.

In reviewing Otto Piper's *Christian Interpretation of Sex,* he observes that "probably no other Biblical study of the subject equals this volume in its honesty, sympathy and its lifting of sex relations," a volume which every theological student should master "in preparation for pastoral work." Hornell Hart's *New Gateways to Creative Living* is "well fitted

for such youth as those whom the author teaches at Duke University." He calls *The Nature of the Early Church* "a remarkable and surpassing volume even for Ernest F. Scott." Commenting upon Moffatt's *Jesus Christ the Same* he notes that "Dr. Moffatt, like Professor Scott, goes far in meeting two great needs in modern thinking; correct perspective and direction." As for Professor E. W. K. Mould, "Fortunate is Elmira College in a teacher whose volume may be recommended especially for college students and pastors' youth classes." The appearance of Dr. R. B. Brandt's *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher* was a "happy omen," for this book "is by a young student writing for the Ph.D. at Yale." But the personal touch reaches its climax with Latourette's *The Great Century: A.D. 1800-1914,* "perhaps the *Magnum Opus* in Christian history"; for here the commentator "takes pride and satisfaction in the fact that these absolutely requisite studies (that is, the whole series on the expansion of Christianity) come from his alma mater."

For the most part, nevertheless, the writer has confined himself to his delimited task as reporter. In many places he has done an excellent job. His selected quotations and comments on philosophical theologians such as Gilson, Maritain, and Reinhold Niebuhr; his search for variety and aptness of materials; his spirit of balance, breadth and appreciation; and his technique of suggesting the central thought in a caption—all tend to render this "digest" a valuable theological handbook.

Some few details seem to this reviewer not to be cast in the most ideal form. These are largely a matter of arrangement or wording. Section IV, titled "Christian Thinking in Great Britain," is devoted entirely to works treating of the moral and religious aspects of the war. Perhaps a more appropriate (or at least more revealing) heading might be some such phrasing as "British Christian Thought and the War," "British Christian Thought Meets the Crisis," or "War and Peace Aims in British Christianity." Again, some would-be critical comments are naïve, ambiguous, and sometimes cryptic. He refers to H. Richard Niebuhr as among the "part-way followers of that school" (Barthian theologians). He says of Sherwood Eddy's *The Kingdom of God and the American Dream* that it is a "freehand drawing" offering "needed lessons," even "though it is out of focus at points." A charge is made of *What Is Christianity?* that "this volume out-Morrisons Morrison." Case's *Christianity in a Changing World* is especially recommended to "our younger thinkers who share a disillusion of contemporary Continental thinkers" whose

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contagion has caused American pastors to "lose their way in the mazes of history."

Almost nowhere does one get unmistakable evidence of Dr. Macfarlands own theological predilections. There are a few scattered hints, but these are inconclusive. In the final section of the book, titled "A Résumé," he does recommend that "our seminary students" avoid committing themselves "to a finished system of thought, much less to any one professor of theology. The thinking of our day calls for the open and reverent mind." He also affirms (p. 84) that he belongs to that Christian group who "class themselves as conservatively and preservatively liberal."

Perhaps the chief virtue in this book lies in the spirit and the approach of the author. Although apparently having neither thought out his personal creed in detail, nor having criticized other theologians from a clearly defined position, he has done an enormous amount of study. Years of reading, travel and reflection, and undiminished sensitivity to the cross-currents of frontier Christian thinking in Europe and America, have given Dr. Macfarland a seasoning which is rare indeed among the more active churchmen. Moreover, the simplicity and charm of his style, his lack of affectation, and his uncommon power of stating in a few sentences the central ideas of a great thinker, all serve to give to his writings a popular appeal, even in circles which are not strictly theological.

J. Neal Hughley

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Rethinking Our Christianity. By J. Neal Hughley. Philadelphia: Dorrance and Co., 1942. 242 pp. $2.00.

This volume is aptly entitled a "rethinking," for the author not only rethinks and re-expounds the ideas of his teachers at Union Theological Seminary, but in the last two chapters (written after the outbreak of war) he rethinks the earlier chapters. As a survey of contemporary theology the work is admirable—"ruthlessly critical" (to use the author's own expression for scientific theology) and constructive in aim.

The major portion of the book is devoted to three themes: (1) an examination of the weaknesses of contemporary Christianity and Christian theologies; (2) a critique of "the conservative theory of Christianity"

or orthodoxy; and (3) a critique of "liberal Christianity," including under this convenient label the positions of Channing, Bushnell, Harnack, Shailer Mathews, Ames, Fosdick, Horton, Wieman, Lyman, Hocking and others. His polemic against liberalism in general is little more than a good summary of Niebuhr and Co.'s polemic, and need not be reviewed here. It is one of the best introductions to the current controversy that I have seen. Suffice it here to call attention to Professor Hughley's own chief concern. The author over-simplifies (consciously) this third task by regarding Harnack as a representative liberal and allowing the critique of Harnack to appear as a critique of contemporary liberals. This is manifestly inadequate, since many of Harnack's basic ideas have been repudiated by many contemporary liberals. Nevertheless, Professor Hughly was wise in pinning his critique on Harnack, for by so doing he reveals what it is that he is primarily attacking. "Our" Christianity is not that of Harnack for two chief reasons: (1) It does not look back to a supposed simple and primitive religion of Jesus, nor even to "the faith of our fathers," but, facing squarely the discontinuities of history, is consciously a new, modern interpretation of Christianity.

> The Christianity of past ages not only should not be ours, but *cannot* be ours. The culture patterns which are building themselves today cannot possibly be a reproduction of the environment of our fathers. Therefore, our beliefs and aspirations must relate themselves to the thought-forms, political habits, scientific philosophies, and social ideals of modern life. This means a transformation so overwhelming that what amounts to a new religion will emerge. And this is not only desirable, but ultimately inevitable (p. 63).

(2) "Our" Christianity is not dominated by the problem of accomodating itself to science (in spite of what is said in the passage just cited), but by the task of formulating a social philosophy. Professor Hughley confesses that "among the outstanding patron saints of the author, after entering Union Theological Seminary in 1929, were Whitehead, Eddington, J. Arthur Thomson, Sir James Jeans, Millikan, Lloyd Morgan, and a host of lesser lights who brightened the road leading to the 'validity of a reconstructed theism' " (p. 149). He lost his interest in the construction of a scientific theology, not because such a construction proved impossible, but because he came to realize its irrelevance to the problem of religion. To approach theological problems as a scientist leads one on in the path of science and scholarship, but it is

quite distinct from "the religious approach" to God. The contrast between the religious attitude and the scientific attitude dominates much of the rethinking in this volume. A theology, or better, a "philosophy of Christianity" is for Professor Hughley a practical, professional, clerical concern. It is an ideology constructed for participants in "the Christian movement." The church is not a laboratory, and the church's theology is not a scientific inquiry but a platform of action.

What action? Here the author is not clear, or at least not consistent. In the earlier chapters he emphasizes the discontinuity between the secular processes of history and the Christian "movement," representing the latter in a Barthian and neo-Catholic fashion as a re-assertion of dogma, of intolerance, of the ascetic and transcendent character of Christ and of His Word. To be a Christian in this sense means to be other-worldly:

> Without this disillusionment, other-worldliness, and contempt for merely human values, our religion would cease to be a gospel of redemption. It would degenerate, as it has all too often today, into petty moralizing and a species of sophisticated amusement. . . . Life is paradoxical and hence must continue to swing between world-affirmation and world-renunciation. . . . For the sake of the Revolution and a socialized commonwealth a true Communist will give up everything. Christianity once possessed such moral dynamics, and must somehow regain it if it is to hold a commanding place in the modern world (p. 111).

Such an ideology is revolutionary socially as well as being other-wordly in its sense of values. It need not necessarily be inhuman, but it is non-human in essence and aim. In order to maintain the paradox or "healthy tension" in human life, such a Christianity hopes that theological liberalism will find itself driven logically into the humanist camp.

But in the face of the war crisis, Professor Hughley has done some quick and cogent rethinking. He maintains his aloofness from natural science, but he shows much more concern for humanitarian ethics and social science. He does not commit himself to the "mythological" theory of theology as Niebuhr and Tillich do, nor to the isolationist and pacifist types of other-worldliness. "Our" Christianity must set out by immediate and practical steps to save "Christian-democratic" civilization, formulating a coherent social philosophy and participating through "wise statesmanship" in the solution of the pressing problems of nationalism, race conflict, and social unrest.

"Our" Christianity is now definitely and practically dedicated to "building a new world order." This program seems evidently nearer the social gospel of the democratic liberals than it is either to the otherworldliness of Jesus or to the apocalyptic mythology of Niebuhr. The author is convinced, or was in September 1942, that "regardless of the course of world events in the immediate or distant future, the main contention is destined to stand" (Foreword). But what is his "main contention?" It seems to be his insistence that Christianity must be defined as a "movement" and not in terms of theological, abstract "essentials."

> It matters not what a brilliant theologian may excogitate or weave together as his idea of the "essence" of Christianity. What does matter, as always, is the existence of that movement, that way of life and society, that sect, church or party, that order of civilization, which goes by the name of "Christian."

It seems that Christianity may be a way of life and society, a sect, church, or party, an order of civilization, and still be a movement. What, then, shall we think of the following more polemical and meaningful conception of the "movement?"

> All actual churches are human, all too human, compromising the absolute ethic at every turn. If the army of returned prodigals who are now despairing of a Christian social order cast themselves too hopefully upon the church (even the "ecumenical" church) they are destined for a new and more terrible disillusionment. The church is and always will be, in large part, a victim of prevailing social ideals and standards. It is the sects, the new, adventurous fellowships and movements which provide fresh vitality for the Christian cause (pp. 223-24).

What Professor Hughley is actually and basically concerned for is the "recovery of community." He admits that "at present it is the party or state, principally the pagan state, which is creating the sense of community" (p. 187). The church type of fellowship ought to be able to exhibit "true" community better than the state. Why does it not do so "at present"? Presumably its ideology is at fault, for Professor Hughley insists that a community is judged by its ideology. And how is an ideology judged? Here the following words seem to me relevant and very true:

> Anybody who wishes may speak about science or religion or philosophy, and his opinion carries weight in so far as his experience is broad, his knowledge accurate, his insight keen, and his judgment reliable. Nobody owns "science,"

not even the scientist. And nobody has a monopoly on "religion," not even the preacher. And since any of these given realms of knowledge is so broad and represented by many diverse points of view, no individual can really speak too categorically in the name of Religion, Philosophy, or Science (p. 160).

If we are dependent ultimately or practically on broad experience, accurate knowledge, keen insight, and reliable judgment in science, philosophy, and religion, the polemic against science seems exaggerated, and the transcendence of the Gospel over human knowledge and morals seems largely rhetorical. These cataclysmic Christians are often more reasonable than their ideology would lead one to believe.

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The Historic Church and Modern Pacifism. By UMPHREY LEE. New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 249 pp. $2.00.

The object of this book is to solace consciences troubled by the belief that pacifism is the teaching of the New Testament and of the early Church, and that a compromise occurred in the days of Constantine from which the Church has never recovered. To allay qualms, the assurance is given that the New Testament has no specific ethic on political problems and leaves the door open to the use of war in the interests of justice. The early Church was not greatly concerned with the question, because the Christian community was not called upon to assume the responsibilities of political power, and in general, because of persecution, held aloof from contemporary society. The Church in Constantine's day in no sense broke with the historic tradition in introducing Christian participation in war. Ever since, the great Christian bodies have supported just wars, and pacifism has been represented only by sects, small and extreme, inclined to repudiate not only war but oaths, government, property, and marriage. The treatment is chronological, beginning with the New Testament and coming down to date.

No adequate work in this field exists, and the writer cannot properly be taken to task that, in a tract for the times, he does not usually go beyond the contributions of learned treatises. In spots he does so. The material on the attitude of the Anglican Church, and in particular of Richard Baxter, is not elsewhere available. But, by and large, the work suffers because many important books have been entirely neglected, and be-

cause the issues are not clearly defined. The thesis is that modern pacifism is not the position of the early Church, but nowhere does one find out precisely what is meant by modern pacifism. Is it the repudiation of war only, or of government as well? And what is the connection between the two? The relevance of the lengthy demonstration that the historic Church endorsed government hinges upon the answer to the foregoing questions.

The most controversial part of the book will be the one dealing with the early Church. No one denies that after Constantine the dominant churches have condoned Christian participation in war, and no one can well contend that the New Testament is conclusive on the subject. One may feel that its teaching points in this direction or in that, but one's conclusion depends less on particular texts than upon what one believes to be involved in the love of enemies. Since Christian warriors as well as Christian pacifists claim to be loving their enemies, the discussion shifts from exegesis to ethics and psychology.

But in the early Church the question is largely one of fact. Were the Christians of the second and third centuries prevailingly pacifist, or were they not? On this point Umphrey Lee adopts the stand of the Roman Catholics, who believe that the mature ethic of the Church must of necessity go back to the beginnings, and those authors in the early Church who do not present this ethic are regarded as aberrations and wherever possible are connected with heresy. Umphrey Lee has simply appropriated the viewpoint of the Catholic Eppstein, setting aside the judgment of Adolf Harnack, who regarded the decree of the Council of Arles in visiting excommunication upon a Christian soldier who threw down his arms in time of peace as a complete reversal of the previous theoretical attitude of the Church. Lee rejects the judgment of James Moffatt, who felt that military imagery was so freely used by the early Christians precisely because none would suspect them of taking it literally. Lee does not even give the evidence its full weight. He says: "Whether there were in the second century those who held that a Christian could not serve in the legions we do not know; but Celsus, the opponent of Christianity, who wrote about the end of the second century, seems to imply that there were." What Celsus says is this: "If all were to do as you Christians, there would be nothing to prevent the king being left in utter solitude and desertion, and the affairs of the earth would fall into the hands of the wildest and most lawless barbarians." Does this

only *seem to imply* that there were some Christians who would not accept military service? Does it not plainly state that there were none who would?

Of course Celsus was mistaken. There were some who did. In the very decade in which he wrote, we learn of Christians in the Thundering Legion, and there is other evidence, increasing evidence, of the presence of Christians in the army up to the time of Constantine. At the same time, there is an increasing protest against their presence, and there is not a single Christian author who justifies Christian participation in war before St. Ambrose, and there is none before the age of Constantine who condones it.

The following statement from Clement of Alexandria is commonly cited to the contrary. He advised, "If you are converted while sailing, follow the heavenly pilot; if while serving in the army, the righteous general." This passage conflicts with many condemnations of war in Clement, unless it be interpreted in the light of the canons of Hippolytus which provided that "a soldier of the civil authority must be taught not to kill men and to refuse to do so if he is commanded." But how could a man be a soldier and not kill? Because the functions of the Roman army in peace were very different from their functions in war. The army in peace time was engaged in public works and policing—there was no other police force. A Christian might share in this, but if actual bloodshed were required he must desist. Such was the practice, after Constantine, of Martin of Tours, who on conversion stayed in the army until an actual conflict was imminent, and only then refused to serve. This distinction alone makes sense of the decree of the Council of Arles that a Christian must not throw down his arms in time of peace. This has commonly been interpreted to mean that if he could not throw them down in time of peace, how much less in time of war; whereas the meaning is much more probably that he might not throw them down *in pace* but might do so *in bello*.

Apart from details, one of the most serious difficulties of the treatment all along the line is the failure to recognize distinctions. All pacifism is treated in a lump, whereas there were three main varieties in the early church: the pacifism of Tertullian, which was legalistic and eschatological; the pacifism of Origen, which was optimistic and utilitarian, to some extent vocational; the pacifism of Marcion, which was ascetic and in a measure aesthetic. Neither are the Christian theories of war differ-

entiated. There were two main types, the just war and the crusade. An acquaintance with the marvellous book of Carl Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens,* would have illuminated this whole subject.

In the modern period, the failure to use Margaret Hirst, *The Quakers in Peace and War,* is explicable only because the author, after a brief mention of George Fox, says that he is not interested in the later history of the Friends. He ought to be. No one has a right to rule "modern pacifism" out of the Christian tradition without first discovering what it has meant as practiced by that peace group which of all the peace groups has been the least aloof from society and government.

ROLAND H. BAINTON

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BOOK NOTES

Taboo: A Sociological Study. By Hutton Webster. Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1942. xii + 393 pp. $4.00.

This volume belongs to the nineteenth century. Like the author's earlier works, *Primitive Secret Societies* and *Rest Days,* it consists of an extensive collection of primitive customs strung on a meager thread of theory. It enjoys but one important advantage over the earlier collections of Frazer, Westermarck, Sumner, and Keller, and other authors of the comparative school, namely, that its cases are better, being derived in the main from the standard works of recent anthropologists rather than from the older travellers' and missionaries' accounts.

Abundant cases illustrate all of the more important types of taboos: those observed during pregnancy and at childbirth and menstruation, those segregating women from men, those relating to sexual intercourse and incest, those surrounding death, the dead, and persons touched by death, those associated with food and property, and those enveloping strange and sacred persons and things.

The author defines taboos very rigidly as "prohibitions which, when violated, produce automatically in the offender a state of ritual disability—'taboo sickness'—only relieved, when relief is possible, by a ceremony of purification" (p. viii). He distinguishes taboos from animistic prohibitions, like those of the Ten Commandments, which are ascribed to the authority of supernatural beings and punished by them. Also excluded from the category of taboos are sympathetic prohibitions based upon analogical reasoning, e.g., the couvade or "male childbed," name avoidances, and rules of abstinence observed by hunters, warriors, and travellers. This narrow definition of taboo is scarcely supported by the cases, which seem to demonstrate that animistic and sympathetic prohibitions are widely confused in the native mind with self-enforcing taboos.

Some consideration is given to the social role of taboos in the cultural history of man. The author has a tendency, however, to regard culture, in its positive as well as it negative aspects, as automatically self-perpetuating, and to pay too slight attention to the functional utility of usages and institutions to which modern anthropologists attribute their survival and perpetuation. All in all, the volume is a useful collection of cases but adds relatively little to the scientific understanding of the phenomena under consideration.

George Peter Murdock

The Yoga of the Kathopanishad. By Sri Krishna Prem. Allahabad: Ananda Publishing House [1942]. 298 pp. Rs.6.

The preface to this volume concludes with the words, "Procul este profani; Flee hence—O Academics!" It will be only fair for the reviewer at once to declare his preference for verbal scholarship, which the author here eschews.

The book is a translation, with verse by verse commentary, of the Katha Upanishad. The Sanskrit text is not given. The aim of the author is to show that the Katha is not "a compendium of Brahmanical speculations, something to be studied from a purely intellectual viewpoint," but "an exposition of the ancient Road that leads from death to immortality . . . the knowledge of which . . . is not confined to any one country or to any one religious tradition."

To support this thesis, Plato and Plotinus and Hermes are quoted; so are Swinburne, *The Secret of the Golden Flower,* the Rosicrucians, Apuleius, the Gospel According to St. John, and Madame Blavatsky. The commentary contains, among other things, a denunciation of National Socialism, a paragraph on woman's place in the modern world, several discussions of alchemical symbolism, and the statement that a century ago in England a man could be hanged for the theft of a sheep. There is also a certain amount of polemic, as useless as polemic always is; and there are two or three instances of what some Western readers might consider to be errors in taste.

Page 119 contains some interesting speculation on the meaning and origin of the Cretan double-headed axe; and several pages (247 *ff.*) on the symbolism of the world-tree repay study. (A suggested etymology of *aśvatha* from **aśva-stha* = "horse-stand" or "hitching-post" could have been quoted to support the connection of the world-tree and the world-stallion; likewise the parallel in Iggdrasil, the name both of the Old Norse world-ash and of Odin's horse.) There is also a sound discussion of *vijñāna*; (but some question remains whether *vijñāna* and *buddhi* can be equated: "discriminative knowledge," finally suggested, is good for *vijñāna; but surely not for buddhi*?). For the most part, however, the commentary is in the familiar Indian style of tortuous, repetitive, apparently endless argument. It would be interesting to talk to Sri Krishna Prem about the Upanishads; but it would be more profitable to read Śaṅkara or Madhva. One is tempted, indeed, to ask why, the job having been done well once, it should be tried again. But in that respect we are all to some degree vulnerable.

Ruthless editing would have done much good; the book would be better one fourth the size. It is marred throughout by rather inapposite and certainly unnecessary quotation. Goethe was not a mystic and should not be used to illustrate the Upanishads; Keats and Tennyson are even worse suited. Without this random citation and with much of the remainder distilled into a stronger concentration, this would be a more useful book. Nāgārjuna's one sentence (quoted on p. 124), "*Nirvāna* and *saṁsāra* are the same," is more enlightening to the Western student of Indian thought than many pages of pleasant but irrelevant English verse.

MURRAY FOWLER

Life of Muhammad. By SUFI M. R. BENGALEE. Chicago: Moslem Sunrise Press, 1942. ix + 286 pp. $2.00.

Other Ahmadiyya Moslems have written at greater length and perhaps more eruditely concerning the life of the prophet Mohammed, but none more inter-

estingly and simply than Sufi M. R. Bengalee, who has been the representative of that branch of Islam in America for the past fifteen years. Obviously not an objective treatment of the prophet, but the work of one who believes profoundly in him and desires to commend him to English and American readers, the book offers a fine opportunity for the student of Islam to get an understanding of the way Moslems regard their prophet. All of us who teach religion and seek to interpret other faiths fairly to our students ought to read more books or articles written by those who believe in and live by those faiths, and where possible to seek contact with living representatives of those faiths.

Mr. Bengalee bases his study on Mohammed on the Koran and the Traditions mainly, and is careful to document the quoted sayings in footnotes. His uncritical use of the Traditions will be objected to by objective students of Islam, but the author evidently accepts them as authentic, and that for him is enough. He uses them just as conservative Christian writers use biblical texts. The book is an excellent example of a devout Moslem's use of his sources.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

The Arabs: A Short History. By PHILIP K. HITTI. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1943. xi + 224 pp. $2.00.

This succinct account of the history of the Saracenic Empire and of the contribution of its civilization has been compiled especially for the growing number of people in the Americas, who by reason of the War situation have come to have a peculiar and personal interest in North Africa, the Near East, Persia, and Malaysia, which are predominantly Muslim countries, and connected both historically and in present sympathy with the Arab world. It will admirably serve this purpose. It is not merely a condensation of the author's larger *History of the Arabs,* for on numerous points its judgments are more sober than those of the larger work, but also its perspective is clearer.

It is really a history of the Islamic movement in the Near East, for it is based almost exclusively on Muslim sources, and the author has relatively little to say of the Jews and Christians and pagans who wrote in Arabic and were the bearers of a considerable movement of culture before Islam was born, as they have indeed continued to play no inconsiderable part in all Near Eastern affairs up to the present day. This limitation, however, is understandable, as the great majority of the people affected by all that has gone on in the periods covered by the book have been Muslims.

From this account the general reader will get a very good idea of what that Saracenic Empire was as it developed in its quite extraordinary history, and what it has contributed to knowledge and to art. It is somewhat of a pity, however, that so good a book should be disfigured by thoughtless overstatement provoked by the author's over enthusiasm. There are numerous examples of this, of which an early one on page viii may be quoted as typical. There we read: "Without Arabic numerals, without the Arabic symbol and idea of the cipher, of the zero, there would be no modern mathematics, nor any busy little ma-

chine-tool shop in the environs of a New England town." Now the Arabs did not invent these numeral signs we now use, nor did they invent the cipher, though they did pass on to the West these things after they themselves had learned them. It is a wholly unwarranted assumption that the West would never have learned these things through some other channel, if they had not happened to learn them through the Arab channel, and equally unwarranted to assume that the West would not have worked out some equally effective system on the basis of Greek mathematics, if it had not learned this particular and very convenient system through the channel of the Arabs. However, these are minor blemishes, which most instructed readers will themselves correct, in an otherwise useful and timely book.

A. J.

Jews and the Post-War World. A pamphlet series published by the Research Institute on Peace and Post-War Problems of The American Jewish Committee. New York, N. Y.:

Number One: *Jewish Emancipation: A Selection of Documents.* By RAPHAEL MAHLER. 1941. 72 pp. 20¢.

Number Two: *Jewish Emancipation under Attack.* By BERNARD DOV WEINRYB. 1942. 95 pp. 25¢.

Number Three: *Governments in Exile on Jewish Rights.* Edited by ABRAHAM G. DUKER. 1942. 64 pp. 25¢.

Number Four: *Jewish Migrations.* By EUGENE M. KULISCHER. 1943. 51 pp. 20¢.

Number Five: *Post-War Migrations.* By PAUL VAN ZEELAND. 1943. 54 pp. 20¢.

The first in this series of excellent pamphlets contains excerpts from laws in various lands emancipating Jews from medieval restrictions, largely in the last century and a half. It begins with the Declaration of the Netherlands recognizing Jews as subjects in 1657, and ends with the Balfour Declaration and Palestine Mandate. There used to be a time when Jews and non-Jews spoke more generally than they do today of Jewish emancipation in terms only of equal civil and political rights for Jews in every land. It is pertinent today, however, to include references to Palestine in a study of emancipation. The Hiter-created problem of acute homelessness and immigration restrictions in various countries, including our own, lead to more sympathetic consideration of Palestine's potentialities. Emancipation, moreover, has come to be understood, in a post-eighteenth-century democratic framework, as involving the right of groups as well as individuals to self-fulfillment and unique development.

The background of the problem is illuminated further by Abraham G. Duker's first-rate introduction to the anti-Jewish legislation assembled with notes in the second pamphlet. The laws range from the elimination of Jews from the Reich's civil service in 1933 to the Decree for the Protection of German Blood and Honor in 1938 in Danzig.

The materials in these pamphlets are the type of ground-work data upon which sympathetic and imaginative solutions must be built. They make clear the fact that that explicit and overt attention must be given to the Jewish problem in any peace settlement. Jews are unlike other minorities in being more scattered, without a mother-country for diplomatic protection, and the special object of virulent Nazi attack. The Jewish problem, in so far as it may be unique, can no more be solved by silence and glossing over than any other problem can. An international bill of rights, now seriously under consideration by the American Law Institute, would require administrative agencies for its positive enforcement and particularization according to the varied traditions and needs of different areas of the world.

BERYL HAROLD LEVY

The Christian Philosophy of History. By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. viii + 222 pp. $2.00.

The chief concern of this series of lectures is with "the religious significance of history," which means the significance of history for religion. Professor Case writes as a professional, scientific historian, who not only takes for granted that there is a single historical stream of life and that the history of anything is really but a part of the totality called "history" or "human history," but also believes that it is the primary function of the historian of religion to exhibit the interactions between religion and man's other concerns. He says in one place that "in the last analysis all history is, or ought to be, social history" (p. 63), but he makes it clear subsequently that by "social history" he means the "entire range of human activities" or "the course of civilization in its totality." His emphasis is throughout on human activities, on "real people" engaged literally in making history, and he attempts to distinguish this living, creative factor in religion from the "by-products . . . that have acquired a static existence in days gone by" (p. 169). The historian aims primarily at discovering when and how men succeed in their enterprises and when and how they fail. History is, therefore, an intensely human affair of almost infinite complexity and "unending continuity" (p. 133).

It is refreshing to read the reflections of a conscientious and mature historian who has confidence in and respect for the achievements of "scientific" history and the faith in progress. He writes:

> The modern historian, whose vision embraces the totality of apprehensible time and the entire range of human activities, has no difficulty in persuading himself that never before have so many men been capable of aesthetic appreciation, moral idealism, and spiritual striving. And the surest guaranty of progress lies in the very fact that they are inspired, as never before, by a restless impulse toward still higher attainments (p. 86).

For him history is all-inclusive, and the chief object of attack in these lectures is, therefore, the revival of what he calls "historical dualism," the search for some-

thing beyond history which will give history more meaning than it has intrinsically. All intelligibility, for him, must be temporal and historical, and to look for "external" or "eternal" factors transcending history is to undermine the very foundation of secular, modern history to which he is whole-heartedly committed. God is, or rather must be, for a historian immanent in history, a strictly temporal being. The historian's point of view is expressed succinctly, and with either naïveté or irony, in Professor Case's confession that "there is mighty assurance in the fact that God is not pressed for time" (p. 216).

From this point of view the significance of history for religion turns out to be that it teaches religious men to discard "the normative view of the past," to dispel the sense of divine or last judgment in crises, and to focus their attention on their responsibilities for creating a better society.

"Man makes his own world of culture" (p. 89). Professor Case seems to believe this quite literally, conceiving man as essentially a free agent engaged voluntarily and responsibly in a creative task. History is what man does, and man has the "power to choose his course of action." I wonder how many of Professor Case's colleagues among scientific historians would share his faith (or methodology) and stress, as he does, man's moral freedom. Most historians succumb to a sense of fatality now and then, and the more they think they understand history the more they seem to see why men *had* to do what they did. Is history really as *man-made* as Professor Case believes it to be? Or is the philosophical idealist in him, possibly even the Christian idealist, too strong for his scientific conscience?

The exposition, though brief, of some of the leading "dualists" (Berdyaev, Tillich, Piper, Gerald Heard, John Macmurray, and C. H. Dodd) is especially interesting and critical, since Professor Case attempts to suggest how and why even these appeals to the trans-historical can be best understood historically, as reactions to particular conditions and problems. He tries to show that "the dialectical mind is not primarily interested in history," but in the present. Though this generalization is difficult to maintain, since even if dialectic is an unhistorical method, the dialectical minds (with the probable exception of Kierkegaard) have certainly been "interested" in history—interested in perverting it, possibly, but decidedly pre-occupied with giving historical perspectives to present issues, and not interested merely in conceiving present issues as present. Be this as it may, Professor Case obviously has a genuine historical interest and with rare acumen and persistence places historical religious interests in their own historical settings.

H. W. S.

Force and Freedom: Reflections on History. By JACOB BURCKHARDT, with an introduction by JAMES NICHOLS. New York: Pantheon Books, 1943. vi + 382 pp. $3.50.

Jacob Burckhardt was an historian of amazing clairvoyance, who in the middle years of the nineteenth century predicted the mechanization of culture, the continuous concentration of power and the militarization of the state, a

time when men would no longer believe in principles but only in saviors. An era of wars would ensue as brutal as wars always are. The artistic treasure of Europe would go up in the holocaust. Liberalism, whether of democracy or of Protestantism, would succumb, and the conservative churches alone would resist totalitarianism. Yet, although power is by nature evil and the modern state is demonic, although progress is an illusion and cycles are quite unpredictable, nevertheless, sheer barbarity may erect a structure in which power can be disciplined into strength. Burckhardt was not without hope for mankind and conceived of his own mission to be that of keeping alight the candles of culture until the restoration, and even should there be no restoration, yet every man and every age has the obligation of devotion, to bear witness to the highest. "We may all go under. I will at least seek out the interest for which I shall go under, namely the culture of Old Europe."

A man who spoke in this fashion would not well be understood by his own time. Only we are quite in a position to appropriate his meaning, and we badly need all the consolation this clear eyed seer could offer.

These essays were a series of lectures delivered at the University of Basel. The translation is a rendering into choice English, for which James Nichols is to be commended and thanked almost as much as for his introduction, which is better than the essays themselves, because they are fragmentary, whereas this preface draws upon all of Burckhardt's published works and letters, as well as upon the comments of such contemporaries as Nietsche. Nichols has painted for us a moving portrait of a profound and lonely man.

R. H. B.

The Philosophy of the Christian World Mission. By Edmund Davidson Soper. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 314 pp. $2.50.

Out of thirty years of teaching history of religion and missions Professor Soper, of Northwestern University, has produced a balanced and useful discussion of the topics which most concern those who are interested in the Christian Mission and its necessary present-day readjustment. It is addressed mainly to a church public, but should also be of value to others, as reflecting a point of view fairly central in American Protestantism.

The first two sections are historical, and summarize adequately the growth of religious universalism in the Bible and the history of the spread of Christianity. The other two depend more on the author's position, which it will probably be better here to describe than to attempt to discuss. He could best be called an open-minded Evangelical; he summarizes fairly many positions, but in time comes back to the idea that the essence of Christianity is the quality of life gained by the converted individual through contact with God in Christ. The historian notes with interest that Dr. Soper is, in the Wesleyan tradition, an Arminian—"God must save man if he is to be saved at all, but God has so made him that his co-operation is as necessary as God's grace" (p. 136; naturally, he doesn't like St. Augustine, p. 135). What he is sure of are the truths about God, Christ, and eternal life, the centrality of which in Christianity no Christian writer would deny.

From this standpoint the author first discusses "Christianity as the World Religion." His treatment of "Christianity and Non-Christian Religions" is given a more combative tone than he really intends by the way the question is put—"Why Take the Gospel to Animists—to Hindus?" and so on, finally "to Moslems—to Jews." On "The Uniqueness of Christianity" he avoids both the intransigence of Kraemer and the uncertainty of Hocking, suggesting that loyalty to one's own religion is the real basis for not being afraid to recognize the good to be found in others. The concluding section treats more detailed problems—missionary aims and methods, the relation of Christianity to totalitarianism and to national cultures, and "Missions and the Ecumenical Church." The last of these chapters is mainly a good brief sketch of the ecumenical and reunion movements. One cannot help feeling, however, that Dr. Soper accepts on the authority of others the principle that Christianity is a corporate religion; it remains peripheral in his own thinking—one cannot call him a good follower of Wesley in this. There is a concluding chapter on "The Kingdom of God," and an Appendix on "Protestant Missions in Latin America." The latter presents an apologetic which is probably that of most serious supporters of those missions; it "is not based on the charge that the Roman Catholic Church is not a Christian Church" (p. 297), but on the contention that the Evangelical witness would be needed as well, even were Roman Catholicism represented at its best.

It would be fascinating to discuss some of Dr. Soper's positions in detail. But it seems sufficient to note in this *Review* that he presents a convenient, clear statement of a position on which the actions of many are based—along with equally clear summaries of the views of other writers on the important questions with which he deals.

E. R. Hardy, Jr.

The Histomap of Religion. By John B. Sparks. New York: Rand McNally & Co., 1943. Map with Foreword. $1.00.

In his Foreword the designer of this colorful map says that it is meant to "depict the development of these several faiths in correlation with each other and with the cultural history of mankind, thus emphasizing their mutual indebtedness and general unity of purpose in spite of the widest diveristy of dogma and ritual."

So far as a graphic scheme with co-ordinated lines of time and typology can show the gradual emergence of different religious ideas and practices at different times in different places, and with varying degrees of influence and importance, this Histomap may be considered a praiseworthy undertaking. But, of course, no such schematic presentation can take the place of reasoned exposition.

Mr. Sparks has some startlingly original ideas on prehistoric chronology, for example, that the Indus Valley culture can be dated to 10,000 B.C., or that Abraham is to be connected with the Neolithic Age. Also, he has failed to show us in color that certain primitive beliefs such as fetishism, tabus, fertility cults, etc. have survived in Christianity, Judaism and Islam.

But in spite of these limitations, the Histomap will probably be of considerable use to teachers of the history of religion.

R. M.

A Basis for the Peace to Come. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 152 pp., $1.00.

Christian Bases of World Order. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943. 255 pp., $2.00.

These two successive volumes of the Merrick Lectures, for 1942 and 1943, are closely related in subject matter and general orientation. Both contain lectures presented in connection with church conferences—the first under interdenominational and the second under Methodist auspices—on the building of a durable peace. Since the authorship is multiple, a brief review must be selective in emphasis.

A striking feature of the first series, from the viewpoint of readers of this magazine, is the combination of a religious and a secular approach to problems of the peace. Nothing is more characteristic of the current social mood among religious leaders than the blurring of the line between religious and secular, between religious faith and ethical ideals of other than specifically religious origin. Thus John Foster Dulles, who thinks in a definitely Christian frame of reference, presents an able analysis of the problems of building an enduring peace based on political realism and ethical universalism which comports very well with Leo Pasvolsky's effective appeal for multilateralism in trade relations as dictated by the cold facts of recent economic history. Dr. Hu Shih's stout insistence on the role of collective power in the maintenance of peace finds support in Dr. William Paton's discussion of the role of the ecumenical Church, though the latter elaborates the supra-national character of the Christian fellowship and the importance of the discipline of power. Bishop McConnell pictures the stern realities that will confront the Church at the end of the war—widespread hunger, vast unemployment, persistent nationalism, decline in morality, the continuance of race prejudice, and an ideological battle at home against the same forces we are fighting abroad.

It is the Norwegian statesman, C. J. Hambro, who says that "while inventions and mechanical devices have been developed to a tremendous extent, there has been no moral or spiritual development among men to equal that process," and posits as an essential truth that "spiritual forces are stronger than material forces." Mr. Hambro's account of the limitations of the League and of the two great international courts, and his emphasis on the role of education in building world co-operation are illuminating and impressive.

The second volume is more heavily weighted with Christian philosophy and theology. The introductory lecture is by Vice President Wallace, who undertakes to state American democratic ideals in Christian terms. The four theological lectures by widely known scholars, Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Willis J. King, Edgar S. Brightman, and Umphrey Lee, illustrate the variety in Protestant thinking. Bishop McConnell introduces a pragmatic note into

his personalism: "Inasmuch as belief in God is not demonstration, but belief, we may just as well set ourselves to believing a God worth believing in." He deprecates both the assumption that the war "took the Lord of the universe by surprise," and the contrary assumption that God is so completely immanent in the world that all is well. God is not immanent in "evil wills." Professor Brightman, also a personalist, makes Nature immanent in God, not God immanent in Nature, for "Nature consists of personal consciousness and of nothing else." But no other person is a part of God. President Willis J. King sees man as creature, but co-operator with God, whose purposes he may delay but not ultimately thwart. He is "realistic" about man as "sinner" but rejects the traditional notion of original sin, and he cannot follow Barth all the way. President Umphrey Lee finds democracy, for the Christian, a doctrine to be held "not as self-evident, not on the basis of some theory of history, not as a hypothesis of a pragmatic philosophy, but as a corollary of their faith in God."

Under the heading, "Factors in World Order," appear the following: a scholarly lecture by Gonzalo Baez-Camargo on the race problem; an expert analysis of the basis of economic freedom by John B. Condliffe; an original discussion of land and human welfare by Bjarne Braatoy; a vigorous exposition of the politics of human welfare from the viewpoint of the new freedoms by Vera Micheles Dean; an eminent physician's analysis of the world problem of health by Dr. Charles-Edward A. Winslow; a challenging survey of the international labor situation by Carter Goodrich; and a moving appeal for a new basis of international education by Reinhold Schairer.

F. Ernest Johnson

Peace Now and Forever. By Max Molyneux. Superior, Wisconsin: Silver-Tonsberg Press, 1942. xii + 162 pp. $1.50.

The central thesis of this book is the idea that human relations must be perfected through the integration of individuals and groups, in all their functioning, into the divine order of existence. Its corollary is that peace, one of the facets of such freely responsive living, will be maintained on these terms. There is little effort to demonstrate by systematic philosophizing or other means a universe metaphysically articulated in accordance with the dynamic experiences from which the author's insight emerges. He is in no way abashed to admit that he promulgates a "modern mysticism."

Unfortunately this eminently reputable central thesis is embedded in an accumulation of continuity-destroying miscellaneous observations, side-thrusts on favorite themes, shifts of logical ground and method, and other distracting modes of supplementary thinking. Incidental tirades against productive and institutional means of advancing knowledge are unnecessarily severe and irrelevant to what appears to be the thread of discourse. Moreover, the level of expression is exceedingly and irritatingly uneven.

Howard Davis Spoerl

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Ancient Religions

The Contribution of the Near Orient to the Concept of Universal History. By James A. Montgomery. *Crozer Quarterly,* xx (1943), 98-104.

The Serapeum of Alexandria: Reported Discovery of the Site. *Religions,* No. 45 (October, 1943), 13-14.

Hesiod and Amos. By Mary E. Andrews. *Journal of Religion,* xxiii (1943), 194-205.

The Grief of Persephone. By H. J. Rose. *Harvard Theological Review,* xxxvi (1943), 247-50.

Lithuania: Land of the Gods. By E. J. Harrison. *Aryan Path,* xiv (1943), 349-57.

Oriental Religions

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